




GRID

2018

GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

NEW DISPLACEMENT BY CONFLICT AND DISASTERS IN 2017



The country names and figures are shown only when the total new displacements value exceeds 20,000.
The boundaries and the names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

WITH THANKS

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Cover photo: A girl displaced by fighting between ISIS militants and government forces in Mosul looks out of the bus window as she waits to be transferred to an IDP camp. From the series The Battle for Mosul © Tommy Trenchard, 2017

GLOBAL REPORT ON
**INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT**

MAY 2018

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FOREWORD

Some of the worst ever levels of violence and displacement were recorded in 2017, driven by political instability and conflict, complex humanitarian emergencies, failed peace agreements, urban warfare and disasters. The international humanitarian system delivered assistance and protection to more people on the move than ever. They include tens of millions displaced within their own countries.

Conflict in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen continued to force dramatic numbers of people to flee their homes. Cyclones, violent storms and floods also swept across the Caribbean and South Asia, destroying vital infrastructure and leaving millions of people homeless.

This year's GRID is published as we mark the 20th anniversary of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Two decades of investment in improving the lives of internally displaced people (IDPs) have not, however, enabled us to find solutions for the majority of them. Progress in policy development has been made, but this report clearly shows that normative aspirations must be matched with implementation and tangible progress.

There is hope, however. This report lays out our common path ahead. Internal displacement is central to the three core UN functions: ensuring peace and security, promoting sustainable development and protecting human rights. We have become better at coordinating our response to the phenomenon, but this must now be accompanied by investments in preventive action.

Our commonly agreed global sustainable development agenda provides a strong framework for us to address the drivers of future displacement risk and reduce its impact. Countries are also beginning to lead the way in achieving the collective outcomes that displaced communities so desperately need.

As the world finalises coherent approaches to supporting refugees, migrants and host communities, this report is a welcome reminder that we need to support people on the move no matter where they are. We owe this to the millions of IDPs worldwide, and we owe it to ourselves if we are to fulfil our ambition to leave no one behind in making the world a safer place for all.



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KEY FINDINGS

- | 30.6 million new internal displacements associated with conflict and disasters were recorded in 2017 across 143 countries and territories.
- | The ten worst-affected countries - China, the Philippines, Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Cuba, the United States, India, Iraq, Somalia and Ethiopia - accounted for more than a million new displacements each.
- | The number of new displacements associated with conflict and violence almost doubled, from 6.9 million in 2016 to 11.8 million in 2017. Syria, DRC and Iraq together accounted for more than half of the global figure.
- | A total of 40 million people remained internally displaced by conflict as of the end of 2017. Of the people reported as having returned, relocated or locally integrated during the year, around 8.5 million in 23 countries may not have found truly durable solutions, and could still be displaced. Counting them would bring the global total to 48.5 million people currently displaced.
- | 18.8 million new internal displacements associated with disasters were recorded in 135 countries and territories. Weather-related hazards triggered the vast majority, with floods accounting for 8.6 million and storms 7.5 million. China, Philippines, Cuba and the United States were the worst affected.
- | The global distribution of internal displacement mirrors the patterns of previous years. Most conflict displacement took place in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Disaster displacement was prevalent in East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia and the Americas, regions with high disaster risk because of high levels of exposure and vulnerability.
- | Many displacement situations, such as the complex emergencies in DRC, Somalia and Yemen, were characterised by high levels of violence and vulnerability. New waves of violence in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, El Salvador and Somalia brought them back among the most-affected countries. Peacebuilding initiatives and ceasefires failed to prevent new displacement in Colombia, Syria and Ukraine.
- | The majority of returns took place to and in countries with active armed conflict and unresolved displacement crises. Nigeria, Somalia and Afghanistan were among the countries where many of those returning home, whether refugees or IDPs, found themselves internally displaced again.
- | Some of the highest levels of displacement associated with disasters came about as a result of tropical cyclones. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria broke several records in the Atlantic and Caribbean, and a series of typhoons in South and East Asia and Pacific displaced large numbers of people throughout the year.
- | Displacement in urban settings, particularly in Iraq and Syria, brought specific challenges in terms of humanitarian access, the delivery of basic services and heightened vulnerabilities for displaced people.

KEY MESSAGES

- | IDMC's latest estimates demonstrate a collective failure to address existing internal displacement and to reduce the risk of future displacement.
- | Since the publication of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 1998, programmes and policies to protect and assist IDPs have not been sufficient to cope with, much less reduce, the growing number of new displacements or the cumulative number of IDPs over time. A new approach is essential.
- | Beyond the need to improve humanitarian responses to these crises, more investments must be made at the national and international levels in sustainable development, peacebuilding, addressing the impacts of climate change and disaster risk reduction.
- | Failure to address long-term displacement has the potential to undermine the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and progress on other international agreements.
- | Countries facing internal displacement must drive policymaking. Over the coming years, countries will have to better account for IDPs and displacement risk, and make addressing internal displacement an integral part of development planning and governance at both the local and national level.
- | Authority and accountability should lie with the highest levels of government, combined with the devolution of resources and decision-making power to local authorities. To enable this, national capacity for monitoring, planning and implementation needs to be systematically built and maintained.
- | To make genuine progress at the national, regional and international levels, there needs to be constructive and open dialogue on internal displacement. This must be led by countries impacted by the issue, with the support of international partners, and in line with their national priorities and realities.

INTRODUCTION

On 1 January 2017, more than 1,000 people trying to enter Europe from northern Africa made headline news.¹ They tried to avoid the increasingly dangerous route across the Mediterranean by scaling a barbed-wire border fence in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in Morocco. They followed hundreds of others who had successfully stormed the same border the previous month.

The reasons behind their desperate and ultimately unsuccessful attempt were as diverse as their countries of origin, but they had at least one thing in common. Coming from as far as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Senegal and Syria, they had undertaken long and arduous journeys to reach the border fence.

Those who do so, however, are just a fraction of the people who flee instability, violence and poverty worldwide. The overwhelming majority remain within the borders of their own countries.

That same New Year's Day, fighting broke out in Wadi Barada on the outskirts of Damascus, displacing more than 1,000 people in the course of a day. They were the first of 2.9 million new displacements in Syria in 2017.² Severe flooding on the east coast of Malaysia displaced 15,000 people in the first three days of the new year. Floods and mudslides would trigger more than 80,000 new displacements in the country, but these represented less than one per cent of the 8.6 million people displaced by sudden-onset disasters in the East Asia and Pacific region during the year.³

More than 13,000 people fled fighting in the Iraqi city of Mosul in the first week of 2017, with around 4,000 people displaced on 2 January alone. These were just a precursor to 1.3 million new displacements associated with conflict in Iraq during the year. By the end of 2017, 30.6 million people had been displaced in conflict and disasters worldwide, and at least 40 million people were living in displacement as of the end of the year.⁴

Internal displacement is a global phenomenon and a political, economic, humanitarian and development challenge. First and foremost, however, it is a personal experience, shaped by the conditions in which displacement takes place: whether it is driven by a disaster, war or other form of violent disruption; how long it lasts; and whether governments and host communities are willing or able to support those displaced.

2018 is an important year for displaced people worldwide. UN member states will finalise global compacts on refugees and migration, and the international community also marks the 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, a set of global principles that serve as customary or soft law for the protection of internally displaced people (IDPs).

There is, however, little to celebrate. More than 30.6 million new displacements associated with conflict and disasters in a single year is not a sign of success by any measure; nor is the persistence of new displacements in the last decade (see figure 1, p.2). Progress in the development of normative frameworks and policies has not been matched by implementation and adequate investment in preventing and ending displacement.

The international humanitarian system has evolved its capacity to support people in need considerably over the last 20 years. Since the publication of the Guiding Principles in 1998, a range of UN agencies have developed programmes to protect and assist IDPs, and there have been repeated efforts to improve coordination within the UN system. Particularly since the introduction of the cluster system in 2004 and its subsequent revisions, humanitarian responses to internal displacement have been more structured and strategic, and better coordinated, targeted and funded.⁵

At the national level, countries have worked to improve their response capacities and their collaboration with international organisations and agencies to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Plenty of obstacles and lessons to be learned remain, but the growing importance that internal displacement has assumed within the international humanitarian community should be recognised.⁶


As we set out in this report, however, progress has not been sufficient to cope with, and much less reduce the growing number of new displacements or the cumulative number of IDPs over time. Our figures illustrate a failure to achieve durable solutions for those already displaced and to reduce the risk of future displacement. The implication is that beyond the ongoing efforts to improve humanitarian responses, more needs to

be done to tackle the drivers of risk that lead ever-increasing numbers of people to flee their homes.

This year's Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) puts these issues in the spotlight and explores why so many countries still struggle with internal displacement despite more than 20 years of international, regional and national policy efforts and investments. We propose a way forward in which affected countries lead efforts to address the phenomenon as part of their national economic, security and development agendas, and we highlight three areas in which political leadership and institutional investments are needed to bring about vital change at the national, regional and global level.

First, existing displacement and future risk need to be better understood through comprehensive assessments of their scale and nature. Complex and interdependent risk drivers, including poverty and inequality, political instability and state fragility, water stress and food insecurity, climate change and environmental degradation, unsustainable development and poor urban planning combine in different ways in different countries to increase people's exposure and vulnerability to displacement. A solid evidence base is vital to make the case for the significant investments that will be required in future action to address these issues.

FIGURE 1: New displacements due to conflict and disasters (2008-2017)



Second, national capacity to deal with internal displacement and reduce future risk will need to be systematically built and maintained. This includes policy planning, implementation and follow-up at the highest levels of government, combined with the devolution of resources and decision-making to local authorities to enable them to help IDPs achieve durable solutions.

Third, internal displacement must be integrated into existing development mechanisms, particularly national development plans and poverty reduction strategies. Failure to address long-term displacement has the potential to undermine the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Greater investment in national and regional efforts to build peace, reduce disaster risk and address the impacts of climate change need also to consider displacement risk.

The capacity across line ministries and service providers to understand and address internal displacement needs to be supported in a more targeted manner. International organisations have a role to play in supporting, but not substituting national programmes, policies and investments.

GRID 2018

This year's GRID takes last year's conclusion as its starting point. GRID 2017's closing reminder of the notion of national sovereignty as responsibility is the basis for our analysis of the need for political incentives in support of a new approach to internal displacement.

Part 1, On the GRID, presents internal displacement data collected by IDMC in 2017. Beyond the number of new displacements due to conflict, disasters and development projects, this part also discusses thematic displacement headlines that occurred over the year, showing the extent and depth of internal displacement across geographies. This year, our Global Report introduces a regional breakdown, analysing data, drivers, impacts and key policies on internal displacement in different countries and regions. Each region contains thematic or country spotlights that provide more detail on specific contexts.

Part 2, Off the GRID, reflects on the 20 years since the Guiding Principles were published. It assesses progress in accounting for IDPs and developing poli-

cies and laws to protect and assist them, and shows that despite growing commitment by many countries and the humanitarian and development communities, the main drivers and triggers of displacement and the conditions that prevent durable solutions remain largely unchanged. We propose a shift from understanding internal displacement as an unforeseeable and external shock to which countries must respond, to its recognition as an inherent and contingent liability, the true scale and cost of which must be accounted for on national balance sheets and in development agendas.

Part 3, Inside the GRID, presents the main challenges we face in making the often neglected issue of internal displacement more visible. It discusses impediments to monitoring numbers, trends and risk, and the new approaches, technologies and partnerships with governments and humanitarian and development organisations we are deploying to address them.

Taken as a whole, this report demonstrates unequivocally the need for renewed commitments from states and other stakeholders to address internal displacement in all its forms, prevent it from happening in the future and keep IDPs at the centre of their efforts.

PART 1

ON THE GRID

The global displacement landscape



INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN 2017

30.6 million new displacements associated with conflict and disasters were recorded in 2017 across 143 countries and territories worldwide. The ten worst-affected countries – **China, the Philippines, Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Cuba, the United States, India, Iraq, Somalia and Ethiopia** – accounted for more than a million new displacements each (see figure 2).

People were not all affected in similar ways: from those pre-emptively evacuated by their governments to avoid the impacts of disasters, to those who lost their homes to bombs and fled in a desperate attempt to save their lives, the levels of displacement severity vary hugely between and within countries.

The numbers presented in this report are the best estimates of a complex reality that requires urgent political attention. Behind the figures are human lives that are uprooted and disrupted, all too often in the most traumatic of circumstances and in many cases for months and even years.





FIGURE 3: New displacements in 2017:
Breakdown for conflict and disasters



NEW DISPLACEMENT BY CONFLICT AND DISASTERS


Thirty-nine per cent of all new displacement in 2017 was triggered by conflict and violence, and sixty-one per cent by disasters. The number associated with conflict almost doubled, from 6.9 million in 2016 to 11.8 million. **Syria**, **DRC** and **Iraq** accounted for more than half of the figure. All three countries are experiencing major humanitarian crises, and at the end of the year they were categorised as level three emergencies, the highest alert status within the UN system. While new waves of violence brought the **Central African Republic (CAR)**, **El Salvador** and **Somalia** among the ten worst-affected countries, **Yemen** dropped off this list because of insufficient data, despite remaining one of the world's largest and most severe humanitarian crisis.

*Homicides, threats, extortion and a general atmosphere of violence due to drug cartels, organised crime, or gang violence, in a situation that has not met the threshold of a non-international armed conflict.


**The use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation, such as surrounding an electoral process or during civil unrest, riots, state repression or demonstrations, in a situation that has not met the threshold of a non-international armed conflict.

***Violence perpetrated across ethnic, religious or communal lines that has not met the threshold of a non-international armed conflict. Communal, in particular inter-communal violence can overlap to a significant extent with political violence with one type of violence triggering the other.


NEW DISPLACEMENTS (CONFLICT)



18.8 million new displacements associated with disasters were also recorded in 135 countries and territories, and as in previous years those with high disaster risk in **South Asia**, **East Asia and Pacific** and **the Americas** were disproportionately affected. Weather-related hazards triggered the vast majority of all new displacements, with floods accounting for 8.6 million, and storms, mainly tropical cyclones, 7.5 million.



The scale of displacement per disaster event ranged from two people displaced by a localised storm in Namibia, to more than two million displaced by hurricane Irma in **the Caribbean**. Data for displacement associated with drought was obtained for the first time, with 1.3 million people estimated to have been affected, mainly in the **Horn of Africa**. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions triggered almost 800,000 new displacements, affecting **Mexico, Iran, Indonesia and Vanuatu** among others (see figure 3).



DISPLACEMENT HEADLINES: THE YEAR IN FOCUS

People were forced to flee in very different circumstances throughout 2017. The following events and displacement situations of the year merit our particular attention due to the sheer scale or the level of violence and insecurity involved; the way they highlight chronic vulnerability or the fact that they have been neglected internationally; their potential for regional ripple effects; and the impact they have, thereby generating future risk.

DISPLACEMENT IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

There was significant new displacement in 2017 in countries in the throes of complex and long-term humanitarian emergencies. Complex emergencies are crises caused by extensive internal or external conflict and are often characterized by a complete or partial breakdown of authority, displacement of populations and widespread damage to societies and economies which necessitate large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance.⁷ Moreover, these contexts often pose significant security threats to relief workers, further amplifying the already high needs. In 2017, the situation in some countries plumbed new depths, especially in **DRC, Yemen, Somalia and South Sudan**.

On 20 October, the UN declared the crisis in **DRC** a level-three emergency (L3), the highest alert level in the international humanitarian system, and called on the humanitarian community to scale up its response.⁸ The number of new displacements recorded for DRC in 2017 reached an all-time high for the country and represents more than twice that reported for 2016. The increase was driven by the outbreak of fighting in the Kasai region and Tanganyika province in addition to protracted conflict in North and South Kivu provinces.⁹

DRC's crisis involves political gridlock, violence between militias and government forces, inter-communal clashes, cholera outbreaks, chronic food insecurity, low levels of school enrolment and severely restricted humanitarian access. Despite the UN's level-three declaration and the

fact that the country had the second-highest number of new displacements worldwide in 2017, the crisis was one of the world's most underfunded (see spotlight, p.20).¹⁰

A level-three emergency was also declared in **Yemen** as far back as 2015, and the situation has deteriorated significantly since.¹¹ UNHCR described the situation in 2017 as the world's largest humanitarian crisis, with 21 million people affected, about 76 per cent of the total population.¹² The number of new displacements recorded in Yemen in 2017 is not as high as that recorded in other countries suffering from conflict and violence. However, lack of access, the invisibility of IDPs moving to urban areas, the no-camp policy and prevalent dynamics of families fleeing and returning once violence subsides means this number does not paint the full picture.

Saudi-led blockades on air and sea ports deprived the population of much needed medical supplies, food, fuel and aid throughout the year, leaving two-thirds of Yemenis, about 17 million people, severely food insecure and 8.4 million of these on the verge of famine.¹³ The shortage of medicines and widespread lack of access to safe water has also been blamed for the rapid spread of cholera, an otherwise preventable disease (see spotlight, p.26).¹⁴

There was also a sharp increase in the number of IDPs in **Somalia**, more than three times the figure for 2016. This has put additional strain on camp infrastructure, and restricted humanitarian access in the southern and central parts of the country led to a further deterioration of conditions for vulnerable populations.¹⁵ Drought and consequent loss of livelihoods was a major driver of displacement and exacerbated ongoing conflict in the country. Levels of acute malnutrition have spiked across the country and the threat of famine is expected to increase.

Conflict also continued to drive extreme food insecurity throughout **South Sudan**, causing significant new displacements in 2017. It also prevented people from pursuing their agricultural livelihoods.¹⁶ Famine condi-

tions in the first half of the year and the dire food security situation more broadly have also been blamed for the high prevalence of gender-based violence.¹⁷

The country also experienced its most protracted and widespread cholera outbreak in recent history, a cause for particular concern in densely populated areas such as displacement camps, where the transmission rate was high.¹⁸ Humanitarians providing life-saving aid to IDPs and host communities were attacked, their convoys looted and their access denied by both authorities and non-state groups.¹⁹

DISPLACEMENT IN A YEAR OF CYCLONES

Cyclones displaced millions of people around the world in 2017. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria broke several records in **the Atlantic and Caribbean**. A series of typhoons in South and East Asia and Pacific displaced large numbers of people (see spotlights on p.32 and p.42).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, tropical cyclone Enawo was the strongest to strike **Madagascar** since Gafilo in 2004.²⁰ South Asia, in the meantime, was hit by cyclone Mora, which displaced people in **Bangladesh, India** and **Myanmar** and affected several Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh.²¹

Our global disaster displacement risk model suggests that cyclones, and the storm surges they cause, are likely to displace an average of 2 million people in any given year in the future.²² Prospective estimates based on current levels of exposure and vulnerability are likely to be conservative, but they are still useful in informing response plans and resilience-building interventions.

Knowing that such events are likely to become more frequent and intense, it is important to reduce disaster risk, including disaster displacement risk.²³ Not only is there an urgent need to curb greenhouse gas emissions, but more efforts are also required to reduce people's vulnerability and exposure to hazards.



A house damaged by Hurricane Maria in Loma Atravesada, Dominica. Photo: IFRC/Catalina Martin-Chico, November 2017

DISPLACEMENT DESPITE CEASEFIRES

Peace processes and ceasefires do not always have the desired outcome, that of reducing violence, thus reducing the risk of further displacement and creating an environment that allows IDPs to achieve durable solutions. This was clearly demonstrated in 2017 in **CAR**, **Colombia** and **Syria**, where displacement continued despite ceasefires and peace-building efforts.

The government of **CAR** signed an “immediate ceasefire” with 13 of the country’s 14 main armed groups on 19 June, but groups that had signed the agreement killed 50 people in the town of Bria the following day.²⁴ Violence continued during the second half of the year, leading to ten times more new displacements in 2017 as compared to the previous year.

A ceasefire agreed between the **Syrian** government and opposition forces in March to end the blockade of al-Wa’ar neighbourhood in Homs province led to the forced displacement of thousands of people in three waves of evacuations.²⁵ People evacuated in the first two waves were taken to camps established in the countryside of northern Aleppo. Those in the third wave, however, were taken to temporary collective shelters in Idlib province, where they were housed until they were able to find a longer-term solution.²⁶ The population had to choose between displacement far from their homes or remaining in al-Wa’ar, where they faced the possibility of harassment and arrest by government forces (see spotlight, p.24).

The **Colombian** government signed a peace agreement in 2016 with the country’s largest guerrilla group, which has been effective in bringing the conflict to an end. Violence in areas previously controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has continued, however, and has intensified in some parts of the country.²⁷ Perpetrators include reconstituted paramilitary groups, organised crime and drug-trafficking militias and FARC dissidents fighting for the territory the guerrillas used to control.²⁸

These groups have targeted social leaders and farmers who have gradually been replacing coca plants with other crops.²⁹ At least 205 social leaders have been murdered since the peace deal was signed, 170 of them in 2017.³⁰ Large numbers of new displacements were

also recorded over the year. The ongoing violence as Colombia’s conflict morphs rather than concludes is of particular concern given an environment of impunity and lack of accountability.³¹

These examples highlight the need for more concerted efforts to ensure that peace deals are successfully implemented. Doing so means making sure their terms are favourable to all, and that compliance is more thoroughly monitored. Understanding and catering to the needs of those most affected, including IDPs, is of the utmost importance to prevent further conflict.

DISPLACEMENT IN CITIES

As in previous years, 2017 saw new displacements taking place in urban settings, bringing with them specific challenges in terms of humanitarian access, the delivery of basic services and heightened IDP vulnerabilities. Hurricanes and earthquakes in **the Americas** and conflict in **Iraq**, **Syria** and the **Philippines** tested urban response mechanisms in a new way.

Several natural hazards wreaked havoc in urban centres. In **the US**, the approach of hurricane Irma prompted the governor of Florida to ask millions of people in Miami to evacuate, and hurricane Harvey brought heavy flooding to Houston, Texas, where tens of thousands of people were displaced. Hurricane Maria hit the island of **Puerto Rico** hard, devastating its urban centres, destroying roads and communications infrastructure and displacing tens of thousands (see spotlight, p.20). A 7.1 magnitude earthquake struck central **Mexico** in September, displacing more than 100,000 people, almost 30,000 of them in Mexico City. Other quakes displaced people in the **Philippine** city of Surigao and in Tehran, **Iran**. Additionally, a landslide destroyed houses and pushed people to displacement in Freetown, **Sierra Leone**.

Given the density and exposure of urban populations, conflicts in cities have also had a devastating impact. Those in **Iraq** and **Syria** are among the most destructive of our times, disrupting public service provision and distorting urban markets and economies. Unexploded ordnances, ambushes and sniper fire add to the grave risks urban populations face, and humanitarian agencies have struggled to adapt their interventions to such complex scenarios.³² The battle for the Iraqi city of Mosul between October 2016 and June 2017 displaced a large portion of the city’s population. In Syria, the



An evacuation center in Iligan City, Philippines, only turns their electricity on during the evenings in order to save their resources. Photo: UNHCR/ Aleks Ongcal, December 2017

offensive on Raqqa that ended in October 2017 forced nearly the entire population of the city to flee. Outside the Middle East, fighting in Marawi, the **Philippines**, displaced hundreds of thousands of people between May and October 2017.

Urban IDPs are often described as invisible, because they mingle with the broader urban poor and become difficult to identify and track. Their needs are rarely met as a result, leaving them short of food, drinking water and basic services, and vulnerable to illness and disease.³³ They often seek shelter in unfinished or abandoned buildings, basements and public buildings such as schools and religious centres, which become unofficial collective shelters.

Despite the fact that urban warfare often leaves whole neighbourhoods in ruins, IDPs tend to return as soon as they are allowed to do so. Their homes, however, may have been damaged, destroyed or looted, and many are forced back into displacement because they are unable to re-establish their lives. This dynamic was

clearly visible in Mosul.³⁴ Other barriers to return include the widespread presence of landmines and unexploded ordnances, as was the case in Raqqa and Marawi. The challenges and particularities of urban displacement need further analysis. If unaddressed, forced displacement in cities can have longer term effects on urban recovery and resilience, which could increase future displacement risk.

CYCLICAL CONFLICTS, CHRONIC DISPLACEMENT

Ongoing conflict increases people's vulnerability, and with each new surge in violence and displacement, those affected become less resilient. Relapses and deteriorating conditions in a number of countries caused great concern in 2017 as the number of IDPs and other people in need of assistance spiked.

CAR has suffered decades of instability, conflict and stalled development. Violence perpetrated by the Séléka coalition of armed groups has escalated since the country's former president François Bozizé was ousted in March 2013. The political conflict has also become increasingly sectarian, leading to inter-communal violence and significant displacement. In 2016, the number of people displaced fell to 46,000, and there were hopes that a new government and its reconciliation efforts would take hold. Violence flared again in 2017, however, to levels unseen since 2013. A UN statement issued in August 2017 warned of early signs of genocide and called for more peacekeeping troops to be sent to the country.³⁵ The Security Council unanimously approved the deployment of an extra 900 peacekeepers in November, but the humanitarian response remains underfunded.³⁶

Ethiopia has faced a steady stream of displacement over the years, but it rose sharply in 2017. Drought increased competition for already scarce resources, particularly between farmers and pastoralists, and this heightened long-standing ethnic tensions both within and across

borders. Drought was also thought to have been the primary cause of displacement during the year. The number of new displacements associated with conflict also increased compared to 2016, the result of escalating confrontations between the security forces and armed groups, particularly in the Oromia and Somali regions.

In a repeat of conflict patterns, **Myanmar's** Rohingya minority bore the brunt of unprecedented violence in the western state of Rakhine in 2017. Attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on 30 police stations on 25 August prompted a fierce military crackdown and inter-communal violence that forced more than 655,000 people to flee to Bangladesh, which led to accusations of ethnic cleansing.³⁷

Rohingya IDPs also remain in camps in Rakhine itself, where they live in appalling conditions with restrictions on their movement and the risk of renewed violence. Others were trapped in remote and inaccessible locations beyond the reach of humanitarians. Renewed clashes also flared between ethnic armed groups and the military in Kachin, Shan and Chin states, triggering new displacements.³⁸

Marguerite Nguena sits in the house she occupies with her children and grandchildren in Bazanga, CAR. Photo: NRC/Alexis Huguët, August 2017



RETURNING TO DISPLACEMENT

While the world's attention is focused on refugees fleeing in search of safety, protection and opportunities abroad, many make the return journey each year back to their countries of origin. Even when returns are voluntary, however, which is by no means always the case, many refugees go back to fragile situations. Refugees unable to return to their former homes or integrate sustainably elsewhere in their country in effect become internally displaced, and face the same obstacles to durable solutions as other IDPs. Returnees may also be forced to move again if the underlying drivers of insecurity and displacement in their home country remain unaddressed.³⁹ Of the almost 2 million recorded returns in 2017, the majority took place to countries still in the midst of armed conflict and unresolved displacement crises.

Nigeria, Somalia and Afghanistan all offered insight into the plight of refugees who returned to a life of internal displacement in 2017. Serious concerns were raised about the forcible return of Nigerian refugees from Cameroon. People were trucked back to militarised displacement camps and villages in Borno state, where the Boko Haram insurgency and military operations against it are ongoing.⁴⁰ As a senior UN official in Nigeria said, "the return of refugees under the prevailing conditions ... is essentially a return to an IDP situation".⁴¹ This was thought to be the case for many of the returnees as of the end of 2017.

Somali refugees returned from Kenya, often prompted by fear of camp closures.⁴² Others returned to take advantage of the cash assistance UNHCR provides as part of its repatriation package to pay off their debts.⁴³ Many, however, were unable to return to their areas of origin and joined the ranks of the country's IDPs instead.⁴⁴ The high cost of accommodation and land in Mogadishu has pushed most of those going back to the capital into living in informal settlements, and returnees to Kismayo have joined IDPs in overcrowded camps with sub-standard housing.⁴⁵

Many returnees to **Afghanistan** have also gone back to a life of internal displacement and increased vulnerability. Large numbers of undocumented Afghans returned from Pakistan and Iran in 2017, and the voluntary nature of these movements is widely contested (see

spotlight, p.36).⁴⁶ Both returned refugees and IDPs struggle to secure safe and dignified accommodation, obtain documentation and access education and other basic services.⁴⁷

IDPs IN HARM'S WAY

Displacement as a result of conflict all too often fails to provide IDPs with the safety they seek and need, as evidenced in 2017 by attacks on displacement camps and settlements, and during evacuations.

IDPs in **Nigeria** fell victim to extreme violence perpetrated both by Boko Haram and the country's military. Boko Haram sent suicide bombers into densely populated displacement camps, and government airstrikes in January intended to target Boko Haram fighters in the north-eastern town of Rann hit settlements sheltering IDPs instead.⁴⁸ An international outcry ensued and the government expressed its regret, but despite calls for the authorities to do more to protect IDPs, Boko Haram bombings, beheadings and shootings inside displacement sites increased during the year.⁴⁹

Insecurity in IDPs' places of refuge often leaves them with little choice but to flee again. Thousands of IDPs fled from camps in Kajo-Keji in **South Sudan's** Central Equatoria province in October to escape fighting between government and opposition forces and clashes between insurgent groups. Some subsequently crossed the border into Uganda.⁵⁰ Artillery shelling near camps in **Myanmar's** Kachin state caused new displacements in January, and in **CAR** a hospital sheltering displaced people was attacked in the town of Zemio in August.⁵¹ Hundreds of IDPs also fled their camp in the **Cameroonian** city of Kolofata after suicide bombings killed scores of residents in June.⁵²

IDPs in transit also came under indiscriminate attack. A car bomb was detonated in a transfer centre in the **Syrian** town of al-Rashideen in April, killing 125 people and injuring more than 400 despite an agreement between the government and rebel groups for their evacuation.⁵³ A month earlier, 73 IDPs were killed in a similar explosion while trying to return to their homes in al-Bab city.⁵⁴

*Temporary IDP shelters
by the mountains in
Sortony, North Darfur,
Sudan. Photo: OCHA/
Amy Martin, January
2017*



NO SOLUTIONS IN SIGHT

Tackling protracted displacement should be a core priority if countries are to achieve sustainable socio-economic growth, and, for those emerging from conflict, sustained peace. The phenomenon, however, is becoming the norm.⁵⁵

A number of factors feed such chronic situations, including governments' inability or unwillingness to address underlying fragility, cycles of violence in the absence of lasting political solutions, poverty and the disruption of livelihoods caused by sudden-onset disasters and slow-onset phenomena such as drought, land degradation, desertification and coastal erosion.

In theory IDPs should be able to achieve durable solutions via return, local integration or resettlement elsewhere, but in reality, the first option is often impossible and third only available in relatively few cases.⁵⁶ Part of the problem lies with the international community's limited engagement beyond providing humanitarian

assistance and governments' failure to undertake structured development planning that helps IDPs bring their displacement to a sustainable end.⁵⁷

Haiti provides a clear example of how the unaddressed consequences of a disaster such as the 2010 earthquake have fuelled subsequent displacement associated with natural hazards. We highlighted this phenomenon in 2012, showing how its cumulative impacts increase the vulnerability of IDPs and host communities alike and fuel further cycles of displacement.⁵⁸ Since the 2010 earthquake, Haiti has been hit by at least nine significant floods and eight storms, the most intense being hurricane Sandy in 2012, hurricane Matthew in 2016 and hurricanes Maria and Irma in 2017.

Limited information about people who remain displaced long after initial humanitarian responses have ended makes it difficult to paint a comprehensive picture of protracted displacement in Haiti, but according to the UN around 2.2 million vulnerable people, or about 20 per cent of the country's population, are still in need of humanitarian assistance.⁵⁹ Help is needed to reduce

food insecurity, rein in a cholera epidemic that has claimed more than 9,700 lives, support IDPs still living in camps and people affected by recent disasters in urban areas, and improve disaster preparedness.⁶⁰

The situation in **Palestine** highlights how the failure of the parties to a conflict and the international community to resolve an entrenched political problem can drive protracted displacement. This has the world's oldest caseload of IDPs, dating back to the 1967 war. The conflict has also produced the world's oldest stock of refugees, dating back to 1948, some of whom still live in camps inside the occupied territories.

Despite the signing of a peace deal for Darfur in July 2011, millions of IDPs are still living in camps in **Sudan**. The government has tried to close displacement camps over the years, claiming they are breeding grounds for further rebellions and asking IDPs to choose between returning to their homes or resettling in urban areas. The drivers of insecurity and conflict have not, however been addressed, making sustainable returns impossible and leading to protracted displacement.


The government announced in February 2018 that it plans to turn some displacement camps in Darfur into permanent settlements, giving IDPs the option of a residential plot or returning to their homes. It remains to be seen whether the new plans are implemented, and if so whether they help Darfur's IDPs achieve durable solutions.

These are but a few examples of long-running and unresolved internal displacement crises, which in turn have created extremely vulnerable populations. Ignoring them poses a real risk to long-term stability and development in the countries concerned.


REGIONAL OVERVIEWS

The distribution of displacement across the globe in 2017 mirrored the patterns of previous years. Most conflict displacement took place in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, although there were also significant new displacements in South Asia, and East Asia and Pacific. Displacement associated with disasters, on the other hand, was prevalent in East Asia and Pacific, the Americas and South Asia.⁶¹

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE: NEW DISPLACEMENTS BY REGION



DISASTERS: NEW DISPLACEMENTS BY REGION




SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



CONFLICT 46.4%
DISASTERS 13.6%
OF THE GLOBAL
TOTAL

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST NEW DISPLACEMENT (conflict and disasters)



Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only 14 per cent of the world's population, but almost half of new conflict displacement took place in the region.⁶² There were 5.5 million new displacements associated with conflict and violence in 2017, double the figure for the previous year.

The **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)** was hardest hit, with almost 2.2 million new displacements, more than twice the number in 2016 and more than the next three worst-affected countries in the region combined. Together, **South Sudan**, **Ethiopia** and the **Central African Republic (CAR)** accounted for a total of more than 2.1 million new displacements.

The international response to the crisis in **DRC** is severely underfunded despite the UN declaration of a level-three emergency in the country and the huge number of people newly displaced, second only to Syria globally (see spotlight, p.20).⁶³ In the meantime, 857,000 new displacements were recorded in **South Sudan**, the result of food insecurity fuelled by conflict and widespread violence targeting civilians.⁶⁴ There is little or no humanitarian access to some regions and communities, making an already dire situation worse.

In addition to DRC, in Central Africa there were 539,000 new displacements in **CAR**, more than ten times the figure for 2016, and 86,000 in neighbouring **Republic of Congo**. In the Lake Chad Basin a combination of the Boko Haram insurgency and clashes over diminishing

resources led to 279,000 new displacements in **Nigeria's** North-Eastern states, 99,000 in **Cameroon's** Far North region, 40,000 in **Niger's** Diffa region and 5,800 in **Chad's** Lac region. The Basin as a whole accounted for eight per cent of new displacements associated with conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa (see spotlight, p.21).

The Horn of Africa accounted for a fifth of the region's new displacements, the result not only of conflict but also sudden and slow-onset disasters and the complex, overlapping dynamics between them.⁶⁵ In **Ethiopia**, border disputes and revenge attacks, and competition over increasingly scarce resources such as land and water in the Oromia and Somali regions triggered more than 725,000 new displacements, most of them in the last quarter of the year. Ongoing instability in **Somalia** caused by al-Shabaab attacks and food insecurity continued to drive the country's protracted conflict, triggering 388,000 new displacements.

The causes of flight in **Somalia** are closely interlinked and it is difficult to disaggregate estimates by trigger, or the event that ultimately left people with little or no choice but to flee their home. Figure 4 (p.18) shows the complexity of the situation, laying out the range of triggers that appear in the data sources.

We are able for the first time to estimate the number of new displacements associated with drought, and the figure is high, at 858,000 out of the total for the

country of 1,287,000. Included in the overall figure are new displacements associated with sudden- and slow-onset disasters and various types of conflict and violence – clan conflict, military offensives by the Somali army and the African Union’s military mission, and other conflict that mainly covers attacks by al-Shabaab and other militias against the civilian population. Also included is the inability to access healthcare, education and humanitarian assistance due to insecurity.

The complexity of the crisis in Somalia and the Horn of Africa more widely, coupled with the lack of high-quality disaggregated data on displacement and its drivers and triggers, means the number of IDPs reported for the sub-region is likely to be an underestimate.

Disasters also triggered significant displacement elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017, forcing almost 2.6 million people to flee their homes. Drought triggered most of the 434,000 displacements recorded in **Ethiopia**, cyclone Enawo displaced 247,000 people in **Madagascar**, floods 189,000 in **Niger** and cyclone Dineo most of the 170,000 in **Mozambique**. Other countries affected by disasters were **Nigeria** (122,000), **Uganda** (95,000) and **Malawi** (84,000).

This type of displacement in the region tends to involve short-term movements before people return and rebuild. Small-scale and frequent disasters go relatively unnoticed as conflict takes centre stage, but what these localised crises illustrate is that displacement is more about an endogenous problem of poverty and lack of development than the consequence of external threats posed by natural hazards. Sub-Saharan Africa’s population and urbanisation rate are predicted to


increase dramatically in the coming decades, putting more people at risk of disasters. If unaddressed, poverty, vulnerability and climate change will increase the risk of displacement.⁶⁶


The drivers of displacement in the region are a complex overlap of social, political and environmental factors, particularly slow-onset hazards such as drought, desertification, coastal erosion and land degradation. A combination of conflict and loss of livelihoods attributed to diminishing grazing land and loss of livestock, continues to cause displacement in the Horn of Africa and Sahel region.

Against this backdrop, attacks by extremist groups triggered displacement in many African countries during the year with al-Shabaab in **Somalia**, Boko Haram in **Nigeria**, **Cameroon**, **Chad** and **Niger**, and local Islamist groups in **Mali**, **Burkina Faso** and **Mozambique**. Despite some regional dimensions and ties to global jihadist movements, these insurgencies are, first and foremost, the product of local socioeconomic and political grievances in areas worst affected by slow-onset hazards. Conflict over natural resources such as precious stones and minerals in **CAR** and **DRC**, and oil in **Nigeria** and **South Sudan** have also triggered some of the worst violence and largest waves of displacement in the region.

Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa is not only a growing humanitarian crisis, but also an obstacle to the region’s development. The continent as a whole is in a unique position, however, because in 2009 it adopted a legally binding regional instrument, the Kampala Convention, which aims to reduce the number of people displaced by

FIGURE 4: Disaggregation of displacement triggers in Somalia





An internally displaced family sit in the shade of their tent, shielded from the midday sun. They have been living in Monguno village in northeast Nigeria since Boko Haram attacked their village in 2015. Photo: NRC/Michelle Delaney, October 2017

conflict and disasters and guarantees their protection. Article 10 also highlights the need to address displacement associated with development projects.⁶⁷

States have taken a range of measures to implement the convention and its provisions, which entered into force in 2012, including the development of national laws and policies on internal displacement and the establishment of structures for the coordination and monitoring of responses. Forty countries have signed the convention, and 27 have ratified it.⁶⁸ Some, such as **Sudan** and **Kenya**, have not signed, but have developed their own national laws and policies independently.⁶⁹ This reveals a widespread recognition of internal displacement as a problem, and the need to address it and reduce future risk.

Progress in domesticating and implementing the convention's provisions, however, has been modest. The reasons vary from country to country, but can be summarised as lack of capacity, failure to make the issue a political and economic priority, and unclear budget allocations at the national level. Additionally,

domestic courts have not made specific provisions to prosecute state or non-state perpetrators of crimes under the convention.⁷⁰ This major gap raises the issue of accountability and responsibility for the protection of people displaced by conflict. The situation in terms of displacement associated with disasters and development projects is even more complex, given the role of the private sector and multinational investors, and the fact that measures to mitigate growing risk have not been laid out in clear legal frameworks.

As with the Kampala Convention, however, the growing gap between words and action is concerning, and the displacement figures we present in this report show that the adoption of policies does not necessarily translate into change on the ground. The region should do more to implement existing laws and policies, and in doing so, realise its potential as a leader in addressing the impacts of internal displacement.

SPOTLIGHT

DRC

An acute L3 emergency without the funding to match

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been ravaged by conflict for decades, and there is no end to the violence in sight. The already dire humanitarian situation in the country deteriorated still further in 2017, prompting the UN to declare a level-three (L3) emergency, a designation reserved for only the most complex crises.⁷¹ As many as 2,166,000 new displacements were recorded during the year, second only to Syria, and there were about 4.5 million IDPs in the country as of the end of 2017.

The L3 designation is intended to highlight the scale of the needs involved and mobilise maximum funding and capacity to respond, but little has changed on the ground since it was declared. Nor is the designation countrywide. It applies only to the provinces of South Kivu and Tanganyika and the region of Kasai, raising the concern that funding earmarked for other provinces with acute humanitarian needs, such as North Kivu, will simply be reallocated to the L3 areas.

Doing so would have potentially serious implications. There has already been a significant reduction in the number of humanitarian organisations working in North Kivu because of funding shortages, and this despite a resurgence of mass displacement caused by renewed fighting between DRC's armed forces and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group. With as many as 1.2 million people living in displacement as of the end of the year, North Kivu accounted for about 26 per cent of the country's IDPs.

The humanitarian coordinator in Kinshasa has described DRC as "one of the world's largest, most acute and complex" humanitarian crises with "unrelenting cycles of violence, diseases, malnutrition and loss of livelihoods", and OCHA has launched its largest-ever funding appeal for the country to assist the 10.5 million people in need of aid in 2018.⁷² The importance of attracting new funds rather than diverting existing commitments has been widely stressed, and the development sector,



which has been all but absent from DRC, has been called upon to play its part in re-establishing the health and other key services, so that much-needed humanitarian funding does not have to be redirected.

DRC's IDPs have a wide range of protection needs, and children make up about 60 per cent of the country's displaced population.⁷³ The UN verified 2,334 grave violations against children in 2016, the highest number since 2012. The figure includes the recruitment of 492 children by armed groups, 82 per cent of which occurred in North Kivu.⁷⁴ NRC also reported that the education of as many as 64,000 children was at risk in the Kasai region because armed groups had occupied schools and instilled a climate of fear.⁷⁵ Children deprived of education opportunities are more likely to join armed groups.⁷⁶

Food insecurity is also at the highest level on record. About 9.9 million people in DRC are food insecure and two million children are at risk of severe acute malnutrition, accounting for 12 per cent of the global caseload.⁷⁷ More than 55,000 people contracted cholera in 2017, during an epidemic that claimed more than 1,000 lives. It is against this backdrop that OCHA has requested \$1.68 billion for DRC in 2018, but given that the 2017 appeal for \$812.5 million was only 50 per cent met, the outlook for closing the funding gap this year is bleak.⁷⁸

SPOTLIGHT

Displacement in the LAKE CHAD BASIN

An Islamist insurgency that began in Nigeria's predominantly Muslim northern state of Borno in 2009, Boko Haram, soon sparked a regional crisis that spread into neighbouring countries.⁷⁹ Eight years later, the group is still active despite concerted and often heavy-handed campaigns against it by national militaries and the Multi-national Joint Task Force set up in 2012 and made up of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.

Boko Haram's violence continued unabated in 2017, with an increase in the number of attacks recorded in Cameroon and Nigeria.⁸⁰ Counterinsurgency operations have also been stepped up. These have caused internal and cross-border displacement not only of civilians but also insurgents, effectively helping to spread the violence. This impact was felt in Cameroon in 2017, where the group's attacks also fuelled internal displacement. The conflict led to 119,000 new displacements in Cameroon, 279,000 in Nigeria, 40,000 in Niger and 5,800 in Chad. There were more than 2.2 million people living in displacement in the Lake Chad Basin as of the end of 2017.

Despite the increase in Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria, a large number of returns to the north-east of the country were recorded during the year. Nigeria, Cameroon and UNHCR also signed a tripartite agreement for the voluntary repatriation of Nigerian refugees living in Cameroon back to areas deemed safe.⁸¹ The agreement and the 1951 Refugee Convention both safeguard against forced returns, but Human Rights Watch and others have documented clear violations, such as Nigerian refugees in Cameroon being forcefully trucked back to Nigeria.⁸² UNHCR also denounced forced returns in June and called on the governments of Cameroon and Nigeria to uphold the agreement to facilitate a voluntary process in line with international standards.⁸³

There have also been waves of what the government calls spontaneous returns to north-eastern Nigeria, meaning people going back voluntarily. Instead of returning, they


have found themselves living in various forms of temporary settlements in their local government areas. The Nigerian military has also sealed off areas it deems to be active conflict zones, preventing civilians from returning. Given these circumstances, many of the movements described as returns might more accurately be defined as failed returns or secondary displacements.

Besides clear physical impediments, returnees face other significant obstacles to achieving durable solutions. Many are pastoralists, farmers and fishermen who previously relied on cross-border trade for their livelihoods, which have been severely affected by their loss of access to land and restrictions on their movement.⁸⁴ The heavy security presence in the region and constraints on activities such as fishing, which the militants are said to have infiltrated, have placed an additional burden on returnees, IDPs and their host communities.⁸⁵ People's inability to sustain their traditional livelihoods has fuelled further displacement toward camps and other areas where humanitarian assistance is available, increasing aid dependency and making durable solutions a distant prospect.

A purely military approach will not defeat Boko Haram or end the region's crisis. It is a region that has long been plagued by lack of investment in basic health and education infrastructure and widespread poverty, inequality and political marginalisation. It has also suffered prolonged droughts which, combined with the overuse of water resources, have caused Lake Chad to shrink to a fraction of its size in 50 years.⁸⁶ All of these elements have coalesced to undermine people's livelihoods, and it is in this environment that Boko Haram emerged and has come to thrive and expand. Those factors will also continue to impede the pursuit of durable solutions, leading to protracted displacement that could in turn fuel further conflict.




MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA



CONFLICT 38.1%
DISASTERS 1.3%
OF THE GLOBAL
TOTAL

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST NEW DISPLACEMENT (conflict and disasters)



The Middle East and North Africa accounted for 38 per cent of new displacements associated with conflict and violence worldwide in 2017, with almost 4.5 million recorded. New displacement in the region was concentrated in **Iraq**, **Syria** and **Yemen**, all of which the UN classified as L3 emergencies.⁸⁷ The three countries also figure among the ten with the largest stock figures globally, accounting between them for 11.4 million people living in displacement as of the end of 2017. Syria and Iraq had the first and fourth-highest figures at almost 6.8 million and 2.7 million respectively, and Yemen the sixth-highest at 2 million.

The fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) caused much of the new displacement in **Iraq** and **Syria** during the year. The battle to retake the Iraqi city of Mosul led to more than 800,000 displacements in 2017, while in Syria, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) drove ISIL out of its self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa, causing the displacement of the city's entire population of about 230,000 people.⁸⁸ Syrian government forces also retook Deir Ezzor from ISIL, causing more than 800,000 new displacements in the process.

We also estimate that there were over 1.8 million returns in Iraq in 2017, most of which to areas previously held by ISIL. People trying to return have experienced a number of significant obstacles, including unexploded ordnances, mines and booby traps, as well as complex administrative processes and new local dynamics. This

has left them unable to achieve durable solutions, meaning we still consider them internally displaced and count them as such.

Returns are also being discussed in **Syria**, both to areas previously controlled by ISIL and opposition enclaves where de-escalation zones were set up in 2017, particularly in Idlib and Daraa governorates. Unsafe conditions in the former and ongoing conflict in the latter, however, continue to displace people and prevent those returning from achieving durable solutions. Return conditions and obstacles in both countries will be important to monitor in 2018 (see spotlight, p.24).

Conflict continued to be the main trigger of displacement in **Yemen** in 2017. The launch of Operation Golden Spear by pro-government forces backed by the Saudi-led coalition and airpower led to new displacement early in the year, with at least 41,000 people fleeing the most affected coastal areas in the immediate aftermath of the operation, followed by many more. Blockades throughout the year caused severe shortages of food and basic medicines, forcing people to move in search of basic services and humanitarian assistance. They have even forced homeless, destitute and hungry IDPs to return to what may have been left of their homes in frontline areas. 160,000 new displacements were recorded in Yemen over the year, a number that should be considered an underestimate (see spotlight, p.26)⁸⁹.

More people returned in **Libya** than were displaced in 2017, but conflict between local militias in several areas of the country still led to about 29,000 new displacements. In **Palestine**, about 700 new displacements were recorded. Demolitions, forced evictions, settler violence and the illegal expansion of settlements continued to force Palestinian families from their homes in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Discriminatory laws that systematically deny Palestinians building permits and access to basic services are also an underlying driver of displacement.

The Middle East and North Africa region faces significant challenges in protecting and assisting people displaced by conflict. **Yemen** adopted a national policy on internal displacement in 2013, but the lack of government capacity and legal framework for its implementation along with the state of paralysis the government has found itself in since 2014, places responsibility for responding to the country's IDPs primarily in the hands of the international community.⁹⁰ Other countries also have policies, but they are reactive in that they are mainly a framework for land and property restitution for a specific past event, such as the pre-March 2003 Baathist era in **Iraq** and the 1975 to 1990 civil war in **Lebanon**.⁹¹ They were not designed as a foundation for the management of future displacement crises.

Despite the relatively low disaster displacement figure, the region is not spared from disaster risk. Drought, desertification, sand storms, flooding and earthquakes are the most common hazards affecting the region, some of which have put a considerable number of people to move. Rapidly growing and increasingly dense urban populations, poor urban planning and low construction standards heighten people's exposure and vulnerability to hazards.

Disasters displaced about 234,000 people across the region, 225,000 of them in **Iran**. The country is prone to seismic activity, and a series of earthquakes caused displacement throughout the year. The largest, of magnitude 7.3, struck western areas in November, reducing whole neighbourhoods to rubble and destroying almost 80 per cent of the infrastructure in the cities of Sar Pol Yahab and Ghasr Shirin.⁹² Storms and flooding also displaced as many as 21,000 people in Iran throughout the year.

The Arab League adopted an eight-year DRR strategy in 2012, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) committed to developing a risk reduction roadmap.⁹³ The Arab League's DRR strategy is one of only a few that explicitly mention the need to prioritise vulnerable groups, including IDPs. Such initiatives demonstrate political will, but many challenges remain, chief among them increasing the capacity of national bodies, clearly delineating their roles and developing standardised data collection methods to inform decision-makers.

Displacement has reached unprecedented levels in the Middle East and North Africa, and the dearth of national or regional policies or legal mechanisms tackling the phenomenon reflects a lack of political will to protect IDPs and address root causes of displacement, in particular the conflicts that plague the region. These conflicts are characterised by blatant disrespect for human rights and international humanitarian law. The international community has sometimes been complicit in, and has otherwise largely failed to address such violations. Without renewed efforts by states in the region, and the wider international community to resolve these political crises, engage in reconstruction and build stability, internal displacement will continue to grow.

SPOTLIGHT

SYRIA


No let-up in displacement despite new agreement

An end to the conflict in Syria is still nowhere in sight, but 2017 may have marked the opening of a new chapter. The government now controls more territory than it has since mid-2012, and de-escalation zones were negotiated and briefly put into operation. Despite signs of a potential improvement in the security situation, however, there were still 2.9 million new displacements in 2017, the highest figure in the world.

An initial agreement signed by Iran, Russia and Turkey in Astana, Kazakhstan, in May 2017 led to arrangements for a ceasefire and the establishment of de-escalation zones, and subsequent meetings reiterated the parties' resolve to uphold and expand it. The four zones covered by the final agreement signed in September primarily include non-government controlled areas of the southern governorates of Daraa and Quneitra, besieged pockets around Damascus and Homs, all of Idlib province and portions of Aleppo, Hama and Latakia governorates.⁹⁴ The deal envisages unhindered humanitarian access, the restoration of basic services and the cessation of ground assaults and airstrikes.⁹⁵

If upheld, this could greatly improve the lives of a large number of people, prevent further displacement and prompt a significant wave of returns. More than 2.5 million people currently live in these areas.⁹⁶ The displacement figures, however, tell a very different story. More than 130,000 new displacements were recorded in Idlib in the first half of the year, and another 150,000 in the second half, while implementation of the agreement was in full swing. In other provinces and areas covered by the deal, conditions have deteriorated severely.

The situation in eastern Ghouta, a besieged area of the Damascus suburbs, was particularly dire in the latter part of 2017. Aid workers said they had less access to the almost 400,000 civilians living there than before the de-escalation zones were agreed.⁹⁷ The already extremely high cost of basic foodstuffs skyrocketed, making it difficult for most inhabitants to afford even



one meal a day, and the proportion of children suffering from acute malnutrition shot up from 2.1 per cent in January 2017 to 11.9 per cent in early November.⁹⁸ An assessment published in December also noted that infant deaths caused by lack of food had been reported for the third consecutive month, and that some people had resorted to going days without eating since November.⁹⁹

The UN and other aid agencies compiled an evacuation list of 500 patients in need of urgent medical attention, but as of March 2018, the evacuations had not been approved and 12 people on the list had already died while the agencies stood by waiting.¹⁰⁰ The UN's special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, told a press conference in December there was "no reason whatsoever to have this medieval type of approach regarding civilians, patients, children, women, particularly if the conflict is getting close to the end, one reason more to consider this unacceptable".¹⁰¹

Against this backdrop, an unprecedented number of returns was also recorded in 2017. More than 800,000 IDPs and about 56,000 refugees were said to have made their way back to their places of origin during the year.¹⁰² The bulk of the returns have been to places still hosting high numbers of IDPs, putting added pressure on already overstretched communities. Detailed information about returnees' situations and the push and pull factors that prompted their decisions is still unavailable, however, making it impossible to draw a direct correlation between return movements and implementation of the de-escalation zones.

An internally displaced couple look after their eight grandchildren at a camp in Hasakeh, Syria. Photo: NRC, 2017



Continued displacement as an outcome of their implementation would not be unexpected. Similar dynamics were seen when so-called local ceasefires or evacuation agreements were agreed in Daraya in Rural Damascus, eastern Aleppo city, Al Waer in Homs and Four Towns in Idlib in 2016 and 2017. Russia and Iran sponsored the arrangements and the Syrian government framed them as reconciliation efforts, but in reality they involved prolonged sieges and bombardments that concluded with the displacement of the populations in question.¹⁰³

The previous arrangements differ from those of the Astana agreement, but there are fears that the establishment of the de-escalation zones will prove to be another political rather than humanitarian initiative. During the drafting of this report, the Syrian government began a full-fledged offensive in southern Idlib, northern Hama and southern Aleppo to retake key areas, leading to the displacement of as many as 385,000 people in the first quarter of 2018.¹⁰⁴

The government was also leading an unprecedented offensive to retake the besieged enclave of eastern Ghouta, which led to the displacement of at least 85,000 people within the enclave in March when the siege was partially breached.¹⁰⁵ It appears that despite new agreements, de-escalation zones and ongoing international peace efforts, heavy fighting and significant displacement are set to continue.

SPOTLIGHT

YEMEN

Insecurity and shrinking humanitarian space



Unrelenting violence and shifting insecurity propelled Yemen to several bleak milestones in 2017: 1,000 days of war, a million suspected cases of cholera, two million people displaced by conflict as of end of year and a humanitarian crisis now widely regarded as the world's most acute.¹⁰⁶

Conflict continues to be the primary driver of displacement, as a coalition led by Saudi Arabia in support of Yemen's government battles Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthi movement. Of the 3.1 million people forced to flee their homes since the violence escalated in March 2015, two million were still living in internal displacement as of the end of 2017. People have been displaced across 21 of Yemen's 22 governorates, but the overwhelming majority of IDPs come from Taiz, Hajjah, Amanat Al Asimah and Amran.

The new displacements of 160,000 over the course of the year is a relatively small figure, but it masks much larger fluctuations and dynamics in which families flee and return as violence flares and subsides. An escalation of the conflict, including sustained airstrikes and ground clashes has also hampered access to various parts of the country for humanitarians, the media, researchers and data collectors, making it impossible to get a full picture of displacement in the country.

Much displacement takes place locally, and movements across frontlines are rare. Forty-four per cent of IDPs remain within their governorate of origin.¹⁰⁷ Their main consideration when they flee is to move toward areas where they are able to access humanitarian assistance and potential livelihood opportunities, which for many means urban rather than rural areas. Family ties, security concerns and financial restrictions are also factors in deciding where to seek refuge. Movement is prohibitively expensive for most, and fraught with safety risks for all.

The situation in Taiz city illustrates this point clearly. It is an active frontline, and movement in and out of the

old city, which is home to around 600,000 people, is considered very dangerous. The frontline has moved little in the past year, but there has been significant artillery shelling and sniper fire. Movement within the old city, which is held by affiliates to the Saudi-led coalition, is also heavily controlled by checkpoints. Family, tribal and political allegiances also dictate the extent to which people are able to move in and around the area.

Fewer than 200,000 people have crossed Yemen's borders into neighbouring countries in search of protection since the conflict escalated, amounting to less than ten per cent of the overall displaced population.¹⁰⁸ The country's geography and conflict dynamics restrict the options of people trying to flee abroad, effectively trapping them between a hostile party to the north, extensive and highly insecure terrain to the east and impoverished neighbours reachable only via a perilous sea journey to the south. The country's main airport has also been closed to civilian traffic since August 2016. The fact that relatively few people have fled outside the country is likely to have played a significant role in keeping Yemen's crisis off the radar.

Blockades on the import and transport of basic supplies, including food and fuel, have led to shortages and spiralling inflation, further reducing the purchasing power of people with very few resources left. The price of the average food basket has been driven up by more than 40 per cent since the escalation of the conflict, and 8.4 million people are on the edge of starvation.¹⁰⁹ The irregular or non-payment of salaries to around 1.25 million civil servants since August 2016 has led to a breakdown in services and further economic deterioration. Fewer than 50 per cent of Yemen's health facilities were still fully functional as of the end of 2017, and 16 million people struggled to access safe water.¹¹⁰

Displaced people are among the most vulnerable to the worsening humanitarian and food security conditions.¹¹¹ Yemen's government adopted a national policy on IDPs

in June 2013 that provides a principled foundation for preventing displacement, protecting those affected and promoting durable solutions, but the breakdown in central governance since has impeded its implementation.¹¹²

Eighty per cent of the country's IDPs live in private dwellings, most commonly with family or in rented accommodation, a potentially protective factor that reflects longstanding trends and the fact that the national policy on IDPs allows for the establishment of displacement camps only as a last resort. The remaining people are accommodated in collective centres and spontaneous settlements established in repurposed schools and health facilities, religious buildings, abandoned premises and makeshift shelters. In some cases, community leaders have actively encouraged such settlements in an effort to ensure IDPs' access to humanitarian assistance and relieve pressure on struggling hosts.

Women and children constitute 75 per cent of Yemen's displaced population, and their protection concerns are particularly acute.¹¹³ Their safety, access to services and livelihoods opportunities are compromised by entrenched inequalities, which puts them at increased risk of abuse and exploitation. Despite social norms that

discourage the reporting of gender-based violence, a 36 per cent increase in access to related services was reported in 2017.¹¹⁴ Displaced children are at extremely high risk of falling out of education and many become embroiled in negative coping mechanisms such as child labour, recruitment into armed groups and child marriage. A survey conducted across three governorates with large displaced populations in late 2016 found that 45 per cent of marriages involved girls under the age of 15.¹¹⁵

As the fighting continues, Yemen has also suffered large-scale outbreaks of preventable diseases. The country hovers on the brink of famine, and 22.2 million people out of the total population of 29.3 million are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance or protection.¹¹⁶ Meaningful steps to revive peace talks offer the only hope of preventing what already constitutes an unprecedented crisis from deteriorating further into a situation that the UN's emergency relief coordinator has said "looks like the apocalypse".¹¹⁷




Internally displaced people living in the Al-Zuhra district of Al-Hudaydah governorate, Yemen. Photo: NRC, January 2017

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC



DISASTERS 45.8%
CONFLICT 6%
OF THE GLOBAL TOTAL

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST NEW DISPLACEMENT (conflict and disasters)



Sudden-onset disasters triggered most of the internal displacement recorded in East Asia and Pacific in 2017. This is not surprising given that the region is the most disaster-prone in the world. Disasters displaced 8.6 million people during the year, accounting for 46 per cent of the global total. **China**, the **Philippines** and **Viet Nam** were among the ten worst-affected countries in the world, with 4.5 million, 2.5 million and 633,000 new displacements respectively. **Indonesia** and **Myanmar** ranked 12th and 13th with 365,000 and 351,000.

The region is affected by both intensive (less frequent but high-impact) and extensive (recurrent but lower impact) events.¹¹⁸ Our disaster displacement risk model estimates that sudden-onset disasters are likely to displace an average of more than 1.3 million people in **China**, more than a million in **Viet Nam** and more than 700,000 in the **Philippines** during any given year in the future. Across the region as a whole the prospective figure is five million. Thirty-six per cent of global disaster displacement risk is concentrated in East Asia and Pacific, more than any other region.¹¹⁹ Flooding is the most common and recurring natural hazard and claims most victims.¹²⁰

The Hunan floods in southern **China** between June and July triggered the region's largest displacement,

more than 1,620,000 people. Further flooding displaced 547,000 in other southern provinces. Tropical storm Tembin, known locally as Vinta, displaced 865,000 people in **Viet Nam** and the **Philippines** in December, and tropical storm Kai-tak, known locally as Urduja, 765,000 in the Philippines and **Malaysia**, also in December. A number of smaller-scale storms, floods and volcanic eruptions also caused displacement in the region.

Beyond the nature and intensity of the hazards themselves, two factors lie behind the scale of displacement associated with disasters in East Asia and Pacific. The number of people and assets exposed to floods and cyclones is thought to have increased by around 70 per cent between 1980 and 2015, largely as a result of urban expansion driven by the region's booming economy.¹²¹ Today the region accounts for 30 per cent of the global population, most of whom live in urban areas exposed to a wide range of hazards including cyclones and storm surges, coastal and riverine floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis.¹²² Vulnerability is also important. As of 2014, 25 per cent of urban residents lived in slums and other settlements less able to withstand the impact of natural hazards.¹²³

Disasters have historically caused significant physical and economic losses, but the region has succeeded in

reducing mortality, the result of several countries introducing disaster risk reduction measures including early warning systems and pre-emptive evacuations.¹²⁴ The latter also constitute displacement, but of a different nature to that caused by the impacts of hazards themselves. If successfully implemented by more countries across the region, such measures would greatly reduce the scale of disaster mortality (see spotlight, p.30).

Pacific states in particular have established policies and guidelines to address human mobility associated with disasters, and these initiatives should be monitored closely for best practices and lessons learned for use in other countries and regions.¹²⁵ **Fiji, Kiribati and Vanuatu** have led the way in incorporating relocation, IDPs' human rights and cross-border movements into their governance arrangements, but clearer links between these national initiatives and the Nansen protection agenda and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are needed.¹²⁶

Though the vast majority of people displaced in East Asia and Pacific in 2017 fled disasters, the region was not immune from displacement associated with conflict. At least 655,500 Rohingya Muslims fled across the border into Bangladesh to escape **Myanmar's** military crackdown and inter-communal violence in Rakhine state, which also caused the internal displacement of about 26,700 non-Muslims. An unknown number of Rohingya may also have been internally displaced en route to Bangladesh. There were reports of thousands of people stuck at the border in northern Rakhine.

The refugee crisis in Bangladesh has been well-documented in the media, but access constraints in Rakhine mean little is known about the scale of internal displacement during the second half of the year, and figures cannot be verified.¹²⁷ Only a few international NGOs are able to operate in Rakhine, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNHCR. The scale of the refugee crisis, however, gives some indication of the protection concerns that any Rohingya still displaced in northern areas of the state, and more than 128,000 Rohingya and Kaman Muslims living in protracted displacement in central areas since 2012, are likely to face.

Nearly 22,000 new displacements were also recorded in Kachin, Shan and Chin states, areas where ethnic minorities have been in armed conflict with the **Myanmar** state for nearly seven decades. About 16,000 took place

in Kachin, where more than 89,000 people have been living in protracted displacement since 2011.

In the **Philippines**, the battle between the armed forces and ISIL affiliates for Marawi was the most significant outbreak of urban warfare in the country's recent history.¹²⁸ It began in May, lasted for five months and led to more than 350,000 new displacements before the government declared its military victory.

The Philippines adopted a national law in 2010 that recognises IDPs' rights in line with the Guiding Principles.¹²⁹ There are numerous examples of how it has helped people displaced by disasters, but it is unclear whether it has been put into action to protect and provide restitution for people fleeing conflict, including those in Marawi.¹³⁰

There are clearly disparate levels of governance capacity and responses to disaster and conflict induced displacement across East Asia and Pacific. Good practices such as some governments' recognition of the importance of protecting IDPs via laws, policies and strategies, and the implementation of measures to minimise or prevent displacement, such as pre-emptive evacuations, are encouraging. But better monitoring and disaggregation of displacement data will be required in order to assess gaps in responses, and allow countries with differing capacities to design and implement concrete measures to better support the region's IDPs.

SPOTLIGHT

INDONESIA AND VANUATU

Displacement for good reason

The responses of the governments of Indonesia and Vanuatu to volcanic activity in 2017 show how effective early warning systems can be in reducing people's exposure to hazards. They also illustrate the fact that displacement need not always be a negative outcome, in that pre-emptive evacuations save lives and are an effective resilience measure. The two countries have unique approaches to disaster risk management, using the Sendai framework and the Sustainable Development Goals to improve their preparedness and responses as a means of reducing loss of life and people's vulnerability.

The Indonesian island Bali was on high alert for much of the last four months of the year as seismic activity around Mount Agung on the eastern end of the island increased. Shallow volcanic earthquakes began in August and evacuations started in September, peaking on 4 October when more than 150,000 people were


staying in 435 shelters.¹³¹ Agung's activity and the subsequent alert level continued to fluctuate, and the exclusion zone around the volcano was extended from six to 12 kilometres before a series of eruptions began in late November.

Evacuations were carried out effectively, and can be attributed to Indonesia's disaster management system, which includes agencies that monitor and respond to natural hazards. Volcanic activity is closely watched by the country's Centre for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation.¹³² Its alerts and notifications inform the National Disaster Management Agency, the police and the military, who in turn prepare potentially affected populations for evacuation.¹³³ Memories of Agung's eruption in 1962-63, which claimed 1,100 lives, also helped to make people more responsive to alerts, warnings and evacuation orders.¹³⁴

The primary purpose of displacement in the form of evacuations is to save lives, but it still takes a toll on people's physical and psychological wellbeing. About 10,000 evacuees in Bali were reported to be suffering from fatigue and stress, and from cold and uncomfortable living conditions in their shelters.¹³⁵ Evacuations also separate people from their livelihoods, homes and other assets, and they may take undue risks to protect them.

Some evacuees in Bali returned early to tend to their land and livestock, while others, particularly those in

FIGURE 5: Evacuation trends in Bali



Source: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB), Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi (PVMBG), The Smithsonian Institution's Global Volcanism Program



isolated mountain communities, refused to leave at all.¹³⁶ In an effort to prevent people on Bali making daily trips in and out of the exclusion zone, the authorities also evacuated as many as 30,000 cows.¹³⁷

While Indonesia was responding to the threats posed by Mount Agung, **Vanuatu** was preparing for the possible eruption of Manaro Voui, also known as Aoba, on the island of Ambae. Faced with an event that potentially put the whole island at risk, the government took extraordinary steps to protect its population of around 11,600 people.¹³⁸

The Vanuatu Meteorology and Geo-Hazards Department (VMGD) is a national body whose tasks include monitoring the country's active volcanoes.¹³⁹ When its alert levels change on a scale of zero to five, it notifies various agencies which in turn use the information to guide responses. VMGD issued a level-four alert on 23 September in response to Manaro Voui's increased activity, which in turn prompted the government's council of ministers to declare a state of emergency on Ambae.

Some residents were moved to temporary shelters between 28 September and 2 October, but the national disaster management office then decided that the entire population of the island should be evacuated before 6 October.¹⁴⁰ The state of emergency was lifted on 27 October, when the government announced that conditions were suitable for the evacuees to return. Most did so within three days. Manaro Voui's activity continues, but as of 31 December the alert level stood at two.

The government has initiated discussions to relocate the population permanently due to the increasing risk of future eruptions.¹⁴¹

The Bali and Ambae evacuations highlight the importance of robust early warning and disaster management systems which ensure that alerts are translated into action. Such displacement should be seen not as an unnecessary inconvenience, but as a preventive necessity that reduces loss of life. These examples also point to socioeconomic and other challenges that must be considered when planning for pre-emptive evacuations in the context of natural hazards.

SPOTLIGHT

VIET NAM

Disasters, poverty and displacement

Viet Nam is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. More than 65 million people, or 70 per cent of the population, live in coastal areas and low-lying deltas exposed to typhoons, tropical storms and floods.¹⁴² The mountainous interior is also frequently hit by flash floods and landslides.

The combination of hazard intensity, high exposure and vulnerability puts the Vietnamese population as a whole at high risk of disaster displacement.¹⁴³ Our global risk model estimates that sudden-onset disasters are likely to displace an average of more than a million people in any given year in the future, giving Viet Nam the 4th highest disaster displacement risk ranking behind India, China and Bangladesh.

Ten disaster events caused 633,000 new displacements in 2017. Typhoon Doksuri caused 117,000 evacuations in the country's North Central administrative region in October, and typhoon Tembin 431,000 across southern provinces in December. Tembin was unusual in that its course was outside the usual typhoon trajectory. Typhoon Damrey, which occurred in November, caused only around 35,000 evacuations, but attracted significant media attention because it made landfall while the 2017 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit was underway in Viet Nam. Like Tembin, it struck an area unaccustomed to such ferocious storms, in this case the touristic Khanh Hoa province in the South Central Coast region of the country.

The fact that most of the displacement associated with disasters in Viet Nam in 2017 was in the form of pre-emptive evacuations is encouraging, but Tembin and Damrey point to the longer-term risks associated with the uncertainties of climate change. While it is difficult to attribute the characteristics of individual storms directly to climate change, these storms were in line with the government's official climate projections,



which forecast more frequent, intense and unpredictable typhoons, often on southerly tracks.¹⁴⁴

A single typhoon has the potential to destroy families' homes and crops, and rebuilding a modest 30 square-metre house to a standard that can withstand future storms costs about \$2,000 - a huge sum for rural farmers and foresters who often earn less than \$2 a day.¹⁴⁵ The cost of recovery on top of livelihood losses has the potential to plunge those affected into a cycle of unaffordable debt, which in turn helps to drive the rural to urban migration associated with Viet Nam's rapid economic transformation over the past 30 years.¹⁴⁶

Working-age members of families affected by disasters face pressure to look for work in provincial capitals and megacities such as Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh. Exact numbers are hard to come by, but population movements following disasters appear to be significant. According to Viet Nam's central statistics office, around 17,000 people, or one in 100 residents, left Kiên Giang province during and after drought in 2016.¹⁴⁷

Rural to urban displacement carries its own risks. All Vietnamese citizens have equal rights under the constitution, but in practice the country's household registration system - which determines access to social services, utilities, land and housing - creates barriers for non-residents, including migrants and IDPs. These impede poor families' access to benefits such as free healthcare and primary education, and unregistered and temporary migrants may be unable to access any services at all.

Flooding in Hoi An, the World Heritage site of Viet Nam. Photo: Shutterstock.com/ NguyenQuocThang, November 2017




Some cities, such as Ho Chi Minh, have relaxed their rules and taken steps to facilitate household registration, but significant obstacles remain.¹⁴⁸

Concern about the environmental sustainability of rural livelihoods is also growing. Viet Nam's provincial governance and public administration performance index (PAPI) for 2016 found that behind poverty and hunger, citizens ranked environmental concerns as the most urgent matters they wanted their authorities to address.¹⁴⁹

The government has begun in recent years to realise the importance of providing low-income groups with flood and storm resilient housing, and of promoting community-based approaches to disaster risk management. A national programme has helped more than 20,000 of the most vulnerable households build safer homes, and is now being improved and scaled up through Viet Nam's first Green Climate Fund project, a partnership between the United Nations Development Program and the government.¹⁵⁰



To be truly effective, however, safe housing needs to be combined with efforts to build resilience and better manage climate risk. As smallholders' farms continue to be divided, becoming smaller with each generation, targeted funding to support more efficient and diversified agricultural livelihoods and more integrated rural planning is essential to create the necessary resilience to climate impacts. So is the facilitation of safe and voluntary movement for those who want to undertake it.

SOUTH ASIA



DISASTERS 15.1%
CONFLICT 5.4%
OF THE GLOBAL
TOTAL

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST NEW DISPLACEMENT (conflict and disasters)



Disasters triggered most of the displacement in South Asia in 2017, with the exception of **Afghanistan** where conflict triggered 474,000 new displacements. Many of the 2.8 million new displacements associated with sudden-onset disasters took place in **Bangladesh, India, Nepal** and **Sri Lanka** during the monsoon season. Except for tropical cyclone Mora, which struck Bangladesh in May, most of the disasters were small-scale and attracted little, if any, international media coverage. Even intensive events such as Mora received relatively little coverage compared with the Atlantic hurricanes, despite displacing considerable numbers of people and creating greater needs in countries with lower income, resilience and capacity to respond.

Overall, the monsoon season was similar to those of previous years in terms of precipitation levels and the number of people displaced, but its impacts were still significant in a region of high exposure and vulnerability associated with poverty, inequality and unsustainable development. About 855,000 people were evacuated and hosted in camps in the **Indian** state of Bihar, where flooding also hit agricultural production. This harmed livelihoods and caused a sharp rise in unemployment, which in turn added to the number of people migrating from rural to urban areas in search of work.¹⁵¹

More than 436,000 people were displaced in **Bangladesh** by torrential rains that flooded up to a third of the country for several weeks. Poor communities in the

capital of Dhaka, which is home to more than 18 million people, were particularly hard hit.¹⁵² The city is one of the fastest growing in South Asia, and is expanding over marsh lands, leaving no space for water run-off.¹⁵³ Korail, its largest slum, is growing across a lake.

Recurrent flash floods and landslides destroyed nearly 89,000 homes and displaced 381,000 people across 35 districts of **Nepal**, including some, such as Biratnagar and Monrang, where flooding is relatively unusual. The Nepal Red Cross Society said the rains were the worst in 15 years.¹⁵⁴ In **Sri Lanka**, seven disaster events, mainly floods and landslides, triggered more than 135,000 new displacements. The country's Disaster Management Centre recorded widespread floods in May in the southern districts of Galle, Matara, Kalutara and Ratnapura, which forced 127,000 people to take refuge in official shelters.

The 2017 monsoon season highlighted again the negative consequences of poor planning and lack of preparedness. National and local authorities struggled to provide aid to millions of people in need.¹⁵⁵ The expansion of slums is an integral part of urbanisation in South Asia, which also heightens people's exposure, vulnerability and displacement risk. **Bangladesh, India** and **Nepal** have relatively low levels of urbanisation, at 35, 33 and 19 per cent respectively compared with the global average of 54 per cent.¹⁵⁶ This, however, is starting to change. India has 25 of the 100 fastest growing cities in the world, and Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata are among the ten fastest.¹⁵⁷

Our global model puts **Bangladesh, India and Pakistan** among the ten countries in the world with the highest disaster displacement risk, and the region as a whole has the highest number of people at risk of displacement by sudden-onset hazards relative to its population size. An average of 240 out of every 100,000 people might be expected to be displaced during any given year in the future, not including pre-emptive evacuations.¹⁵⁸

Some countries in the region have taken policy steps to address displacement associated with disasters. **Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka** have begun to report against the Sendai framework by conducting data readiness reviews. Some also mention the need to assist and prioritise IDPs and other vulnerable groups in their DRR policies. Bangladesh has a specific policy on the management of displacement associated with disasters, and India has one that protects the rights of people displaced by development projects.¹⁵⁹

With 474,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence, **Afghanistan** accounted for the majority of the conflict figures for the region (633,000). No major offensives took place during the year, but the security situation deteriorated to such an extent

that the country was reclassified from post-conflict to one in active conflict again.¹⁶⁰ The US and its allies also stepped up their bombing raids, including the US' use of the world's most powerful non-nuclear weapon to target groups affiliated to ISIL in the Achin district of Nangarhar province, close to the border with Pakistan.¹⁶¹

The number of displacements directly associated with the increased bombing is not clear, but the eastern and southern provinces most affected also had the largest number of displacements. The voluntary and involuntary return and deportation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran and the EU added to the number of IDPs in the country and will continue to do so in 2018 (see spotlight, p.36).

Periodic violations of the ceasefire between **India and Pakistan** in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir led to at least 70,000 new displacements in Indian-controlled areas and at least 53,000 in Pakistani-controlled areas.



A woman affected by the floods wades through the waist-deep water in search of clean water. Photo: BDRCS/ Aminul Shawon, August 2017

SPOTLIGHT

AFGHANISTAN


Moving from humanitarian to development planning

After almost four decades of conflict and violence, the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated in 2017 and the country was reclassified from post-conflict to one of active conflict again.¹⁶² The year was marked by a shift in conflict dynamics as the military moved to secure urban areas.¹⁶³ This left a vacuum in rural areas that allowed the Taliban to consolidate control over 16 new districts.¹⁶⁴

Large numbers of people fled these areas toward urban hubs in search of safety, aid and government services. At the same time sectarian violence surged in Kabul, where a truck bomb in May and a string of smaller attacks in June killed hundreds of civilians.¹⁶⁵ The attacks triggered protests against an already fragmented government and led to the announcement of elections set for July 2018.¹⁶⁶

Displacement has become a familiar survival strategy and in some cases even an inevitable part of life for two generations of Afghans faced with continuous violence and insecurity and recurrent disasters. There were 474,000 new displacements in 2017, and as of the end of the year there were 1,286,000 IDPs in the country.¹⁶⁷ Nangarhar province was hosting the highest number as of mid-November, followed by Kunduz, Badghis and Baghlan.¹⁶⁸ More than 50 per cent of people displaced by conflict in Afghanistan have now been forced to flee twice or more, compared with seven per cent five years ago.¹⁶⁹

Despite the worsening security situation, more than 560,000 refugees and undocumented migrants returned from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.¹⁷⁰ The voluntary nature of these movements is questionable, however, and many of these returnees went back to a life of internal displacement because insecurity prevented them from returning to their place of origin or achieving a durable solution elsewhere.¹⁷¹



This trend will grow while insecurity and a struggling economy continue to make it difficult for the country to absorb and reintegrate returnees.¹⁷² Afghanistan's 2014 policy on IDPs grants returning refugees the same right to petition for assistance as their internally displaced counterparts, but like other IDPs they tend to lack information on the process or are unable to afford to travel to government offices to register.

Responsibility for putting the policy into operation has been largely decentralised to provincial Directorate of Refugees and Repatriations (DoRR) offices, but they receive little or no support from stakeholders to ensure its successful implementation.¹⁷³ With 30 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces affected by renewed or ongoing conflict in 2017, many DoRR offices have also had to switch their focus from development and planning for durable solutions back to meeting immediate needs.¹⁷⁴

IDPs' needs have changed little over the past five years, and returnees who go back to life in internal displacement face similar challenges.¹⁷⁵ Some aspects of their situation have improved, but their most important reintegration needs remain the same: safety and security from conflict and violence, housing and shelter, and decent jobs.¹⁷⁶ Many, however, continue to struggle to meet even their most basic needs for food and water, the result in part of significant aid reductions. Many also lack the information and documentation required to access education and other services.¹⁷⁷

Without safe and reliable job opportunities or the information needed to make well-informed and dignified choices about their future, displaced people in Afghanistan are unable to lift themselves out of cycles of vulnerability and poverty.¹⁷⁸ It is also clear that these challenges



An internally displaced man from Ghor Province collects scraps and clothes to burn during the winter to keep his home warm and cook food in Police Rah camp on the outskirts of Herat city, Afghanistan. Photo: NRC/Jim Huylebroek, May 2017

cannot be addressed by humanitarian interventions alone.¹⁷⁹ A shift from humanitarian to development planning, and from national to local implementation is not just a generic recommendation but an urgent priority.¹⁸⁰

The country made some policy progress in 2017. It was one of 43 to present a voluntary national review of its implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that year, which echoed the need for the localisation of development efforts.¹⁸¹ It also raised challenges associated with data availability and management, and the need for a comprehensive database that pools all information related to the SDGs and facilitates disaggregation.¹⁸²

The review also gave specific mention to internal displacement as an impediment to the economic growth and poverty reduction envisaged under SDG 1. As it stands, the national policy framework considers measures to include returnees and IDPs in local community development councils, handled by the national Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations (MoRR).


Once IDPs' immediate assistance needs are met, transitions already underway toward localised and longer-term development planning should be bolstered as the foundation for a stronger collective response with rights-based outcomes.¹⁸³ This also means spreading awareness of returnees' and IDPs' rights under the constitution and the national policy on displacement, so they are better positioned to pursue durable solutions.

THE AMERICAS



DISASTERS 23.8%
CONFLICT 3.9%
OF THE GLOBAL
TOTAL

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST NEW DISPLACEMENT (conflict and disasters)



At 4.5 million, the number of people displaced by disasters in the Americas was about ten times higher than the 457,000 who fled conflict and violence in 2017, affecting high and low-income countries alike. People fled their homes from **Canada** to **Chile** to escape earthquakes and climate extremes in the form of cyclones, wildfires and floods. The region as a whole accounted for 24 per cent of displacement associated with disasters globally, second only to East Asia and Pacific.

Displacement associated with conflict and violence saw a steady increase, from 436,000 in 2016 to 457,000 in 2017. Mirroring previous years, countries like **El Salvador**, **Colombia** and **Mexico** were among the most affected. Criminal violence was also widespread in **Guatemala**, **Honduras** and **Venezuela**, but figures for internal displacement in those countries are difficult to come by.

The Atlantic hurricane season accounted for the vast majority of the region's displacement associated with disasters. Hurricane Irma was the largest disaster event of the year worldwide, displacing around 2 million people over two weeks in August and September. Hurricane Harvey displaced another 848,000 and Maria around 146,000. About twenty countries and territories, most of them small island developing states in **the Caribbean**, suffered the worst impacts of the season (see spotlight, p.42).

The US was also highly affected, particularly by Harvey, which caused unprecedented flooding in Houston, Texas. It is ironic that a subsidised flood insurance mechanism the federal government introduced in 1968 actually ended up promoting the construction of housing in flood-prone areas.¹⁸⁴ In this sense, Harvey's impacts were as much due to decades of unsustainable, badly conceived and poorly implemented urban planning as the intensity of the hazard itself. The storm displaced around 848,000 people in the US.

The west coast of **the US** and **Canada** suffered the impacts of major wildfires. In southern California the biggest wildfires affected an area the size of New York City and Boston combined, triggering the evacuation of more than 204,000 people.¹⁸⁵ Other wildfires in the US triggered more than 181,000 new displacements, and in Canada around 78,000. British Columbia experienced the worst wildfires in the province's history, displacing around 65,000 people.

Central **Mexico** was hit by a 7.1 magnitude earthquake that affected seven states and displaced 104,000 people. It struck on 19 September, the same day as in the 1985 Mexico City earthquake that killed thousands. Following the 1985 earthquake, Mexico established laws, policies, strategies and institutions to manage disaster risk, and now has one of the world's most sophisticated earthquake early warning systems.¹⁸⁶

Emergency drills have been conducted throughout the country every year since 1985 on 19 September as a reminder of the importance of disaster awareness.¹⁸⁷

The 2017 earthquake struck hours after the annual emergency drills, damaging and collapsing buildings and killing 230 people.¹⁸⁸ This showed that despite having strong governance and civil society engagement, Mexico still needs to do more to reduce disaster risk and avoid losses, damage and displacement.

Floods caused displacement throughout the continent with **Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and the US** as the most affected countries. The flooding in Peru was the worst in 20 years, and displaced around 295,000 people.¹⁸⁹

Displacement associated with conflict and violence in the Americas accounted for about four per cent of the global total. **El Salvador** appeared to be the worst affected country, with 296,000 new displacements, followed by **Colombia** with 139,000. This figure for Colombia was fewer than the 171,000 recorded in 2016, the result in part of the peace agreement signed between the government and the country's largest armed group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

The end of FARC's 50-year insurgency followed more than a decade of policy initiatives intended to address the plight of the country's IDPs, including the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law, which laid the foundations for the negotiations that eventually led to the 2016 peace deal.¹⁹⁰ The process was backed by the international community and is widely considered a success to be emulated in other countries and regions affected by conflict.

Despite this important milestone in **Colombia's** recent history, violence continues to cause displacement. Criminal gangs, guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), dissident FARC fighters and reconstituted paramilitary groups have occupied many of the territories FARC used to control. They have taken over illegal activities prevalent in these areas such as drug production, illegal mining and other extractive practices. The highest numbers of IDPs were recorded in the marginalised Pacific coast departments of Cauca, Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca. Indigenous and African-Colombian communities have been disproportionately affected by the new wave of conflict.

The situation in Colombia has been defined as an ongoing humanitarian crisis characterised by urban displacement and dire conditions for IDPs, with two out of three living below the poverty line.¹⁹¹ Progress in implementing the land restitution and reform agreed by the government and FARC has been slow, raising fears that the peace process might be undermined and new waves of violence sparked.

The political and economic situation in neighbouring **Venezuela** deteriorated over the course of the year. The number of IDPs in the country is unknown, but as of the end of 2017 more than 500,000 Venezuelans were estimated to be living in exile across the border in Colombia, and about 110,000 people fled the country in October 2017 alone.¹⁹² It is also hard to establish how many of the people on the move have fled criminal violence, repression and intimidation, and how many the country's dire and deteriorating economic situation. Most, however, are in desperate need of food, medicines and healthcare.¹⁹³

The **Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA)** continues to be plagued by drug-related criminal and gang violence. An extrapolation of findings from a national survey in **El Salvador** suggests there were around 296,000 new displacements in the country as a result. An unknown number of people have been displaced in **Honduras**, while in **Guatemala** there are only reports about evictions, which represent a small part of all displacements. Internal displacement in the NTCA has tended to be invisible, but a number of policy developments in 2017 have the potential to begin filling an urgent knowledge and action gap (see spotlight, p.40).

The Americas as a whole also made important policy advances toward government transparency, responsibility and accountability for internal displacement. The 2017 San Pedro Sula Declaration, adopted by Central American countries, lays out the region's position on joint protection mechanisms for IDPs and migrants. This declaration also addressed forced displacement as a component of the 2030 Agenda, and referenced the Sendai Framework, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the SDGs.¹⁹⁴ This was a clear step in the right direction as countries continue to strengthen their regional, sub-regional and national efforts to address both violence and disaster-induced displacement in the region.

SPOTLIGHT

NORTHERN TRIANGLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA

A reluctant and fragmented response



There has been a marked upsurge in recent years in the number of people fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – known collectively as the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA) – to escape drug-related violence, the activities of organised crime gangs, conflicts over land and other generalised violence.¹⁹⁵ This rise in the number of asylum seekers, many of them unaccompanied minors or whole families, is undoubtedly symptomatic of a larger displacement crisis inside the three countries' borders.¹⁹⁶

Information about internal displacement is, however, largely anecdotal, making NTCA's IDPs all but invisible. Partly because of this knowledge gap, authorities have been reluctant to acknowledge and tackle the phenomenon. Given their reluctance and the lack of systematic data, responses to IDPs' needs have been fragmented. It is also difficult to judge their effectiveness.

The causes of flight within and from the region are much less ambiguous than its scale. Homicide rates in NTCA were nearly seven times the global average in 2017, despite reductions in recent years.¹⁹⁷ Aside from assassinations, extrajudicial killings and femicide, the region is also haunted by disappearances, rape, kidnappings, threats, the forced recruitment of children, intimidation and extortion. There tend to be few official investigations into crimes and even fewer convictions, even for homicides, creating an environment of flagrant impunity.¹⁹⁸ Some communities also face the impact of structural violence rooted in the reallocation of resources in ways that limit their ability to secure their basic needs.

Faced with such endemic violence, many people feel they have no choice but to uproot their families and livelihoods in search of safety elsewhere in their countries. Given the criminal organisations' wide reach and states' lack of protection capacity, and in some cases political will, they often find that internal displacement does not provide the sanctuary they seek. Studies have found that people who had fled NTCA countries to Mexico crossed the border after those perpetrating violence or threats against them had caught up with them.¹⁹⁹ Many people are also reluctant to file reports for fear of reprisals, deep distrust of some authorities and the lack of a guarantee of state assistance if a report is made.

Amid mounting evidence of a displacement and protection crisis in NTCA, stakeholders worked at the local, national and regional level in 2017 to strengthen responses for those affected.²⁰⁰ Such efforts are cause for cautious optimism, but it remains to be seen whether they will translate into real change for people at risk of, or affected by displacement.

The Honduran government has taken the regional lead in officially recognising displacement, and it took several promising policy steps during the year. The Inter-institutional Commission for the Protection of People Displaced by Violence, created in 2013, was endowed with a human rights secretary and a directorate for IDPs' protection. Draft legislation on preventing and responding to internal displacement is due for presentation to congress in 2018, which would make gang-related displacement a criminal offence. Several municipalities also began designing displacement response

plans, a first step toward creating local public policies to address the phenomenon.

In El Salvador, the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court accepted petitions filed in November referring to internal displacement associated with criminal violence. The move came after the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights granted precautionary measures in favour of one of the cases and following an amendment to the Criminal Code in 2016 that included the crime of restricting freedom of movement by threats, intimidation or violence.²⁰¹ The country's justice and security minister also officially recognised displacement associated with gang violence, a significant development for a government that had previously been reluctant to do so.²⁰²

This progress was undermined, however, by the US government's announcement in January 2018 that it was to revoke temporary protective status for nearly 200,000 Salvadorans who had been living legally in the country since two earthquakes struck in 2001.²⁰³ In the absence of clear and effective protocols for reintegrating returnees, it is feared that deportations on such a scale could overwhelm El Salvador's political and economic capacity to receive them and add to the country's displacement crisis.

A national government's acknowledgement of internal displacement on its territory and its responsibility for addressing the phenomenon is an essential first step toward an effective and integrated response.²⁰⁴ It is, however, only a first step. A broad range of measures are needed to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of a displacement crisis. Long-term solutions lie in socio-economic development and regional cooperation based on a full understanding of the breadth and depth of the crisis.

With this in mind, countries of origin, transit and asylum met in October 2017 for a conference on the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in the Americas.²⁰⁵ With the adoption of the global refugee compact due in 2018, national and regional stakeholders discussed ways of putting commitments made in their 2016 San José action statement into practice to better protect people who flee violence in NTCA.

The US government had been one of nine - along with those of the three NTCA countries, Belize, Canada, Mexico and Panama - that welcomed the 2016 San

José action statement. Together with representatives from international organisations, academia and civil society, they pledged to prevent and address the causes of violence, improve asylum and protection responses and promote regional cooperation.²⁰⁶

Policymakers and responders in NTCA need to harness this momentum and implement the political commitments already made. Legislative, administrative and budgetary measures should be based on reliable and timely data on the numbers and needs of IDPs that sheds light on risk across the displacement continuum, from internal flight to cross-border movement and back again. In parallel, countries outside the region should recognise the need to share responsibility for addressing the situation and achieving durable solutions. Otherwise the impact on individuals, communities and countries as a whole of a growing displacement crisis will continue unchecked.

SPOTLIGHT

THE ATLANTIC HURRICANE SEASON

and the importance of resilience


The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was the seventh most active since records began in 1851 and the most active since 2005. Ten hurricanes affected around 20 countries and territories, of which six developed into category 3 storms or above.²⁰⁷ The three major hurricanes, Harvey, Irma and Maria, displaced over 3 million people in the space of a month. They hit as the region was still

recovering from the devastation wrought by hurricane Matthew, which displaced 2.2 million people in 2016.

The 2017 season set several new records. Harvey was the wettest recorded tropical cyclone in US history, dumping around 137 centimetres of rainfall on the continent.²⁰⁸ More than 19 trillion gallons of rainwater fell in parts of Texas, causing widespread floods and prompting the largest disaster response in the state's history.²⁰⁹ It was also the first major hurricane to make landfall in the US since Wilma in 2005, the 12-year gap being the longest on record.

Hurricane Irma was the most powerful hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic, with maximum sustained winds of 296 km/h, accompanied by torrential rain and storm surges.²¹⁰ It also triggered the highest number of new displacements associated with a disaster in 2017 at more than 2 million, accounting for 11 per cent of the global total of 18.8 million. Irma affected 15 countries and territories, more than any other storm of the season.

FIGURE 6: People displaced by the three main storms of the Atlantic Hurricane Season 2017



Sources: IDMC analysis from several sources (e.g. FEMA, COE, Copernicus EMS, IOM, CDEMA, local governments, IFRC DMIS), Hurricane paths and track area NOAA (2017), population data from the Demographic and Social Statistics of the United Nations (UNSD, 2015).


The US endured significant impacts and received most of the media coverage, but a number of Caribbean islands, including **Cuba**, **Dominica** and **Puerto Rico** also suffered substantial losses and displacement both as a result of pre-emptive evacuations and the damage and destruction of homes.

Dominica bore the brunt of hurricane Maria, which tore across the island as a category 5 storm on 18 September. Every household was affected. Dominica was unprepared for such an intensive event, making recovery and reconstruction challenging and slow. Three months after the disaster, only eight per cent of the island's inhabitants, mainly those living in the cities of Roseau and Portsmouth, had had their electricity supply restored.

🌀 Around **3 million** people in 16 countries and territories were displaced during the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season. Most of the displacements were triggered by three major hurricanes: Harvey, Irma and Maria.

Event name	Country	Displaced People	Percentage of the displaced population in the territory
Harvey	United States	848,000	0.3
	Cuba	1,738,000	15.3
	United States	202,000	0.1
	Dominican Republic	24,000	0.2
	St. Maarten (Dutch part)	13,000	31.7
	Haiti	13,000	0.1
	St. Martin (French part)	11,000	2.7
Irma	British Virgin Islands	6,000	19.2
	Bahamas	1,600	0.4
	Guadeloupe	1,500	0.3
	St. Barthelemy	1,500	16.2
	Antigua and Barbuda	1,400	1.5
	Anguilla	500	3.4
	US Virgin Islands	390	0.4
	Puerto Rico	190	0.01
	Turks and Caicos Islands	60	0.2
	St. Kitts and Nevis	33	0.1
	Puerto Rico	86,000	2.3
	Dominica	35,000	47.4
Maria	Dominican Republic	23,000	0.2
	US Virgin Islands	1,900	1.8

Cumulative number of people displaced



The economy, which depends on tourism and agriculture, was also hard hit. Post-disaster needs assessments suggest the tourism sector is likely to take at least a year to recover given the extent of infrastructure damage. This leaves people who depend on tourism for their living to face the dual challenge of losing their income while trying to rebuild their homes.²¹¹

Crops, boats and other farming and fishing equipment were also lost or destroyed, which will have a knock-on effect on neighbouring countries because Dominica is an important exporter of food to the region.²¹² The extent of the damage to the economy was such that people may be forced to leave the island in search of decent job opportunities and living conditions.²¹³

The total number of people Maria displaced on Dominica is hard to quantify. IOM identified around 3,000 people still living in collective centres across the island two weeks after the storm struck, but numerous unofficial displacement sites and host families were not assessed. Initial assessments of destroyed and damaged buildings put their number at between 17,000 and 20,000. These would have been home to 54,000 people, or about 80 per cent of the island's population.²¹⁴ Based on building assessments conducted by the government in mid-December 2017, we estimate that more than 35,000 people were displaced, and they are likely to remain so, until they fully recover from Hurricane Maria.

Like Dominica, **Puerto Rico** was also unprepared for Maria's impacts, making recovery and reconstruction slow. The island's economy was already in crisis, the result of years of mismanagement, and around 40 per cent of its inhabitants were living in poverty. This in turn meant that spending on social programmes was high, but Puerto Rico – which is an unincorporated US territory – receives little federal funding relative to its population size.²¹⁵ Nor had it received any federal disaster aid a month after Maria struck, unlike other affected areas of the US such as Florida, Georgia, Texas and the US Virgin Islands.²¹⁶

This despite the fact that Puerto Rico was left without mains drinking water, 80 per cent of its power grid was destroyed and mobile and other communications infrastructure badly damaged. Around 60,000 homes were still roofless three months after the disaster.²¹⁷ The island's economic losses were estimated to amount to around 73 per cent of its GDP, and the poverty rate to have increased by 10 per cent.²¹⁸

On the island of St. Maarten, the hurricane damaged or destroyed 70 per cent of homes and buildings. Photo: The Netherlands Red Cross/Arie Kievit, September 2017



The situation in Puerto Rico shows how economic drivers combine with a storm's short and longer-term impacts to reduce a population's resilience and heighten its vulnerability, which in turn increases the risk of displacement. Maria displaced at least 86,000 people on the island, of whom 70,000 were evacuated from flood-prone areas after the failure of the Guajataca Dam.²¹⁹ Many people who fled their homes, however, took shelter with friends and family and were not counted, making the estimate conservative. There was also significant migration to the continental US, and this is likely to continue. Some estimates suggest the island could lose around 14 per cent of its population by 2019 as a result of Maria's impacts.²²⁰

The 2017 hurricane season also hit **Cuba** hard. The island was in the throes of a severe drought and was still recovering from the aftermath of hurricane Matthew in 2016 when Irma made landfall on 9 September. The storm raged for more than 71 hours and affected 12 of Cuba's 15 provinces. More than 158,000 houses were reported damaged, of which more than 16,600 were partially collapsed and around 14,600 completely destroyed.²²¹

Cuba, however, offers a lesson in resilience. All Cubans are taught what to do when hurricanes approach from an early age. Disaster preparedness, prevention and response are part of the national curriculum, and people of all ages take part in drills, simulation exercises and other training. The island's civil defence system and meteorological institute are pillars of its disaster risk management system, and every individual has a role to play at the community level as a storm bears down. Schools and hospitals are converted into shelters and transport is quickly organised.²²²


Around 1.7 million people were evacuated before and during Irma, keeping them safe from its destructive power and demonstrating that, when managed as a resilience measure, displacement need not always be a negative outcome.

EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA



DISASTERS 0.4%
CONFLICT 0.2%
OF THE GLOBAL
TOTAL

5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST NEW DISPLACEMENT (conflict and disasters)



Three-quarters of the displacement recorded in Europe and Central Asia in 2017 was associated with disasters. Natural hazards including floods, wildfires and landslides, displaced 22,000 people in **France**, 7,100 in **Kazakhstan**, 6,800 in **Portugal**, 6,200 in the **UK**, 5,900 in **Russia**, 4,700 in **Tajikistan**, 3,500 in **Albania**, 3,300 in **Kyrgyzstan**, 2,100 in **Italy** and 2,100 in **Spain**. The most intensive natural hazard recorded was a wild-fire in September that forced as many as 10,000 people to leave their homes on the French island of Corsica.

Accurate figures for displacement associated with conflict are difficult to come by. Ceasefire violations along the contact line in **Ukraine** led to 21,000 new displacements in 2017, but a number of issues prevent the accurate profiling of the country's IDPs. These include a lack of access to non-government controlled areas and an overly bureaucratic registration process. Figures are thought to be inflated in some regions and underreported in others (see spotlight, p.47).

Displacement associated with conflict in **Turkey** continues to be an extremely sensitive topic. The government has banned local and international media access to Kurdish areas, creating an information blackout. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) requested access to conduct an assessment in 2016, but to no avail. The organisation nonetheless interviewed victims of the conflict in the Kurdish areas and assessed that around 200,000 people were newly displaced in 2016.²²³

No new information exists on the fate of these people nor is data available for new displacements in 2017. We have, however, used open source satellite imagery of three towns – Sirnak, Idil and Yüksekova, where clashes had occurred and curfews were instated – to identify housing destruction associated with the conflict and estimated that at least 5,300 people had been displaced in those towns in 2016. More detailed satellite imagery for other towns and time periods can provide a more accurate number of the damages and the people that were displaced as a consequence. Additionally, the unknown number of families occupying damaged structures make the figure a gross underestimate.

Other governments in the region have stopped reporting on displacement or claim there is none on their territory. Our figures for **Cyprus** include old case-loads of IDPs, but the authorities in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have provided no new information since declaring displacement over in 1975. In Russia, the government has not reported any IDPs despite ongoing skirmishes in Chechnya.

There are also two situations of unresolved conflict and protracted displacement in the region: in Nagorno-Karabakh, where **Azerbaijan** and **Armenia** dispute control of the territory; and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, **Georgia's** two breakaway republics. The Georgian government shares its annual report on IDPs with IDMC, and 289,000 people were still recorded as displaced as of the end of 2017. A ceasefire over Nagorno-Karabakh

was negotiated in 1994 and kept conflict at bay until tensions escalated last year. No number of new displacements is available, but there was thought to be considerable damage to property and housing in the areas around the contact line.²²⁴ The total number of people displaced in **Azerbaijan**, primarily by the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, is 393,000.

A number of regional policies and programmes that relate directly or indirectly to displacement have been put in place. The EU's action plan for DRR for 2015 to 2030 sets out policy actions required to put the Sendai framework into practice.²²⁵ Among its recommendations, the European Commission recognised the importance of addressing IDPs' specific needs when establishing urban resilience policies in order to fulfil Sendai's "understanding disaster risk" priority.²²⁶

The EU funds various programmes to improve disaster preparedness and response, including the Central Asia Centre for Emergency Situations and Disaster Risk Reduction (CACESDRR), which **Kazakhstan** and **Kyrgyzstan** inaugurated in 2016. Its goals are to improve the coordination of regional-level preparedness initiatives, DRR capacities, contingency planning, monitoring and the sharing of early-warning information.²²⁷ The PPRD East 2 programme, which began in 2010, aims to improve the protection of people affected by disasters in **Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova** and **Ukraine**.²²⁸

In terms of displacement associated with conflict, the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation on IDPs in line with the Guiding Principles, which proposes that governments consider the principle of human rights for all when formulating legislation and practices.²²⁹

Some national-level policies also exist. **Azerbaijan** has had a policy in place on the protection of people displaced by its conflict with **Armenia** since 1993. Amendments in 1999, 2007 and 2011 aimed to improve and widen the assistance provided to IDPs and train state officials in data collection. IDPs in Azerbaijan are entitled to a monthly allowance, temporary housing, a plot of land, tax privileges, free secondary school textbooks, heating fuel, utilities, local telephone calls, health services and higher education.²³⁰

Armenia, on the other hand, does not recognise internal displacement as an entitlement criterion, and IDPs there have received assistance via government

poverty alleviation and welfare programmes instead.²³¹ The last updated Armenian survey on IDP was in 2004, and no more recent information is available.

Georgian law protects people displaced by conflict and recognises displaced children as IDPs entitled to allowances and accommodation.²³²

The EU funds a project to improve IDPs' protection in Ukraine. It aims to promote sustainable long-term solutions to displacement by working with the government to align national legislation with EU standards, including the European Convention on Human Rights.²³³

While Europe and Central Asia suffer little new displacement, there are as many as 2,946,000 people still living in displacement as a result of conflicts that date back to the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia more than 20 years ago, and another 1,113,000 people in Turkey as a result of the government's decades-old conflict with Kurdish groups. Around 15 per cent of Europe's protracted IDPs still live in makeshift shelters or informal settlements with little access to basic services.²³⁴ They, and the unresolved conflicts that displaced them, tend to receive little public or media attention, nor do the relatively small-scale disasters that hit the region.

SPOTLIGHT

The difficulties of counting IDPs in **UKRAINE**



The conflict in Ukraine between the government and pro-Russia separatists in the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk began in 2014 and remains unresolved, despite the Minsk I and II agreements signed in 2014 and 2015. The agreements provided for an immediate ceasefire and aimed to pave the way for the gradual return of the disputed territories to Ukrainian control, but fighting and shelling along the contact line continues to cause loss of life, displacement and damage to civilian infrastructure.

The Ukrainian government's policies and frameworks to guide its response to displacement acknowledge the protracted nature of the phenomenon and demonstrate its willingness to address it. Its most recent initiative was the adoption on 15 November of a strategy to integrate IDPs and facilitate durable solutions.²³⁵ Significant gaps remain, however, in the way the government defines, registers and subsequently responds to IDPs and their needs.

The Ministry of Social Policy (MoSP) currently has a national database of nearly 1.5 million IDPs, but the highly bureaucratic registration process means that the figure is likely to be an underestimate for some areas of the country, particularly those where IDPs' financial situation is less acute and they may feel that the scant state benefits they would receive by registering are not worth the time and effort.²³⁶ That said, the fact that registration determines IDPs' social benefits means it is likely to be an overestimate elsewhere, particularly in non-government controlled areas (NGCAs), where registering as an IDP is the only way to ensure people continue to receive what is rightfully theirs as Ukrainian citizens.

Given these difficulties, OCHA has made its own calculations for its humanitarian needs overview. It was able to estimate the number of IDPs in the national database living "more permanently in government-controlled areas" separate from those in NGCAs. This was done because it is unclear whether the latter are indeed IDPs or simply residents who had registered to access social benefits.²³⁷ OCHA identified 760,000 IDPs as living in government-controlled areas, a figure which it rounded up to 800,000 to account for those who are unregistered. According to various surveys, this applies to between five and nine per cent of the country's IDPs.²³⁸

The number of IDPs in NGCAs remains unknown. The de-facto authorities there have severely restricted humanitarian access, making it impossible to gauge the scale of displacement. The fact, however, that around 1.2 million residents a month crossed into government-controlled areas in 2017 to obtain personal documentation and pension payments, access medical care, education, food and other supplies or maintain social ties is an indication of how dire their situation is.²³⁹

There have been no accurate profiling exercises carried out for IDPs, which makes it difficult to respond appropriately to their assistance and protection needs, or to develop strategies for durable solutions. It is clear, however, that those directly affected by the conflict, primarily those who live along the contact line, remain highly vulnerable and are in need of emergency assistance including shelter, food and non-food items. Those living in protracted displacement in government-controlled areas away from the contact line would benefit from early-recovery and recovery assistance such as income-generating activities.

TALLYING UP THE NUMBERS FOR A BETTER GLOBAL PICTURE


CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE: UNPACKING THE GLOBAL 'STOCK'

A total of 40 million people are estimated to be living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence as of the end of 2017 (see map 1, p.49). Seventy-six per cent of the world's conflict IDPs are concentrated in just ten countries (see figure 7). Of these, **Syria, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Sudan** and **South Sudan** have been among the ten countries with the world's largest IDP populations in recent years.

The persistence of large numbers of IDPs across the world reflects the intractability of conflict and crisis, notably in the **Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa**. It also highlights the inability of governments to cope with and recover from the impacts of displacement, particularly those that suffer high levels of new internal displacement each year while already hosting some of the largest IDP caseloads in the world. This was the case in 2017 for **Syria, DRC, Iraq, South Sudan and Afghanistan**.

There are a number of uncertainties around the total cumulative number of people displaced worldwide as a result of conflict and violence. Besides problems of out-dated data, the uncertainty is largely due to the lack of tracking of IDPs' movements and vulnerabilities over time. Insufficient data on the three movements typically associated with a 'durable solution' – i.e. return, relocation and local integration – makes it difficult to determine whether someone's displacement has come to a definitive end, and whether they can objectively be removed from official records. This means that, in some cases, existing conflict displacement stock figures may be overestimates.


FIGURE 7: The ten countries with the highest number of people displaced as of the end of 2017



MAP 1: People internally displaced by conflict and violence as of 31 December 2017

PEOPLE INTERNALLY DISPLACED BY CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

as of 31 December 2017



The country name and the figure are shown only when the value exceeds 20,000 people displaced. The boundaries, names and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the IDMC.

In 2017, IDMC collected for the first time information regarding the conditions under which return movements took place and the extent to which they may have led to a significant reduction in the needs and vulnerabilities of those displaced. However, for 8.5 million IDPs worldwide reported as having either returned, relocated or locally integrated, the information on their current condition is either too sparse or unavailable. Knowledge of the overall context suggests that most of these 8.5 million had not overcome a situation of vulnerability at year end. Some had returned to damaged or destroyed homes, others were still living in temporary accommodation, or had no access to income and livelihoods. Because they may only have achieved 'provisional solutions' to their

displacement, we report on them separately below in order to call attention to their situation (see figure 8, p.51). Countries with some of the highest numbers of IDPs having reached these 'provisional solutions' include **Afghanistan, DRC, Iraq, Syria and Yemen**. More data is needed to monitor their situation over time in order to determine whether they will need to be added to the global stock, or whether they can be definitively removed from it.

DISAGGREGATING STOCK FIGURES BY LEVELS OF SEVERITY

The severity of displacement varies considerably between and within countries. IDPs in different situations face different vulnerabilities, and these are important to assess for several reasons. First, they are key to nuancing global displacement stock figures, and understanding the heterogeneity that lies behind them. Second, they are needed to inform targeted interventions to help bring displacement to a sustainable end.


The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions sets out eight benchmarks against which this process can be measured: long-term safety and security; access to livelihoods and employment; enjoyment of an adequate standard of living; effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property; access to personal and other documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs and access to effective remedies and justice.

An assessment of IDPs' situations in **Colombia** and **Syria** helps to understand the extent to which the severity of displacement can vary. The two countries had similar numbers of people displaced by conflict as of the end of 2017: 6.5 million for Colombia and 6.8 million for Syria. But this is where the similarity ends.

Displacement in **Colombia** dates back to the start of the conflict between the government and FARC in 1964, and in Syria to the start of the civil war in 2011. The Colombian government has made efforts to understand IDPs' needs based on vulnerabilities along seven categories, many of which mirror IASC's benchmarks: housing, family reunification, documentation, nutrition, health, education and income. The currently available information does not provide the whole picture: the Colombian government has complete information for less than 20 percent of all registered IDPs. Of those, around 459,000 have overcome vulnerability in general, and almost one million have overcome the housing related vulnerability. We have reflected this in our stock figure for Colombia, which decreased from 7.2 million as of the end of 2016, to 6.5 million as of the end of last year. As more information becomes available, the figure might continue to be revised downwards.

Data on **Syria's** IDPs is not so comprehensive, but the information available from humanitarian partners, including OCHA's 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, and knowing that countrywide conflict is still ongoing and has led to the largest number of new displacements anywhere in the world in 2017, allows for a

FIGURE 8: Provisional solutions for IDPs displaced by conflict



broad assessment of their situation. Vulnerabilities and the severity of displacement in the country are clearly very high, however, a systematic measurement against IASC's benchmarks is missing to date.²⁴⁰

Measuring specific IDP caseloads against the eight benchmarks systematically in the future would allow us to draw conclusions about the severity of each displacement situation, and to provide a more nuanced reading of aggregated global displacement stock figures.



Indigenous people in Colombia struggle to cope with displacement one year after the peace agreement.
Photo: NRC/Ana Karina Delgado Diaz, November 2017

DISASTERS: BETTER ACCOUNTING FOR DURATION, SEVERITY AND RISK

More than half of the new displacements associated with disasters in 2017, or 9.9 million, were triggered by just ten events (see figure 9). This figure includes all forms of displacement, from people pre-emptively evacuated in anticipation of a disaster, to those fleeing their homes in response to a hazard's impacts. Disaster events in 2017 struck countries with very different income levels and capacities to prevent and respond to displacement, meaning that while some IDPs were able to return home quickly, many remained and are likely to remain displaced for weeks, months or years, depending on the extent of the damage and losses wrought.


The new displacement figures based on evacuation data encompass both short and long-term movements, and as such do not imply that everyone displaced by a specific hazard underwent the same experience. It is currently not possible to disaggregate the data we obtain by type and duration of movement for most of the events, yet this is key to understanding the severity of the displacement. It also makes it difficult to estimate a global stock figure for disaster IDPs that would show many people worldwide are currently living in displace-

ment as a result of disasters that may have occurred in previous years.


To overcome this limitation, and to understand what the likely scale of future disaster displacement is, IDMC has developed a global model to assess the risk of displacement associated with sudden-onset hazards. This model estimates that an average of 13.9 million people will be displaced during any given year in the future.²⁴¹ This figure, however, only includes people whose houses are likely to be severely damaged or destroyed, not those who may be displaced as a result of pre-emptive evacuations. Nor are forced movements associated with slow-onset hazards such as drought or sea-level rise included, which makes the risk estimates very conservative.

Despite such limitations, we know that the scale of displacement risk is significant and affects almost every country in the world. We also know that there are different levels of disaster displacement risk across the globe, and that understanding these variances is vital for decision-makers to be able to prepare and adjust their investments to reduce it accordingly (see map 2, p.53).

FIGURE 9: The ten largest disaster events that triggered displacement in 2017



MAP 2: Countries at low, medium and high disaster displacement risk



DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: PUTTING MORE DISPLACEMENT ON THE GLOBAL MAP

There is no recent global estimate of the number of people displaced by development projects. The last one, of 15 million people a year, is more than ten years old, and was derived from a previous estimate of 10 million people displaced annually by dams, urban and transport projects published in 1996.²⁴² The figure was increased to 15 million to account for mining and other sectors and the general proliferation of development projects worldwide. It is considered conservative, but there is no evidence to substantiate that.²⁴³

Given the wide range of project types and varying provisions to deal with their impacts, it is difficult to monitor when displacement starts and ends, where people move to and in which conditions. As such, this type of displacement remains a global uncertainty. In an effort to bridge the data and knowledge gap, for this year's GRID we applied both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to start building a global picture. Based on an analysis of resettlement plans published by the World Bank for 30 countries in 2016, around 19,000 people can be considered to be at risk of displacement in the near future as a consequence of 115 projects (see map 3).

MAP 3: People at risk of being affected or displaced as a consequence of development projects





FIGURE 10: Assessing displacement in the Jatigede dam, Indonesia



This figure represents just a small fraction of the risk associated with development investments, a fact confirmed by analysing the displacement associated with previous projects such as dams.²⁴⁴ New analysis of satellite imagery for 39 dams with a completion year from 2016 into the future shows that 55,000 people are at risk as result of these investments alone. These estimates, however, are not straightforward, and the case of the Jatigede dam on the Cimanuk river in West Java, Indonesia, exemplifies the complexity of monitoring this type of displacement. This dam, the second biggest in the country, was first proposed in 1963. Most of the families to be affected received compensation and agreed to relocate when construction began in the early 1980s, but many of them returned after learning that the project had stalled as a result of funding issues and other setbacks in the 1990s.²⁴⁵

After decades of planning and protests, the Indonesian government announced in 2004 that the project would resume. Construction restarted in 2008 and the reservoir began to be filled in 2015, forcing the remaining people to move. Analysis of satellite imagery shows around 5,500 submerged structures as of end of 2017. By applying national average household size, this translates into around 23,000 people displaced (see figure 10).

Forced displacement associated with large development projects throws a spotlight not just onto a country's development priorities, but also more broadly onto the underlying global paradigm that drives large-scale investment. Studies on this type of displacement have tended to focus on how to better understand and mitigate the negative impacts on those displaced, rather than questioning whether development investments that displace large numbers of people are necessary in the first place.

More investment is needed in new approaches to monitoring the global scale of this type of displacement, and future research also needs to further unpack the underlying assumptions and risks associated with large development investments. This is particularly relevant to projects planned as part of efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 9 on resilient infrastructure.


PART 2

OFF THE GRID

Making progress in reducing internal displacement

2018 is an opportunity to take stock as we look back on 20 years of efforts to protect and assist IDPs through normative frameworks and assess the global scale and nature of internal displacement. The humanitarian origins of policies on IDPs have shaped their focus on humanitarian assistance and protection. What is missing is a more comprehensive framing of internal displacement risk and approaches to assess and reduce its negative impacts.

Significant data challenges also persist. These limit policy successes and consign IDPs to the margins of national economic and security agendas. The path ahead must be based on a broader and more ambitious goal of truly reducing displacement, led by the countries it affects.



A young returnee girl by the Kunar riverside in Behsud District, Nangarhar, Afghanistan. Photo: NRC/Enayatullah Azad, January 2017

NORMATIVE ORIGINS AND POLICY PROGRESS

Internal displacement is not a new phenomenon, but as a policy issue only emerged on the global agenda in the early 1990s. The sharp increase in internal conflicts during the post-Cold War era forced millions of people to flee both within and across borders, and raised the question of legal protection for those who remained in their countries. Refugees were afforded international protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention, but IDPs had no comparable rights.²⁴⁶ Francis Deng, the representative of the UN secretary general on internally displaced persons at the time, concluded in 1995 that a new legal instrument was required to ensure that IDPs' specific needs were recognised and addressed.²⁴⁷

The lack of respect for human rights and humanitarian law was recognised, but there was also a belief that specific legal instruments would be unable to address internal displacement as a whole.²⁴⁸ It was further argued that specific conventions and laws on IDPs would distract from existing norms, that countries had little political appetite for them and that they would be too narrow and unable to address the causes of displacement.²⁴⁹

Given these challenges, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were presented to UN member states in 1998 as an alternative to a formal convention. They included norms that cover prevention, assistance and solutions in principle, but in reality the prevention aspect and to some extent that of solutions receded into the background, leaving the focus to fall on protecting and assisting IDPs.

The strong rights-based approach – the “right not to be displaced” – was important, but it also meant that internal displacement was framed in a way that left concern for national economic and social development aside.²⁵⁰ This affected policymaking and implementation by countries with large populations of IDPs.

At the same time, the Guiding Principles have been an effective international soft law mechanism, and the basis for many national, regional and international laws, strategies and policies. Global initiatives based on them, such as IASC's Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, its Operational Guidelines


on Human Rights and Natural Disasters and the UN's Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, have shaped humanitarian action. The position of the special representative on IDPs, which later became the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, strengthened awareness of the need to establish laws, policies and actions to address and reduce internal displacement.²⁵¹


Two African instruments, the 2006 Great Lakes Pact and the 2009 Kampala Convention, became the first legally binding mechanisms on internal displacement based on the Guiding Principles.²⁵² Based on their provisions, 14 African countries had a law on internal displacement as of March 2018 and 15 were in the process of developing one. Seventeen had a national policy on IDPs' protection and assistance, and 41 had other national instruments relevant to internal displacement.²⁵³

Despite this progress in policy development, however, internal displacement has continued unabated (see figure 11, p.59). In other words, international efforts to apply universal human rights and humanitarian principles to IDPs and their situations have only been partially successful. Their persistently high number tells us that the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection is not, and never will be enough to significantly reduce internal displacement in the long-term.

A shift toward prevention and risk reduction is needed. In order to increase awareness of internal displacement as an economic, security and political priority, we need a better grasp of how it comes about, and how its impacts generate new risk.

FIGURE 11: Internal displacement numbers and policy developments over the last 20 years





RE-FRAMING THE ISSUE: RISK AND IMPACTS

The large numbers of new and cyclical displacements presented in Part 1 of this report affect the achievement of economic and social development goals. Protracted displacement is increasingly becoming the norm and, combined with regular new displacement, it increases the vulnerability and exposure of already marginal populations and overstretches local governments' capacities to respond. As such, internal displacement is both a driver and outcome of a steady accumulation of risks, undermining progress on the 2030 Agenda, the Sendai Framework, the Paris Agreement, the Agenda for Humanity, the New Urban Agenda and their related national and regional strategies.

IDPs tend to receive assistance as part of humanitarian responses, isolating internal displacement as an issue from core development processes at the local and national level. Yet poorly managed development, including economic investment and social expenditure, clearly influence displacement patterns and trends. From China to the Horn of Africa, from Pakistan to Burundi and from Turkey to Mexico, displacement risk is fuelled by conflict and political instability, economic concentration in hazard-prone areas, environmental degradation, weak governance, lack of social protection and high levels of poverty and inequality.

The perception has grown that conflicts and disasters affect increasing numbers of countries, the risk of crises is regularly featured in the media and discussions about the causes of migration and the drivers of displacement abound.²⁵⁴ UNHCR observed as far back as 1998 that "population displacements are more than ever perceived as a threat to economic, social and environmental stability, as well as political security".²⁵⁵ Yet risk-informed humanitarian and development action have not shaped the way we address internal displacement. If it is to be reduced, we need to shift our attention to the accumulation of risk.

Displacement risk may not be at the top of most national governments' agendas, but it is a contingent liability that affects countries' economic and development balance sheets as the years go by. All new development investment, whether in economic infrastructure, housing, urban development or agriculture, has the potential to either increase or reduce displacement risk. Today's risks have been shaped by how those policies

and investments were made in the past. The future sustainability and resilience of societies and economies will be influenced by how they are made in the present.

Between now and 2030 it is estimated that \$2 trillion to \$9 trillion a year will be invested in water, sanitation, energy, transport and housing infrastructure.²⁵⁶ More than 60 per cent of the world's population is expected to live in towns and cities by the same date, and around 60 per cent of the area likely to be needed to accommodate the influx is still to be built.²⁵⁷ If investments of this scale are informed by an understanding of how they are likely to affect displacement risk in the long-term, they could have a significant impact on global sustainability and resilience.

Slow progress in addressing risk drivers leads to increased internal displacement, forced migration and humanitarian needs, and cyclical crises challenge already limited capacities to manage risks and provide adequate basic services and infrastructure. Years of conflict and underdevelopment in Haiti have resulted in a vicious cycle of risk generation, increasing the impact of disasters which have in turn become drivers of new and protracted displacement. The impacts of geophysical and weather-related disasters and epidemics in recent years have combined to bring the island to the brink of socioeconomic collapse. It lost 120 per cent of its GDP after the 2010 earthquake, dependency on international humanitarian aid remains high and resilience has been severely compromised.²⁵⁸


Displacement risk is unevenly distributed, with low income countries usually bearing the greatest risk in relation to population size. High disaster displacement risk is concentrated in only 5 countries in South and South East Asia and the Pacific – India, China, Bangladesh, Viet Nam and the Philippines.²⁵⁹ All five are characterised by high levels of exposure of people and assets and only slow progress in national efforts to reduce vulnerability.²⁶⁰

Conflict displacement risk is also concentrated in particular regions and countries, but this is less well understood. The complex dynamics at play between conflict, drought and poor natural resource management in Middle Eastern countries such as Libya, Egypt

and Syria have been studied, but it is not possible to infer direct causality.²⁶¹ More research is required to unpack how these factors determine displacement dynamics.²⁶²

Comparisons with UNDP's Human Development Index show that low levels of human development correlate strongly with disaster displacement risk. A number of countries with high human development face both high economic loss risk – a reflection of significant exposure of physical assets – as well as high displacement risk. Most of the countries with high levels of displacement risk, however, are those with low levels of human development, highlighting the role of vulnerability and exposure of populations to disaster (see figure 12).


FIGURE 12: Correlation between human development, disaster displacement risk and economic loss risk



Strong correlations are similarly evident between a broader set of development indicators and existing displacement.²⁶³ Here again, we are unable to infer causality, but they highlight areas that likely both generate displacement risk and are affected by displacement triggers such as conflict or disasters. The number of new displacements associated with conflict is higher in countries where fewer girls are enrolled in primary school and where infants are more likely to die (see figure 13). The quality of education and healthcare, represented through proxies of pupil-teacher ratios and the number of hospital beds per head of population, correlate strongly with disaster displacement.

In some countries this correlation may be as much a reflection of impact as of risk. Low health and education levels can be a driver of vulnerability, but also a direct impact of conflict and disaster. Infrastructure quality can also be both a determinant of displacement risk and a consequence of destruction by a hazardous event or war. New displacements associated with conflict are more common in countries where there is less internet access, where electricity consumption is lower and ports are less developed in the first place, but conflict also impedes infrastructure development. In

FIGURE 13: Conflict and disaster displacement relative to selected education and health indicators



this sense, displacement drivers and impacts are closely related, particularly in situations of protracted or cyclical displacement. Unless the main causes and impacts of vulnerability and displacement are addressed, they will continue to fuel future risk. Moreover, just as displacement can be a result of poor economic and social development and human security, it also threatens development gains, heightening people's vulnerability in the process.²⁶⁴

Taken together, the situations in Nigeria and South Sudan illustrate this point well. The disruption of livelihoods caused by the shrinking of Lake Chad has undermined economic growth in Nigeria, paving the way for the rise of Boko Haram, counterinsurgency operations and widespread displacement.²⁶⁵ Armed conflict and displacement in South Sudan have exacerbated food insecurity because farmers are unable to cultivate their crops. They have also disrupted markets and driven up food prices, undermining people's resilience to other shocks.²⁶⁶

That large-scale internal displacement has severe social and economic impacts, not just for those displaced but also for communities of origin, host communities and countries as a whole, is widely recognised.²⁶⁷ Qualitative research and case studies have explored how the phenomenon affects the wellbeing of individuals and communities, and it has been shown to limit the economic potential of IDPs and their hosts.²⁶⁸ What is missing are systematic and quantitative assessments of its impacts on local and national economies, and attempts to cost them coherently and comprehensively at the global level.²⁶⁹

A key challenge in assessing the costs of internal displacement lies in differentiating between the impacts of a disaster, conflict or other trigger and the impacts of displacement itself.

Displacement may affect an economy through the loss of assets such as livestock, loss of productivity and other impacts that may be direct or indirect, tangible or intangible and immediate or longer-term. Current attempts to quantify these impacts only cover lost assets and the direct, tangible and immediate costs, and these only partially.

The immediate economic impacts of internal displacement can be understood as the cost of providing shelter, transport, food and healthcare to IDPs. Its longer-term impacts can be understood in terms of lost opportunities, or the economic potential of IDPs and their host communities.

The economic impacts of displacement can be either positive or negative, and sometimes both at the same time, depending on which part of the economy is considered and from whose perspective. Local employers may see a drop in wages driven by the arrival of IDPs competing for work as positive, but host community workers will see it as negative. Landlords may see rise in rents caused by increased demand from newly arrived IDPs as positive, but local tenants will see it as negative. A comprehensive assessment should consider both positive and negative impacts, including the question of who benefits and who pays.

Wider and less direct impacts, such as reduced consumption, taxation or exports, and lost productivity caused by ill-health and interrupted education, should also be assessed and can be quantified. Others, such as the disruption of social networks, psychological trauma, deterioration of social stability and diverted development investments are difficult to quantify, but can represent a significant economic burden. Many of these costs are often assumed by affected communities and humanitarian organisations, but they should be understood as contingent liabilities of governments and accounted for as such.

Existing studies have highlighted seven major areas in which internal displacement may affect an economy, through impacts on housing and infrastructure, livelihoods, social and cultural factors, education, health, security and the environment. These correspond to the dimensions of human security and sustainable development, and have underpinned a number of frameworks in recent decades, including the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach in the 1990s, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and most recently the SDGs.²⁷⁰

Individual security, prosperity and social progress and state security and stability relate to each other. They are affected by, and can also drive internal displacement. The different human security and economic development dimensions relate to displacement in multiple ways, and each dimension has links to others (see table 1, p.63).

Understanding the relationship of each of these dimensions with internal displacement has to become the basis for more effective approaches to assisting IDPs and reducing the phenomenon over time. Accounting

for future displacement needs to build on recent efforts to broaden the scope of metrics and move beyond the current focus on numbers of IDPs and their immediate needs.

TABLE 1: Examples of displacement drivers and impacts across dimensions of economic and human security

Dimension of economic and human security	Displacement driver	Displacement impacts:		Links to other economic and human security dimensions
		Short-term	Long-term	
Infrastructure and housing	Destroyed housing	Emergence of unplanned settlements	Increased cost of housing in host community	Disease outbreaks caused by poor sanitation in substandard housing
	Land grabs	Cost of building, renting or buying new housing	Investments in housing and infrastructure in host community	Unplanned settlements contributing to environmental degradation
Livelihoods and food security	Limited livelihood opportunities	Loss of assets	Decline in working conditions and wages caused by increased competition for scarce jobs	Rise in malnutrition and associated health concerns
	Food insecurity and malnutrition	Inability to cultivate crops	Less capacity to save, buy and invest	Rise in poverty-driven criminality
		Competition for work in the host community		
Political, social and cultural factors	Ethnic, religious or other social tensions and violence	Disruption of social networks	Disintegration of cohesive communities and loss of traditional support mechanisms	Decreased investor confidence
		Insecurity in camps and deprived urban settings, including sexual violence	New demographic makeup resulting in political instability	Limited ability to engage in livelihood activities as a result of insecurity
	Conflict or criminality	Clashes between IDPs and host communities		Health and psychological impacts of violence
Health and education	Lack of access to basic services	Disease outbreaks due to poor sanitation in displacement camps	Potential physical or mental disability reducing ability to work	Limited productivity and economic activity
	Disease outbreaks	Lower quality of education due to influx to host communities	Lost years of schooling and subsequent reduction in revenues	
Environment	Environmental degradation and deforestation	Reduced access to ecosystem-dependent livelihoods	Natural resource scarcity and economic degradation in host and transit areas	Loss of livelihoods caused by environmental degradation
	Sudden- and slow-onset hazards and associated loss of livelihoods	Higher exposure and vulnerability to hazards		Conflict over resources between IDPs and host communities

THE NEW CURRENCY: DISPLACEMENT DATA FOR DEVELOPMENT

When Francis Deng was appointed as the UN secretary general's first representative on IDPs in 1992, he and his team had no solid baseline to work from. A first assessment of the number of IDPs globally was a rudimentary exercise, but even this put the figure at 24 million.²⁷¹ There was little information on IDPs' situations or the measures countries were taking to support them, and no information available on the risk of future displacement.

The same year, a number of landmark policy instruments were launched by UN member states, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The first world conference on sustainable development, the Earth Summit, was held in Rio de Janeiro, and its two main outcome documents, the Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, set a course for the next 20 years. The vast body of scientific research that underpinned the conference and its outcome documents allowed the international community to devise a concrete programme of action, set baselines and outline priorities for a sustainable development pathway.

There was no such evidence base for internal displacement at the time, but the first Global IDP Survey was undertaken in 1997-98. This gave birth to the Global IDP Project in 1998, which later became IDMC. We have published annual global figures and analyses of patterns and trends for internal displacement associated with conflict since our inception, and in 2008 we began doing the same for that associated with disasters. Even today, however, there are major evidence gaps on local dynamics and global trends. There are numerous challenges in collecting and analysing basic metrics such as the number of IDPs, their locations and the duration of their displacement.

The current interest in data and statistics on development represents a significant opportunity to fill some of these gaps.²⁷² Data is key to policy development, planning and - of course - monitoring progress, but the drive for more data on international development has not necessarily meant higher quality.²⁷³ A new push is needed now, for validated, credible and interoperable data.

Standard sets of metrics and statistics on internal displacement are vital for the implementation and monitoring of a number of international agreements, including the 2030 Agenda. There are other important frameworks and strategies under the agenda's umbrella that have the potential to act as catalysts for action on internal displacement. They include the Sendai framework, the UNFCCC Paris Agreement, the Nansen Initiative's protection agenda for people displaced across borders by disasters, the Agenda for Humanity, the Valletta Summit action plan and the New Urban Agenda.²⁷⁴

Quality statistics are also needed to monitor progress toward targets such as the ambitious objective of reducing new and protracted internal displacement by at least 50 per cent by 2030, set by the then UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon in 2016.²⁷⁵ Key metrics are also needed to inform the agreement and implementation of the global compacts on refugees and migration, which are scheduled for adoption later this year.

There has been some progress in recent years in efforts to strengthen national capacities to monitor progress against SDG indicators, and with the establishment of the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS). EGRIS began its work in 2016 to identify a set of national statistics on internal displacement, and to develop recommendations for overcoming the challenges inherent in national-level data collection, analysis and standardisation.²⁷⁶

Several countries and territories have shown leadership in this regard. Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq's Kurdistan Region, Kosovo, the Philippines, Somalia, Uganda and Ukraine should be commended for acknowledging that internal displacement is an issue in their territories and committing to understanding the scale and nature of it.²⁷⁷ All ten have engaged with EGRIS and reflected on the serious gaps in their data on IDPs. They have been open about the challenges associated with collecting, validating and analysing data on internal displacement and applying it to policymaking and investment planning.

*Children from the Jiw community of Colombia, in a new house built by NRC in El Resguardo Caño la Sal, Guaviare, where the community returned.
Photo: NRC/Edgar León, March 2017*



In general, however, nationally owned, validated and credible data is not easy to come by. Yet it will be key to increasing recognition of the phenomenon and making metrics and statistics for policymakers and planners more comparable and applicable. For countries to include addressing internal displacement in their local and national development plans and their reporting on the SDGs, they will need to either own or access data they can trust.

A number of countries are committed to making progress on this. They are trying to monitor progress on the SDGs in ways that include consideration of IDPs by collecting disaggregated data against specific indicators, or they have selected indicators as proxies for leaving no one - including IDPs - behind.

Afghanistan's voluntary national review highlights conflict and internal displacement as a key challenge to the country's development strategy, particularly in terms of economic performance, employment, inequality, public service distribution and governance. Internal displacement in particular is framed exclusively as an

impediment to SDG 1 on economic growth and poverty reduction. It is not mentioned under SDG 2 on hunger and food security, SDG 3 on health and wellbeing or SDG 5 on gender equality.

Azerbaijan's report focuses on the principle of leaving no one behind, and specifically mentions refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups including older people, people with disabilities, children, young people and women. It mentions IDPs under SDG 1 on poverty reduction and SDG 5 on gender equality. In its efforts to reduce poverty, the government focuses on the most vulnerable groups, including IDPs. Its progress report mentions that 250,000 IDPs have been provided with housing in more than 90 newly built settlements. It also states that one of the country's most serious gender-related problems is the violation of the human rights of more than a million refugees and IDPs, most of whom are women and children, as a result of the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.

These are promising developments, but many countries still face challenges in understanding, accounting

for and addressing displacement. They report a need for statistical capacity building, particularly in the use of information and communication technologies to monitor the SDGs.

Other countries with significant numbers of IDPs do not mention them at all in their voluntary national reviews, including DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, which regularly have the largest caseloads of new and protracted displacement associated with conflict. This points to a critical problem. IDPs may be recognised by a country's humanitarian bodies, but they are "off the grid" and ignored in its core development processes.

Beyond the 2030 Agenda's principle of leaving no one behind, internal displacement is directly relevant to all of the SDGs despite the absence of a specific target or indicator (see figure 14, p.67). Targets on migration and mobility under SDG 10 and high-quality disaggregated data under SDG 17 are clearly linked with internal displacement. SDG 11 on urban resilience and SDG 13 on climate action are also directly relevant, and can only be achieved if displacement is addressed.

AT A GLANCE: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN NATIONAL SDG PROGRESS REPORTING

As part of their efforts to monitor progress toward the SDGs, 65 countries submitted voluntary national reviews to the United Nations Statistical Commission in 2016 and 2017. At this early stage, most describe progress against the previous global agenda of the MDGs and their institutional arrangements for planning, implementing and monitoring the SDGs.

Regrettably, few of the countries worst affected by internal displacement have submitted a review, and even fewer mention the phenomenon. The three that accounted for the highest numbers of new displacements associated with conflict in 2017, Syria, DRC and Iraq, have not yet filed reviews. Of the 15 most-affected countries, only eight have done so and only two, Afghanistan and Nigeria, specifically mention internal displacement.


Different countries have established different institutional frameworks and policies to track their progress toward the SDGs. Some have set up a dedicated office within a ministry, the prime minister's office, presidency or national statistical body. Some include big data and information generated by private sector companies, while others rely on more traditional sources such as household surveys, censuses and administrative registers. Several countries mention the adoption of open access policies and online databases. All have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, country-specific indicators that are more or less equivalent to the global ones, though often fewer in number.

Most countries rely on internationally standardised demographic and health surveys (DHSs) or multiple indicator cluster surveys (MICSs) to populate a number of SDG indicators. Such household surveys tend not include information on IDPs, however, effectively making them invisible in national statistics. People forced to move from their habitual place of residence are often not listed in the administrative registries of their host region. As these registries serve as the basis for household surveys, IDPs usually do not appear in the lists of households to be visited by interviewers. Some countries have attempted to address this issue by conducting specific surveys for other "invisible" groups such as pastoralists. A similar approach could be applied for IDPs.

FIGURE 14: Internal displacement and the SDGs



FIGURE 15: Ownership and responsibility for internal displacement data



The focus on data for monitoring progress against a range of international frameworks, not least the SDGs, demonstrates a growing recognition that accountability starts with counting. Slow but steadily growing responsibility for accounting for displacement reflects this progress. The main data sources for that associated with conflict are still international humanitarian agencies, but governments are increasingly collecting and analysing information on displacement associated with disasters (see figure 15).

Many countries, however, face serious challenges in building the required statistical, administrative and analytical capacity. Setting national targets, identifying indicators and collecting and analysing data to track progress against a plethora of national, regional and global development strategies consume human and financial resources that are much needed elsewhere.

That said, the internal displacement figures currently reported will not suffice. Until now we have only been able to monitor outcomes in the form of stocks and flows, that is the number of IDPs at a specific point in time, and the number of people moving in and out of displacement over a specific time period. As discussed below, however, countries will need to monitor progress against a much wider set of issues, including governance arrangements; local, national, regional and global policies, programmes and investments; development and humanitarian indicators that determine risk and countries' capacity to support IDPs; and more complex displacement metrics, including duration and severity.

WHERE NEXT? MONITORING PROGRESS IN REDUCING INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

The above review of internal displacement monitoring over the last two decades points to two critical gaps. There is no comprehensive assessment of how displacement risk has increased or decreased over time or what has driven it, and there has been little analysis of how progress has been made in reducing existing displacement or what has hindered it. As a result, the evidence available is of limited use to inform effective programmes and policies at the national or local level.

Efforts by governments, the UN system, civil society experts and academia to address internal displacement remain dispersed and incoherent, because they lack a framework for action and accountability. Given that countries are committed to making progress against 17 SDGs and their 169 targets and 232 indicators, the inability of national and international stakeholders to set clear priorities for action and targets for progress on internal displacement is a glaring gap. It also presents a political obstacle at the national and local level, because those advocating for IDPs' protection and durable solutions find it difficult to make the case for greater political will and investment.

There have been previous attempts to provide such a framework, most notably in 2005, when the Brookings Institution tried to answer the question of what national responsibility for internal displacement means, and how it could be promoted and supported.²⁷⁸ The primary focus of the study was on governments, and it made recommendations in a number of vital areas, including the establishment of institutional focal points on IDPs, the development of national policies on internal displacement, data collection, awareness raising and the allocation of adequate resources.

The framework was also problematic, however, in that it failed to fully account for the realities of displacement drivers and adopted an essentially top-down approach. Recommendations for applying the Guiding Principles ran parallel or counter to national priorities and perspectives, and they contrasted with national guidance documents developed to support other international agreements such as the MDGs and SDGs.²⁷⁹

What is required now is a country-led framework, aligned with broader development goals and which allows for the development of national and global programmes, targets and standards for reducing internal displacement and displacement risk. Such a framework should recognise the relevance of the Guiding Principles, but take as its starting point the priorities set by governments and communities facing internal displacement. These may include needs and risk assessments, investment planning and budgeting, and contingency planning.

The right questions, indicators and metrics will need to be defined to plan for, invest in and monitor progress over time, and they need to cover the three areas of inputs, outputs and outcomes discussed above:

- | What do countries and their partners invest in displacement governance and how do they do it?
- | Which resulting capacities and conditions determine a country's displacement risk and its ability to support IDPs?
- | Is internal displacement increasing or decreasing in terms of the number of IDPs and distribution, duration and severity of the phenomenon?

Action can be taken across these three areas and progress monitored within existing national strategies and programmes and with existing resources, but real progress will require additional support, particularly for capacity development at the national and local level.

DISPLACEMENT GOVERNANCE

Thirty-one countries currently have dedicated policies and strategies on IDPs. This has been presented as a success, but given that 143 countries and territories were affected by internal displacement due to conflict and disasters in 2017, it means only a small minority have taken explicit responsibility for the phenomenon. Aside

from dedicated policies, overall governance arrangements and the ways internal displacement is reflected in sector strategies and programmes are also critical.

A few key questions can guide local and national governments in planning for implementation and reviewing progress:

- | Where in the government is political leadership on internal displacement located?
- | Does a national policy or strategy for reducing internal displacement exist?
- | Are dedicated budgets available to address internal displacement, and where does responsibility for their execution lie?
- | Does the country have the capacity, and is there a centralised system for collecting, analysing and reporting data on internal displacement? And if so, is it aligned with systems and standards for reporting against the SDGs?

As well as monitoring local, national and international policies on internal displacement itself, we should track relevant policies and frameworks on forced displacement, migration, disaster management, climate change, conflict and peacebuilding and poverty reduction.

CAPACITIES AND CONDITIONS

To effectively assess the risk of new displacement and address existing displacement through protection, assistance and support towards durable solutions, specific capacities and conditions at the local and national level that determine displacement risk need to be identified and monitored. These cut across a number of development domains and sectors and across the SDGs, some indicators of which could be used as proxies.

The data needed to feed into this monitoring framework is often publicly available in global databases at the national level, but lack disaggregation. The SDGs' 232 indicators cover a broad range of aspects relevant to policies and drivers of internal displacement, but a large library of indicators is not practical for programming and investment planning, or for regular and systematic

progress monitoring. Instead, a limited number should be chosen as proxies and provide sufficient explanatory value. Presented within a composite index, they can be used to assess and track the conditions that shape a country's displacement risk over time and its capacity to address and reduce internal displacement.

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT METRICS

Numbers of IDPs and information on their situations, including their location and the duration and severity of their displacement, should be recorded consistently at the local and national level. It is vital to improve the way numbers and metrics on patterns and trends of new displacements, and the numbers of existing IDPs are determined. Combined with advances in tools, methodologies and technological innovation, this will enable monitoring to be broadened out to include different types of displacement, such as that associated with development projects, urban displacement and slow-onset hazards, and to increase geographic and demographic coverage. In addition to monitoring numbers of IDPs, metrics on the severity of their displacement and the costs resulting from it need to be developed.

This three-tiered approach to monitoring would provide countries and the international community with a more realistic sense of whether internal displacement can be expected to increase or is being reduced. If implemented regularly and over time, it would provide a more solid basis for agreeing and planning more effective approaches to addressing the phenomenon. Monitoring in this way would also allow us to understand progress regardless of spikes caused by flare-ups in conflict or the impact of disasters, and to guide countries' investments over time.

We will test this approach in 2018 in a number of countries with significant levels of displacement, and present our initial results to them for discussion. Together with these pilot countries, we propose to develop a systematic national review of indicators on the policies, drivers and impacts of internal displacement that need to be monitored over time. Our aim then is to expand the approach to all countries facing internal displacement and regularly provide information in the form of a country dashboard (see table 2, p.71). We will also analyse the results in our future GRIDs.

TABLE 2: Example of a country monitoring dashboard²⁸⁰

[Country name]			
Displacement governance		Capacities and conditions	Displacement metrics
Government collects and publishes data on IDPs	Y / N	Affected by conflict or generalised violence	Y / N
Displacement risk assessments and early warning tools exist	Y / N	At high risk of disasters	Y / N
Responsibility for internal displacement located at highest level of national government	Y / N	Education: % of children out of primary school	
Decentralised and dedicated budget for local governments to support IDPs	Y / N	Health: neonatal death rate	
National policy on internal displacement or IDPs	Y / N	Environment: rate of deforestation	
Internal displacement in other policies:		Economy:	Displacement severity index ranking ²⁸¹
– Disaster risk reduction	– Y / N	– Ease of doing business	
– Peacebuilding	– Y / N	– Trade integration	
– Poverty reduction	– Y / N	– CO2 emissions per capita	
– Infrastructure and investment plans	– Y / N	– Infrastructure: electricity consumption per capita	
– National policy on resettlement	– Y / N	Governance capacity:	
– Signatory to international frameworks on internal displacement or migration	– Y / N	– Tax/GDP ratio	
		– Social expenditure	Humanitarian assistance for IDPs in the past year

PART 3

INSIDE THE GRID

Filling the data gaps

We continued to make concerted efforts to bring as much internal displacement as possible “on the GRID” in 2017, and to paint a more comprehensive and three-dimensional picture (numbers, duration and severity). To keep doing so we need ever more credible, validated data on the magnitude, duration and severity of displacement, its impacts on those displaced and their host communities, and the risk of it occurring in the future.

Comprehensive monitoring on a range of indicators is required to measure progress against a number of global policies and targets related to internal displacement. These include reducing the phenomenon by half

by 2030, addressing climate-related displacement and disaster risks and achieving the SDGs.²⁸² We need this data to reframe the issue in terms of displacement risk, and to equip governments with the evidence and tools to address and reduce it (see Part 2).

This need goes beyond support for global policy processes. The impacts of displacement will vary depending on its magnitude, cause and duration. The people who bear the impacts and costs will also vary, because displacement risk and resilience to it are unequally distributed. To understand these dynamics and support timely and effective responses, we need accounting to be as comprehensive as possible.



A student at the Aal Okab school stands in the ruins of one of his former classrooms in Saada city, Yemen, which was destroyed in June 2015. Students now attend lessons in UNICEF tents nearby. Photo: UN OCHA/Giles Clarke, April 2017

TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE

For this year's GRID we have analysed more data than ever before, entering more than 5,000 displacement-related "facts" in our database. We obtained information on 915 incidents of displacement associated with conflict in 2017, an increase of more than 300 per cent on 2016, and we produced estimates for 890 disasters, an increase of more than 50 per cent. We achieved this through the use of new tools and approaches and by putting greater emphasis on event-based monitoring of key flows.

Comprehensive accounting also means capturing more phenomena and small-scale events. Though these situations are often hard to identify and track, particularly when they do not prompt a humanitarian response, accounting for them is vital to our broader understanding of both displacement and displacement risk. We reported on 111 disasters that displaced 25 people or fewer in 2017, 52 of which displaced fewer than ten. Small incidents of displacement associated with conflict are even trickier to identify, but we still managed to obtain and verify information about 21 events in which 200 or fewer people were displaced.

We also increased the amount of information we recorded on returning IDPs and refugees, recording more than 165 facts in 25 countries. The issue of returns has been high on the international agenda, but the data we obtained suggests that reports of them should not be taken at face value.

We recorded 981 stock facts about the number of people displaced by conflict and 973 about those displaced by disasters, though the latter tend only to be collected during the immediate aftermath of an event. Given that our global stock figure of 39.5 million people displaced by conflict represents many separate case-loads with varying degrees of need, we also attempted to assess the severity of each situation to help direct attention and resources to where they are most needed.

Our data on new displacements comes from a range of sources, including national and local governments, the UN and other international organisations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, civil society and the media (see figure 16, p.74). In a few cases we produced figures using remote-sensing data and satellite imagery.

UNDERSTANDING STOCKS AND FLOWS

The data we collect falls into two categories, stocks and flows, which reflect the terms used by national statistics offices and the UN Statistical Commission's Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS). It should be remembered that the figures in this report represent people whose lives have been uprooted and disrupted, often violently and traumatically, and who have suffered significant personal losses.

A stock figure refers to "the total number of people who match an established definition of being internally displaced in a determined location at a specific moment".²⁸³ In this report, we present this figure "as of the end of 2017".

Flows refer to "the number of people who meet certain criteria within a particular time period, (as opposed to a specific reference date), and whose status as a member of the population in question changes as a result".²⁸⁴ Displacement flows have a direction and describe the process leading to people being counted as IDPs (inflows) or no longer counted (outflows). The number of new IDPs identified between two specific dates following the event that triggered their displacement is an example of an inflow, which we refer to in this report as "new displacements". IDPs who flee abroad, or who die in displacement, are examples of outflows.

Once we obtain data, we analyse, transform and map it onto our data model (see figure 17, p.74), subjecting our findings to internal and external peer review. Despite our best efforts to collect data on all relevant inflows and outflows, the overwhelming majority of information we obtained was related to new displacements and returns.

FIGURE 16: Data on new displacement by type of source





FIGURE 17: Internal displacement data model depicting the main stocks and flows



KEY DATA GAPS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Although we have increased the scope of our monitoring and improved the means by which we verify and analyse our sources' data, a number of gaps remain. These increase the uncertainty of our estimates and pose a challenge for policy development and programming. Accurate measurements of displacement and displacement risk are required to measure progress toward global targets, and an accurate understanding of the dynamics of displacement situations and the needs of IDPs is required for effective action on the ground.

Some of the gaps we encountered were the same as last year, including limited geographic coverage across and within countries, difficulties in distinguishing between new, secondary or tertiary displacements, challenges in obtaining disaggregated and geospatially referenced data on IDPs and their movements, and accounting for all types of displacement.²⁸⁵

LACK OF OBSERVATIONAL DATA ON FLOWS

We strive to produce our figures using verified observational data related to the metrics in question. We record the information in our database as it is collected and shared. In the best-case scenario, we are able to rely on direct measurements of each flow.

Unfortunately, we were only able to obtain comprehensive observational or event-based data on specific flows in a small number of countries. Most of the flow data we obtained was not disaggregated by type of movement, meaning that aside from the few instances in which we received information about people being displaced from camps or shelters we were unable to distinguish new, secondary or tertiary displacements.

For most countries, we had to infer the number of new displacements from net increases in nationally aggregated stock figures from one reporting round to the next. As we noted last year, this is a method of last resort because it is extremely conservative and can lead to significant under-reporting.²⁸⁶

The data we obtained on South Sudan demonstrates the need for comprehensive flow monitoring and illustrates the extent to which periodic collections of stock data can lead to the scale of new displacement being underestimated. Our new displacement figure is based on an analysis of 47 reported incidents supported by additional information from partners in the field. Had we arrived at our estimate based on changes in the country's relatively static stock figures, we would have reported only 189,000 new displacements instead of 857,000.

The lack of comprehensive, disaggregated flow data inhibits our ability to report accurately on the dynamics of a given situation in other ways. New displacements increase the number of IDPs whereas secondary and tertiary displacements do not. If the stock figures remain more or less steady, they make it impossible to detect repeated or short-term displacements. As was the case in South Sudan, the volume of new displacements may be offset by IDPs who return or flee onward across borders. Data on flows is also needed to determine when displacements occurred and to estimate their duration.

The operational implications are significant. People who have been displaced for a few weeks will have different needs and vulnerabilities to those who have been living in displacement for months or years. The same is true for people who have been displaced only once compared to those displaced several times. As we reported in Off the GRID last year, IDPs who have been displaced repeatedly within their own country may also be more likely to cross an international border.²⁸⁷

Measuring new displacements and understanding the factors that drive them is required for effective policy design and implementation. The policy discourse has begun to shift away from an exclusive focus on response in recent years and toward managing and reducing displacement risk (see Part 2). Disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation agendas explicitly frame displacement from the perspective of risk reduction and risk management, and the goal of halving the number of IDPs by 2030 will not be met unless the risk of new displacement is reduced.

The UN goal of halving the number of IDPs has renewed attention on returns and collective outcomes.²⁸⁸ This underscores the need for better monitoring and understanding of these flows. We obtained data on returning IDPs and refugees for 25 countries in 2017, and for some, including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and Syria, we also obtained information about the conditions people were returning to. The evidence suggests, however, that few if any returnees should be “taken off the books” as IDPs because many returned to conditions of high vulnerability, remain displaced in their areas of origin or became displaced again (see spotlight, p.36).

Comprehensive monitoring and reporting on the flows related to the end of displacement remains difficult because of conceptual and data challenges. The definition of an IDP is relatively clear, but the notion of when displacement ends is more complex and harder to determine. We consider that a person ceases to be an IDP when they have sustainably returned to their habitual place of residence, integrated locally or settled elsewhere in the country, provided this happens voluntarily, in safety and with dignity. Even such outcomes, however, do not necessarily imply an end to the negative consequences of displacement.

Many initiatives, including EGRIS, aim to define the end of displacement and establish associated metrics. In doing so it is important to consider former IDPs’ rights and ongoing situations until they no longer have needs or suffer discrimination related to their displacement in line with the IASC framework on durable solutions.²⁸⁹ The process of achieving a durable solution can be long, complex and take many forms, which means that obtaining accurate and reliable data on it poses many challenges.

What qualifies as a durable solution varies significantly from one country to another, particularly when displacement triggers and impacts are very different. Defining each of the stages in the process and tailoring it to each situation is also an enormous endeavour from a practical and technical perspective. Establishing clear thresholds, and collecting time-series data on the corresponding indicators in a consistent way is equally challenging.

As a result, data on returns is often unavailable or unusable because definitions vary within and between agencies. Reporting on returns may also lead to people being “taken off the books” as IDPs, despite the fact that may

not have been able re-establish their lives sustainably or achieve a durable solution.

The path toward durable solutions is not a one-way street. Our data shows that people get stuck or return to a situation of displacement (see Part 1). Ongoing monitoring and longitudinal data are needed to identify policies and measures that reduce the risk of repeated displacement, and of IDPs returning to situations of chronic vulnerability. To bridge such gaps, interoperable data on forced displacement is essential.

UNCERTAIN, GEOGRAPHICALLY LIMITED AND DECAYING STOCK DATA

Most of the data we receive on displacement associated with conflict is in the form of stock figures, enabling us to estimate the total number of people displaced as of the end of the year. As in previous years, we were unable to obtain enough up-to-date data on displacement associated with disasters to generate a global end-of-year estimate, but we have made progress toward filling this gap by using models and analysing proxy indicators such as data from social media.

As with the flow data, the stock figures we receive are seldom what they seem. In Colombia and Ukraine, for example, official government counts are just the starting point of our analysis, and both cases illustrate why we publish lengthy annotations to all of our figures for displacement associated with conflict in addition to our online methodological annex.

Our estimate of the number of IDPs in Colombia as of the end of 2017 is based on data in the government’s victims registry (RUV). The RUV database, however, keeps a record of everyone who fled their homes during decades of civil war, regardless of whether they are still displaced or not. As such, it is not a true reflection of the country’s stock of IDPs. Our estimate is lower than the government figure because we subtracted people who have died in displacement or overcome their vulnerabilities based on seven dimensions of vulnerability: housing, family reunification, identification, nutrition, health, education and income.²⁹⁰

Our estimate of Ukraine’s stock of IDPs refers to those living relatively permanently in government-controlled



Villagers from government-controlled Novotoshkivka, Ukraine, transport non-food items back to their homes. Photo: NRC, January 2016

areas. It is based on data published by OCHA, which in turn derives its figures from a number of sources including IOM, the Ministry of Social Policy's database on IDPs, the State Statistics Service and the country's pension fund. Many returned IDPs who live in non-government controlled areas remain in the ministry's database in order to access their pensions and other benefits and services, but unfortunately the exact number of people in this category is unknown.

Based on the available data and contextual information provided by partners in the country, we estimate that there were around 800,000 IDPs in Ukraine as of the end of 2017. This is roughly half of the figure we reported last year (1,653,000). The main reason for the decrease is the absence of concrete evidence concerning the exact status of claimants registered as IDPs living in non-government-controlled areas, a significant proportion of whom are suspected to travel back and forth across the contact line to receive benefits.

Most organisations working in Ukraine have indicated that the previously reported figure was consequently an overestimate, which has also led to government efforts to adjust its registry.

We also note that people who have returned to their former homes may still have vulnerabilities and face risks associated with their displacement. In this sense, their return does not imply the achievement of a durable solution. Furthermore, figures about returns were not available at the time of data collection. Overall, IDMC estimates are conservative in that they do not include unregistered IDPs living in non-government controlled areas, nor do they include returnees who achieved provisional solutions, since we were unable to obtain figures for both categories (see spotlight, p.47).

DEALING WITH DECAYING STOCK DATA

As in previous years, decaying data was one of the main challenges we faced in 2017 despite our best efforts to obtain the most current and updated information. We were able to capture recent data on most of the situations we monitor, but there were still a number of caseloads, including Bangladesh, Myanmar and Turkey, for which it was significantly out-of-date, resulting in figures in which we have low confidence (see figure 18).

BANGLADESH

Bangladesh's stock of 432,000 IDPs consists of two old caseloads. About two-thirds are members of tribes displaced in the Chittagong Hill Tracts area in the south-east of the country between 1977 and 1997. The remainder are Urdu-speaking Biharis displaced in 1970s who are still presumed to be living in camps across the country. The last surveys of the two caseloads were nine and 12 years ago respectively. This year we reached out to 38 institutions and individuals in an attempt to update our figures. Our contextual analysis and the limited, conflicting new information we obtained did not, however, enable us to revise our previous estimate.

MYANMAR

Our stock figure for Myanmar is around 635,000 IDPs, but about two-thirds of the data relates to people displaced at an undisclosed time in the past by conflict, development projects and disasters in the south-east of the country.²⁹¹ The figure is based on a survey conducted by The Border Consortium (TBC) in 2012 and

partially replicated in 2014.²⁹² The data does not allow us to determine when these people were displaced, or whether or not they remain so.


Displacement has historically been an important coping mechanism in the south-east, but many IDPs may have settled permanently in their areas of displacement.²⁹³ As such, our figure may capture the cumulative flow of new, secondary and repeated displacements rather than the number of people displaced as of the end of 2017.

TURKEY

Lack of access to conflict-affected areas in Turkey make it difficult to paint a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of internal displacement in the country. Our stock figure of 1,113,000 aggregates three caseloads, representing two main waves of displacement.

The first, of around of 954,000 people, was reported by Hacettepe University's Institute of Population Studies in research carried out between December 2004 and June 2006. Its goal was to estimate the number of IDPs in Turkey's Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions, mainly people of Kurdish ethnicity displaced by the conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) between 1984 and 1999.²⁹⁴ The study highlighted the barriers IDPs faced in integrating locally or otherwise achieving durable solutions, but it has never been updated, making it difficult to estimate the size of the current displaced population.

FIGURE 18: Source data on stocks of IDPs displaced by conflict, ordered by date



The second caseload is made up of people displaced by the resurgence of the same conflict in 2015 and 2016, and the third is an update of our GRID 2017 figure. Based on the analysis of satellite imagery, it accounts for people displaced by military operations in the south-east of the country since 2016.


SYRIA

Despite the fact that the displacement situation in Syria is one of the most dynamic we monitor, we struggled to produce a robust end-of-year estimate of the number of people displaced by the conflict. This was because one of our key data providers stopped publishing and sharing its data at the end of November, and our remaining sources cover less than half of the country. As a result, our estimate is a mix of data last updated in November and December.

YEMEN

The most recent data from the country's Task Force on Population Movements was published in September 2017 and included some which had not been updated since May. Complicating matters further, the task force's data was collected by two different partners, each with its own methodology and verification standards. Given the events that took place in the second half of the year and the fact that conflict became more frequent in December, it is reasonable to assume that the displacement figures, particularly the number of new displacements, would have been significantly higher had the data been updated (see figure 19).

FIGURE 19: Reported incidents of conflict and displacement associated with conflict in Yemen in 2017



Sources: ACLED and IDMC-IDETECT

With the exception of Colombia, relatively little stock data we obtain speaks to the impacts of displacement on IDPs. We obtained information about IDPs' location and type of shelter for several countries, but information about their needs was aggregated into broader assessments or funding appeals. As a result, our assessment of the severity of each displacement caseload is limited and based on contextual analysis and the expert opinions of our team and data sources.

Assessing the severity and impacts of displacement is vital for focusing attention and political will and for allocating resources where they are most needed. The lack of understanding of the medium- and long-term impacts on IDPs and their host communities is an obstacle to providing the funding, services and other

resources needed to resolve displacement once it has occurred. Without knowing the amount of time and resources required to achieve collective outcomes, it will remain challenging for both donors and governments of countries affected by displacement to take responsibility and help IDPs achieve durable solutions.

LIMITED REPORTING ON DISPLACEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH DROUGHT AND OTHER COMPLEX PHENOMENA

More than 686 million people across Africa and Asia have been affected by drought since 2008, more than earthquakes, storms and floods combined.²⁹⁵ We have not, however, been able to obtain verified data on more than a handful of displacement situations associated with the phenomenon. We have documented the difficulties in monitoring and reporting on this type of displacement in detail in previous reports, but they include:

- | Inconsistent definitions of both drought and related displacement
- | Distinguishing displacement from other migratory patterns
- | Attributing displacement to drought when a number of overlapping stressors - often drought, conflict and food insecurity - occur simultaneously or in rapid succession.²⁹⁶

Our inability to account for displacement associated with drought and other complex and slow-onset phenomena amounts to a major blind spot with global consequences. Drought is the most visible and pressing natural hazard in some regions of the world, and our lack of reporting on these situations represents a geographical bias in our global figures. More importantly, it means that we are missing opportunities to improve humanitarian responses to complex emergencies and inform national, regional and global policy processes that aim to reduce drought risk.

This year we were able to estimate new displacements associated with drought for the first time thanks to a determined effort to collect data and extensive outreach to a number of partners. Across Burundi, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Somalia we put the figure at 1.3 million. This is based on our analysis and that of our partners on the ground. It refers to people who reported drought as the primary cause of their displacement when data collected on other indicators was consistent with our conceptualisation of the phenomenon.²⁹⁷

A displaced woman and her son walk their two surviving animals in Ferdigab, Somaliland. They spend the day on the lookout for grass and water for the weak animals, cutting tree branches to feed them. Photo: NRC/Adrienne Surprenant, April 2017



In Ethiopia and Somalia, for example, displacement came about as a result of drought and the consequent deterioration of pastoralists' livelihoods. In Burundi and Madagascar, the displacement came about because of crop failure and farmers' food insecurity. We did not include other countries, such as Angola, Chad, China, Mauritania and Niger, where EM-DAT reported that 10 million people were affected by drought, because of a lack of accessible and verified data.²⁹⁸

In Burundi, Ethiopia and Somalia we recorded new displacements associated with both drought and conflict. When people cited drought as a factor that fuelled the conflict which led to their displacement, we recorded them as displaced by conflict. Given how many other countries experienced both drought and conflict in 2017, we expect that the former played a role in other new displacements attributed to the latter, particularly in Chad and Niger, where we recorded around 46,000 new displacements associated with conflict.²⁹⁹

We continue to struggle to produce displacement figures for other complex phenomena, including different forms of development activities, gang and generalised violence and the gradual impacts of climate change and desertification. Our new figures for people displaced by, or at risk of being displaced, by recent and ongoing dam construction represent a small fraction of the overall scale of displacement associated with development projects. We have focussed initially on this type of displacement because the phenomenon was relatively easy to describe, detect and measure, and because some data on dams at least was readily available (see Part 1 and online methodological annex).

Our figures for the three countries in the Northern Triangle of Central America reflect displacement associated with gang violence. We still struggle to report on these situations comprehensively, however, because data is severely lacking. As with drought, we and our data providers face challenges in identifying these movements and obtaining data on them, often because the people displaced chose to remain off the radar for fear of reprisals.³⁰⁰ Recent inter-governmental initiatives to address and respond to this type of displacement require a more rigorous evidence base to develop more coherent solutions to what is essentially an invisible crisis.

We will continue to highlight our most significant data gaps and challenges, and illustrate why they matter to both policymaking and operations. The issues we face not only add uncertainty to our figures. They also pose a more fundamental impediment to a fuller understanding of internal displacement, how it comes about, its impacts and how it can be resolved. Such data is needed to reframe the phenomenon, encourage national governments to take responsibility for it and help them to address it by implementing a range of relevant policies and plans.

By calling attention to the challenges we face and describing the ways in which we are working to overcome them, we are making an explicit appeal to our data partners to share ownership of the issue. As stated at the most recent UN General Assembly, our global internal displacement database serves as the primary reference and central repository for others' reliable data that we have analysed and validated, and which is needed "to improve policy and programming, preventive measures on and response to internal displacement and to promote the achievement of durable solutions".³⁰¹

CONCLUSION

Toward a global framework for national change

Despite progress in implementing the Guiding Principles over the last 20 years, internal displacement is still not a key component of national and global development agendas. Efforts to address the phenomenon are not yet seen as investments in risk governance and sustainable development.

To reduce displacement risk, protect and assist those already displaced and help them to achieve durable solutions, countries have to be in the driving seat. Investments in equitable development, peacebuilding and disaster risk reduction will have to go hand in hand with coordinated humanitarian action. A first step would

be to develop a country-led framework for reducing internal displacement to facilitate planning, target setting and monitoring.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AS OPPORTUNITY

Some progress has been made in mainstreaming internal displacement into domestic policy. Greater leadership is particularly visible when it comes to displacement associated with disasters, which more countries than ever

Classrooms in Damascus and surrounding towns reopened in 2017 for summer school, giving internally displaced children in Syria the opportunity to study again, after being forced to leave their home towns. Photo: NRC/Karl Schembri, August 2017



recognise as a development concern. They also increasingly embrace the positive impacts of a strengthened global disaster risk reduction agenda.

These developments should be supported, continued and reinforced, but there are two caveats: first, policy instruments do not necessarily lead to successful implementation; and second, the pace of implementation may be outstripped by the generation of displacement risk, which then materialises. So where will the political will and solutions come from to reverse this trend? What incentives do states have to reduce displacement risk?

This report has started to present the case for investment by arguing that human and state security, economic growth and social stability are impossible to achieve in countries that have large numbers of people living in protracted displacement, or face recurrent new displacement and high levels of risk. Displacement is both a cause and consequence of insecurity and low or unequal economic and social development.

More solid evidence is required, but examples from 2017 show that high vulnerability combined with poor physical and economic security can quickly translate into crises for individuals, communities and states. Unsustainable development practices increase the risks that trigger displacement, even in high-income countries with significant governance capacity.

Our hope and intention is that by assessing the true costs of internal displacement on local and national economies, countries and those interested in reducing the phenomenon will be encouraged to focus their attention on the trade-offs inherent in the setting of national priorities and development and humanitarian budgeting.

As this report clearly demonstrates, more comprehensive monitoring of progress in reducing internal displacement is vital at both the national and international level. The shortage of data on existing situations, which we regularly highlight, and the absence of sound risk models for all types of displacement, are obstacles that need to be addressed. That said, much relevant data produced by governments for other purposes is available, which means we are still able to assess some of the drivers and impacts of displacement, albeit sometimes indirectly and imperfectly.

More data will not necessarily translate into better outcomes, however, and reporting only on the scale of internal displacement and the urgency of protection concerns will not paint a truly global picture. It is even less likely to shift political attention and programme approaches. High quality and interoperable data across the entire displacement continuum is needed, and that data must be used to inform smart and effective responses.

The suggested guiding questions and country dashboard for monitoring put forward in Part 2 of this report helps to address these issues by encouraging countries to understand internal displacement in relation to political, economic and security priorities. It also encourages more comprehensive reporting on progress against the SDGs, commitments under the Sendai Framework and the Paris Agreement, and on the future global compacts on refugees and migration.

Comprehensive and concrete investments are needed to reduce existing displacement, account for the risk of new displacement, and integrate displacement risk into development planning. Below we set out clear recommendations to do so at the national, regional and global level (see table 3, p.84). A range of development and humanitarian actors, including national line ministries, will have to cooperate and coordinate to put them into practice in order to achieve collective outcomes.³⁰²

TABLE 3: Reducing displacement risk through national and local action for collective outcomes

Account for internal displacement risk

- 1 Invest in administrative and statistical capacities for improved data collection, analysis and progress monitoring for internal displacement in line with requirements for planning and reporting against the SDGs
- 2 Establish or improve displacement risk assessment and early warning capacities at the local and national level

Build displacement risk governance capacity

- 3 Show political will by locating responsibility for a national accounting system for IDPs and for the monitoring of internal displacement at the highest level, backed by the necessary political authority and resources
- 4 Share power by decentralising responsibility for the prevention of displacement and IDPs' protection to the local level, backed by the necessary devolution of authority and dedicated human and financial resources
- 5 Promote accountability by encouraging national audit offices and similar control mechanisms to undertake periodic reviews of progress in reducing displacement within national development plans and strategies

Integrate displacement risk into existing development instruments and mechanisms

- 6 Ensure that internal displacement is considered in national development plans, poverty reduction strategies and sector investment plans
- 7 Develop social and economic investment plans for municipalities and regions with high numbers of IDPs, resource constraints and low infrastructure and social service capacities
- 8 Invest in ecosystem services and natural resource management in line with frameworks such as the Convention on Biodiversity, the Framework Convention on Desertification and Deforestation and the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction
- 9 Accelerate action on peacebuilding and conflict prevention at all levels in line with regional frameworks and peace processes
- 10 Shift from humanitarian assistance and protection to greater investment in preparedness and prevention, including comprehensive social protection and welfare programmes that target particularly vulnerable groups



Gloria Guerrero, 74, walks past the coconut trees in her backyard damaged by typhoon Nocten in Catanduanes, Philippines. Photo: Linus Guardian Escandor II, January 2017

TOWARD A COLLECTIVE APPROACH

As we launch this report, countries are negotiating the global compacts on refugees and migration. They are also reporting on progress against SDGs that are central to the issue of human mobility in the 21st century, particularly goal 11 on safe and resilient cities. The link between displacement on the one hand, and economic growth, social progress and human and national security on the other, should be apparent in these policy processes, but it is not explicitly made.

Country-led strategies are needed that harness the benefits of mobility while managing the risk of displacement through prevention, peace and resilience building and disaster risk reduction. This would put countries in the driving seat, but the international community – primarily UN agencies and large humanitarian and development organisations – should also move internal displacement up their agendas and provide more coordinated support.

The UN secretary general, António Guterres, has highlighted the urgent need for a more effective and holistic approach to understanding and dealing with crises through proactive investments and prevention, noting that “while the causes of crises are deeply interlinked, the UN’s response remains fragmented”.³⁰³ The international community’s approach to internal displacement is a prime example of this, in which fragmented data, analysis and knowledge impedes coordinated responses.

By taking on internal displacement as an integral part of his crisis prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development agenda,³⁰⁴ the UN Secretary-General would be at the forefront of a much-needed paradigm shift from reaction to prospective action, and from fragmented response to prevention and sustained development investment. By working with member states and the UN system toward common goals and national targets for reducing internal displacement, including by the establishment of a dedicated function and office at the highest level, he might convert the promise to leave no one behind into reality.

We need to raise our collective ambitions. We need to accept that the people who tried to scale the Ceuta border fence were doing so because of our failure to ensure the physical safety and wellbeing of the most vulnerable, our failure to understand internal displacement as the starting point of broader crises. But if we change the narrative, and listen to those who are suffering as well as those that are responsible and capable, we can bridge the gap between development priorities and humanitarian concerns, and truly turn the tide on internal displacement.

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TABLE 1

NEW DISPLACEMENTS BY COUNTRY FOR DISASTERS AND CONFLICT

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	New displacements in 2017 (disasters)	Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	New displacements in 2017 (disasters)
Afghanistan	474,000	27,000	Congo	86,000	
Albania		3,500	Costa Rica		11,000
Angola		14,000	Côte d'Ivoire	5,500	
Anguilla		500	Croatia		230
Antigua and Barbuda		1,400	Cuba		1,738,000
Argentina		27,000	Dem. Rep. Congo	2,166,000	27,000
Australia		31,000	Dominica		35,000
Bahamas		1,600	Dominican Republic		69,000
Bangladesh	6,000	946,000	Ecuador		3,000
Benin		3,500	Egypt	3,800	
Bolivia		3,500	El Salvador	296,000	390
Botswana		2,000	Ethiopia	725,000	434,000
Brazil		71,000	Fiji		370
British Virgin Islands		6,000	France		22,000
Brunei		94	French Polynesia		1,100
Bulgaria		22	Gabon		8
Burkina Faso	4,900	8,200	Gambia	162,000	880
Burundi	14,000	11,000	Germany		220
Cambodia		15,000	Ghana		23,000
Cameroon	119,000		Greece		800
Canada		85,000	Greenland		78
Central African Republic	539,000	2,900	Grenada		150
Chad	5,800		Guatemala	1,200	45,000
Chile		8,300	Guinea		710
China		4,473,000	Guyana		200
Colombia	139,000	25,000	Haiti		15,000
Comoros		94	Hong Kong, China		3,300
			Hungary		96

* Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures



Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	New displacements in 2017 (disasters)
Iceland		50
India	78,000	1,346,000
Indonesia	2,800	365,000
Iran		225,000
Iraq	1,379,000	3,900
Ireland		62
Italy		2,100
Jamaica		29
Japan		21,000
Jordan		160
Kazakhstan		7,100
Kenya	24,000	35,000
Korea		4,300
Kyrgyzstan		3,300
Lao PDR		190
Lebanon	200	
Liberia		970
Libya	29,000	
Madagascar		248,000
Malawi		84,000
Malaysia		82,000
Maldives		76
Mali	35,000	6,800
Mauritania		2,900
Mauritius		100
Mexico	20,000	195,000
Montenegro		2
Mozambique	120	170,000
Myanmar	57,000	351,000
Namibia		3,400
Nepal	2	384,000
New Caledonia		570

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	New displacements in 2017 (disasters)
New Zealand		6,300
Nicaragua		20,000
Niger	40,000	189,000
Nigeria	279,000	122,000
Norway		220
Oman		320
Pakistan	75,000	1,800
Palestine	700	77
Panama		300
Papua New Guinea		1,400
Paraguay		5,200
Peru		295,000
Philippines	645,000	2,529,000
Portugal		6,800
Puerto Rico		86,000
Russia		5,900
Rwanda		5,000
Saudi Arabia		100
Senegal		630
Serbia		42
Sierra Leone		12,000
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)		13,000
Solomon Islands		580
Somalia	388,000	899,000
South Africa		15,000
South Sudan	857,000	75,000
Spain		2,100
Sri Lanka		135,000
St. Kitts and Nevis		33
St. Martin (French part)		11,000

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	New displacements in 2017 (disasters)
St. Vincent and the Grenadines		20
Sudan	17,000	54,000
Suriname		6,000
Switzerland		160
Syria	2,911,000	2,300
Taiwan, China		20,000
Tajikistan		4,700
Tanzania		1,900
Thailand		50,000
Togo	2,700	50
Trinidad and Tobago		200
Tunisia		990
Turks and Caicos Islands		60
Uganda	1,300	95,000
Ukraine	21,000	
United Arab Emirates		850
United Kingdom		6,200
United States		1,686,000
Uruguay		9,100
Vanuatu		14,000
Venezuela		2,100
Viet Nam		633,000
Virgin Islands		2,300
Yemen	160,000	13
Zambia		2,800
Zimbabwe		10,000

TABLE 2

LARGEST DISASTER EVENTS TRIGGERING DISPLACEMENT IN 2017

Hazard	Event name	Month disaster began	Country / territory / province	Displacement	Figure source(s)
	Hurricane Irma	August	15 countries	2,013,000*	
			Cuba	1,738,000	Defensa Civil de Cuba
			United States	202,000	FEMA
			Dominican Republic	24,000	Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias (COE)
			Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	13,000	Copernicus
			Haiti	12,500	CDEMA (Local authorities)
			St. Martin (French part)	11,000	Copernicus
			British Virgin Islands	6,000	BVI - Dpt of Disaster Management
			St Barthélimy - Guadeloupe (France)	1,500 + 1,500	Copernicus; Préfecture
			Bahamas	1,600	Government of The Bahamas
			Antigua and Barbuda	1,400	IOM
			Anguilla	500	DMIS
			Virgin Islands	390	FEMA
			Puerto Rico	190	FEMA
			Turks and Caicos Islands	60	IOM
			St. Kitts and Nevis	30	CDEMA (Local authorities)
	Floods - Hunan	June	China Hunan Province	1,620,000	Xinhua (quoting provincial government)
	Monsoon floods	June	India: Assam; Bihar Gujarat; Maharashtra; Rajasthan; Tripura Uttar Pradesh; West Bengal	1,344,000	National and State Disaster Management Authority

* Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures








Hazard	Event name	Month disaster began	Country / territory / province	Displacement	Figure source(s)
	Drought	January	Somalia	892,000	PRMN
	Typhoon Vinta / Tembin	December	2 countries	865,000	
			Philippines	434,500	DROMIC
			Viet Nam	430,500	Central Steering Committee on Disaster Prevention and Control
	Hurricane Harvey	August	United States	848,000	FEMA
	Tropical Depression Urduja / Kai-Tak	December	2 countries	765,000	
			Philippines	764,200	DROMIC
			Malaysia	800	NDMA
	Southern floods	June	Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Anhui, Hubei, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan	547,000	Ministry of Civil Affairs
	Floods - Visayas; Mindanao	January	Visayas, Mindanao	518,000	DROMIC
	Tropical cyclone Mora	May	3 countries	499,000	
			Bangladesh	477,500	Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief-Government (MDRCC)
			Myanmar	21,200	Myanmar Relief and Resettlement Department (RRD)
			India	300	Media (Local authorities)

TABLE 3

DISPLACEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH CONFLICT IN 2017

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Abyei Area		31,000	1,700	<p>This estimate is based on two intention surveys carried out by IOM DTM in Abathok and Agok in April and November 2017, respectively. With no updated population baseline data for Abathok, the figure may be an overestimate. IDMC has subtracted the estimated number of households that considered themselves to be locally integrated within the area of displacement according to the survey.</p> <p>We did not obtain any data for the returns category, as none of the data collecting agencies in Abyei track returns systematically. While partners state that returns are ongoing, there are no estimates available for 2017. Therefore, the provisional solutions figure is partial and only includes an estimated number of IDPs that are in the process of integrating locally. Based on IOM DTM's intention surveys in Agok and Abathok, this figure is around 1,700 IDPs. The surveys indicate that some IDPs who have locally integrated intend to stay or are hesitant to return to their place of origin. The estimate of 1,700 is based on survey data targeting a sample of the displaced population in each location. However, no objective assessment of IDP integration in host community has been made. There is, in other words, insufficient evidence that durable solutions have been achieved.</p>
Afghanistan	474,000	1,286,000	533,000	<p>IDMC's estimates are based on data collected by REACH/OCHA, UNHCR and IOM. It includes internally displaced people who happened to become displaced while living in the country, and other groups who happened to become displaced upon their return to Afghanistan from abroad. Despite significant humanitarian access challenges, we strived to establish the most accurate picture of the situation on the ground as possible with the help of our partners in country. These estimates should be considered as underestimates.</p> <p>It is difficult to collect and analyse robust data on cross-border returns to Afghanistan from Iran, Pakistan and other countries, because someone's categorisation as an IDP or returnee depends on the circumstances of their movement, which are not always clear.</p> <p>Our provisional solutions figure includes IOM caseloads of undocumented spontaneous returns and deportations from Iran, undocumented spontaneous returns from Pakistan, as well as UNHCR caseloads of documented voluntary returns from Iran and other countries.</p>
Armenia			8,400	<p>As in previous years, we did not receive any information on return movements in 2017. However, based on the assumption that the IDPs last registered in 2004 have been displaced for almost three decades and that no organisation in the country has any information on them, they are likely to be in the process of achieving durable solutions.</p>
Azerbaijan		393,000	250,000	<p>IDMC's estimate includes IDPs as reported directly by the Government of Azerbaijan, from which we substracted a certain number of individuals who were reported as being beneficiaries of temporary housing programs from the government.</p> <p>The displacement of people in Azerbaijan, around the Nagorno-Karabakh region, is a consequence of the country's unresolved armed conflict with Armenia. According to statistics from the Government of Azerbaijan, as of November 2017, around 250,000 IDPs received temporary houses as part of a government social programme towards improving the living conditions of IDPs (between 2002 and 2017). We have estimated that these IDPs have achieved only provisional solutions because they have not completely overcome vulnerabilities caused by their displacement.</p>

* Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Bangladesh	6,000	432,000		This figure is based on decaying data related to two caseloads: displacement in Chittagong Hills Tracts and displaced members of the Bihari community. IDMC's research does not support removing these caseloads from the stock as no evidence suggests these IDPs have returned to their place of origin or achieved durable solutions. The estimate for new displacement refers to inter-communal clashes in Chittagong Hills Tracts in June 2017.
Bosnia and Herzegovina		99,000		The estimate is based on the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina statistics which largely rely on electoral commission's lists. The figure was last updated in 2015. More than half of the IDPs live in Republika Srpska, more than one third in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a minority in the Brčko district. The displacement was caused by wars which followed the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
Burkina Faso	4,900	4,900		IDMC's displacement estimates for Burkina Faso are based on IDP registration data from the government (SP/CONASUR) collected by OCHA. Violence in the Sahel region flared up in 2017 due to activities of Ansarul Islam and other criminal groups, leading to an upsurge in new displacements. The figures are likely to be significant underestimates, as many IDPs affected by the conflict have not been registered by SP/CONASUR."
Burundi	14,000	57,000	13,000	IDMC's displacement estimates for Burundi come from data collected monthly by IOM, regarding people fleeing political violence. Most IDPs became displaced in 2015, although the threat of political violence has continued to displace people on a smaller scale in 2017. The data on new displacements is an IDMC calculation based on variations of IOM's monthly stock figures. This figure is likely to be an underestimate as not all of Burundi's provinces have been equally covered by IOM surveying for the entire year. As the political situation in Burundi has improved from previous years, Burundian refugees staying in neighbouring countries have been encouraged to move back by the Government of Burundi and other governments in the region. About 13,000 refugees who were staying in Tanzania have moved back to Burundi in the context of organised voluntary repatriations between September and December 2017. However, as no data has been obtained on the living conditions of these returnees after they arrive, we cannot determine whether they have become displaced again within Burundi or if they have reached a durable solution, placing this case in the provisional solutions category.
Cameroon	119,000	239,000		These figures refer to displacement triggered by the regional crisis caused by Boko Haram as well as the more recent clashes in the anglophone parts of the country. The Far North region of Cameroon is the most heavily affected of the country due to its geographical position in between Nigeria and Chad. The new displacement estimate is based on two metrics: the sum of caseloads reported as having been displaced within 2017 by IOM as part of the DTM programme for the Far North region, as well as individuals reported as having been displaced as a result of the protests and government response to the latter due to the crisis in the Anglophone regions (Southwest and Northwest), as reported by ECHO and ACAPS. The stock figure is based on IOM DTM.

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Central African Republic	539,000	689,000	4,600	<p>The current displacement crisis in CAR has been ongoing since late 2012, but violence has increased during 2017 and includes attacks on civilians, and medical and humanitarian staff. IDMC's primary source is the Population Movement Commission (CMP), which publishes regular dashboards and reports based on data provided by local and international NGOs, community and religious groups as well as local authorities. This data is complemented by reports from OCHA, MSF, UN, MINUSCA, and ECHO. IDMC calculated new displacements during 2017 by adding up individual new displacement flows from 65 different reports.</p> <p>Given that there is no disaggregated figure, our estimate is based on the CMP reports that specify that a return was in fact cross-border. As such, it is a lower bound, including only the cases when we are certain that the returns involved refugees. An upper bound would be the total number of returns, 113,000, minus the total number confirmed to involve IDPs, 39,000, which would mean 74,000. We prefer, however, to use conservative estimates and so decided to publish the figure referring to the 4,600 certain refugee returns. These are considered to have achieved provisional solutions because it is unknown if they were able to settle sustainably once back home.</p>
Chad	5,800	158,000	51,000	<p>Internal displacement in Chad is closely linked to the Boko Haram insurgency, and is mainly concentrated around the western Lac region although population movements, most notably crossborder movements, are also reported in other areas of the country in relation to the Central African Republic and Sudan crises. Due to limited monitoring during the year, the new displacement figures are considered to be an underestimate. The IDP Stock figure is based on a new round of DTM assessment conducted by IOM in the last quarter of 2017. The new displacement estimate is based on variations from several reports published by OCHA and UNHCR, relaying decaying data from IOM.</p> <p>Based on OCHA reports, one group identified as 'IDP returnees' were actually people going back temporarily to farm or fish, leaving some or all of their family members in displacement camps, which they later returned to themselves. On this basis we decided to categorise them as having achieved provisional solutions in order to conduct a better assessment of their situation.</p>
Colombia	139,000	6,509,000	541,000	<p>IDMC's estimates for Colombia are based on the Victim's Registry (RUV), which keeps record of all victims of the decades-long civil war. Since the RUV only counts the total amount of IDPs since 1985, IDMC has partnered with them to obtain a Stock figure by discounting people who have died, and people who have moved towards a durable solution. The latter (Returns and Provisional Solutions) are approximated based on some of the RUV's social and economic indicators. The New Displacement Figure is a projection by the UN's Colombia Information Management and Analysis Unit based on RUV data.</p> <p>The RUV carries out a vulnerability assessment considering seven categories: housing, income, family reunification, education, identification, health and nutrition. Of up to three million people for whom information is available in the housing category, almost one million are reported to have overcome housing-related vulnerability. These do not technically constitute returns, relocations, or local integrations since there is no information available about their geographical location. However, given that they have overcome the vulnerability most characteristic of displacement, they can be considered a step closer to achieving a durable solution. This one million reportedly includes the 459,000 already registered as returns; we therefore subtracted 459,000 from one million to arrive at an estimate of the IDPs having only achieved provisional solutions. We consider that the remaining 541,000 are part of the 'local integration process' and have therefore achieved provisional solutions.</p>

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Congo	86,000	108,000		The displacement estimates reflect the number of people displaced as a consequence of the Pool region conflict. IDMC figures are based on local authorities and IDP population census conducted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Humanitarian Affairs in Pool and Bouenza departments.
Côte d'Ivoire	5,500	16,000		Conflict displacement in Côte d'Ivoire dates back to clashes linked to the November 2010 elections. Due to significant improvements in the security situation, most displaced people were able to return by the end of 2013. IDMC's 2017 stock figure is based on a complete review of multiple sources dating between 2014 and 2017. The new displacements in 2017 primarily occurred in Classified Forest of Goin-Débé, where ethnic land disputes (illegal plantation of cocoa) forced thousands to flee.
Cyprus		217,000		IDMC's estimate is based on decaying data from a 2014 report from the US State Department and includes only Greek Cypriots, as well as their descendants, displaced as a result of the 1974 division. This is based on the Government of Cyprus's IDP registration criteria it used to issue identity cards to the displaced at the time of the invasion.
Dem. Rep. Congo	2,166,000	4,480,000	1,498,000	IDMC's displacement estimates are based on new displacements reported by UN agencies and NGOs working in affected regions, compiled by OCHA and verified by the Commission de Mouvement de Population (CMP). There has been a significant increase in new displacements from 2016 due to inter-communal violence in Kasai and Tanganyika, and clashes between armed groups and government forces primarily in North and South Kivu. However, the stock figure can be considered an overestimate as there is no comprehensive data available on returns. Through its population movement alert mechanism, OCHA reports on yearly return flows, which indicate when IDPs have reportedly returned to their areas of origin. OCHA reports that around 1,498,000 returned to their homes in 2016 and 2017, based on news obtained from community leaders in the various affected villages and towns. However, OCHA does not have the resources to verify if people who have reportedly returned have done so durably. It is clear from humanitarian assessments that many people who have temporarily returned may become displaced again during a flare up of violence, and often return to damaged houses and destroyed crops. These cases can, therefore, not be considered as durable returns, placing them in the provisional solutions category. At the same time, a total of about 632,000 people have returned to their areas of origin in 2016 and 2017 but are staying in makeshift shelters, IDP sites or with host families. While this qualifies them as still being displaced, these cases have not been added to the overall stock figure due to the risk of double counting.
Egypt	3,800	82,000		This figure is mostly based on data from 2015 to 2017 which concerns forced evictions in the Sinai region by the Egyptian Government. No additional update could be obtained for displacements which happened in 2015 and 2016.

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
El Salvador	296,000			IDMC considered information about cases of internal displacement registered by the police and by the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, as well as the information provided in a JIPS IDP profiling report published in March 2018. However, IDMC based its estimate of new displacements on data collected in a representative survey conducted in November 2017 by the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública of the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas. For lack of reliable data, IDMC did not publish a stock or returns estimate for 2017.
Ethiopia	725,000	1,078,000		The IDMC estimates were based on IOM DTM assessments. IDMC additionally used IFRC assessments to calculate new displacements between September and October. The main limitation of the estimates is the nature of the DTM which captures only stock figures. New displacements estimates were calculated by using the positive differences between the stock figures. Thus, IDMC is not able to capture new displacements which occur between DTM rounds. We believe that for this reason our new displacement estimate is an underestimate. The figure is significantly higher to last year's due to escalation of violence along the Oromia-Somali border.
Gambia	162,000			The estimate is based on an assessment jointly produced by the United Purpose, Catholic Relief Services, ActionAid, and the Gambia Red Cross Society. It corresponds to the number of people who were displaced due to fears over political violence in January 2017 and who returned home after the political crisis ended.
Georgia		289,000		IDMC's 2017 stock figure is calculated based on the Government of Georgia's official registry, and caseloads of people reported as displaced as a result of the 1991-1992 and 2008 conflicts in South Ossetia.
Guatemala	1,200	242,000		IDMC's stock estimate is based on a 1997 UNFPA figure of people left internally displaced after the civil war. While the figure is decaying and should not be taken into account for much longer, IDMC has not found any information that would allow these people to be taken off the stock. The new displacements estimate is based on media reports of people displaced by government evictions. In order to avoid double counting IDMC does not add new displacements to the total stock figure.
Honduras		190,000		For lack of updated evidence, IDMC only publishes an IDP Stock figure for Honduras. This estimate is based on an IDP Profiling conducted in 2015 by the Honduran Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence. It publishes annual figures of displaced people from 2004 to 2014. In 2016, UNHCR published an estimate stock figure which consists of the sum of all the annual values plus the average annual value (assumed displacement for 2015). This would be a stock figure for end of 2015 and leaves out any returns that would have happened since 2004. However, this is the best estimate profiling's figures allow for. The profiling is being updated in 2018.
India	78,000	806,000		IDMC's estimates for India are considered conservative, based mainly on media reports, as there is a lack of systematic monitoring of conflict displacement in the country and limited access to affected areas. Displacement in India was typically related to border skirmishes with Pakistan, along with some civil unrest and communal tensions. However, due to the fluid and ongoing nature of displacement in the country, it is believed that only a small proportion of IDPs returned home by the end of the year.

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Indonesia	2,800	13,000		IDMC's estimates include a number of caseloads: those displaced by inter-communal violence or insurgency-related violence between 1998 and 2004 and have since been unable or unwilling to return; those displaced between 2007 and 2013 by attacks against religious minorities and who have since failed to return; those forcibly evicted due to land conflicts; those displaced due to the long-running separatist conflict in Papua; and those displaced by electoral violence in 2017. We collected data from various sources, including government agencies, international NGOs, UN agencies and media outlets.
Iraq	1,379,000	2,648,000	3,191,000	IDMC estimates are based on IOM DTM assessments. The new displacements figure was calculated by adding the positive differences between the stock figures as well as by adding movements which occurred between the DTM rounds that were not captured in the stock figures. A large majority of new displacements in 2017 was triggered by the Iraqi army's advances against ISIL, primarily the Mosul offensive. IOM DTM reports on people returning to different types of shelter and accommodation. Based on discussions with partners, we decided not to report on any returns and include the vast majority of those returning to their own houses, rented accommodation, hotels, abandoned buildings and other unknown types of shelter under the provisional solutions category. Returns in Iraq cannot yet be considered durable given the widespread destruction of housing and infrastructure, unexploded ordnance and lack of public services; meaning that few, if any, of the conditions contained in IASC's framework on durable solutions will have been met.
Kenya	24,000	159,000		The new displacement estimate was based on on media reports, IFRC assessments and National Drought Management Authority reports. Due to limited reporting on internal displacement, IDMC considers the figure to be an underestimate. The stock figure is based on a combination of IOM assessments from 2015 as well as new displacements reported in 2017. Most displacements in Kenya were triggered by inter-communal violence, cattle rustling and conflict over resources.
Kosovo		16,000	5,800	The estimate is based on a national IDP database which is maintained by the Ministry for Community and Return. The database is updated with the support of UNHCR and other partners, and is in turn based on assistance provided to displaced families. The slight decrease in the number of displaced reported in 2017 corresponds to people who have returned home and are in process of reaching durable solutions, therefore added to the Provisional Solutions category. The displacement was caused by wars which followed the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. UNHCR registers all returnees displaced within the country returning to Kosovo voluntarily. This includes individuals who come back to Kosovo with no prior announcement and without the guarantee of receiving humanitarian and housing assistance, called spontaneous returnees; as well as individuals or families who have expressed an interest to return and have been assisted by UNHCR, the Ministry for Communities and Returns or other agencies. The assistance is provided before, during and after the return, usually via respective municipalities, UNHCR or NGOs within established programmes. However, according to the Government of the Republic of Serbia, most of the returns are not durable and IDPs suffer from displacement-related vulnerabilities upon their return. Because of conflicting information and insufficient proof that these people achieved durable solutions, we include 87 people who returned during 2017 and 5,800 people who returned between 2000 and 2017 in the provisional solutions category.

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Lebanon	200	11,000		The bulk of our 2017 estimate is based on data provided by the UN Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on Palestinian refugees displaced from Nahr-el-Bared camp in Lebanon as of the end of 2016, as a result of the conflict between the Lebanese army and Fath-al-Islam in 2007. No further update could be obtained. New displacement estimate refers to people displaced by clashes in Ain al-Hilweh camp in August.
Libya	29,000	197,000	315,000	IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by IOM DTM reports. In 2017, the number of returnees exceeded the number of IDPs, reflecting an overall decrease in the intensity of clashes. Major displacement events occurred in last quarter of 2017 in the coastal city of Sabratha. IOM reports on people returning to different types of shelter, including to their own houses, rented accommodation and abandoned buildings. Based on discussions with partners, IDMC determined that these returns are largely unsustainable due to the ongoing conflict, the disruption of services and the high level of destruction of housing infrastructure. As none or very few conditions presented in the IASC framework on durable solutions are met in these cases, these IDP returnees are considered to have only reached provisional solutions.
Macedonia		140	60	The estimate is based on the number of IDPs registered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. The decrease in the number of IDPs reflects those who wished to de-register from the IDP registry. As their whereabouts are unknown, IDMC accounts for them in the Provisional Solutions category. The displacement was caused by violent incidents in 2001 due to the repression of Macedonian government against the Albanian minority. IDMC received information on 60 people who de-registered from the IDP registry in 2016 and 2017. However, due to a lack of understanding of what this concretely implies, these people are included in the provisional solutions category.
Mali	35,000	38,000		IDMC bases its estimates on data provided by the Population Movement Commission (CMP), which reports on displacements triggered by the 2012 conflict, as well as clashes periodically occurring since 2014. The CMP is composed of many agencies, such as UN HCR, IOM, OCHA WFP, UNICEF, as well as NGOs, including NRC. It compiles the data collected and treated by these agencies at national level.
Mexico	20,000	345,000		This estimate is based on a preview of a forthcoming report prepared by a local NGO called the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Protection of Human Rights (CMPDPH). It is worth noting that since the Government of Mexico does not officially recognize the phenomenon of internal displacement, estimates relative to population movements have historically been challenging to produce.

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Mozambique	120	10,000	3,000	<p>The stock estimate is based on new displacement data from 2016 provided by UNICEF and local media documenting returns in 2017. The original 2016 figure was founded on the assessment of several (but not all) IDP camps in various locations in Mozambique. The reports on returns in 2017 do not always provide specific figures, therefore IDMC is using a conservative estimate. Given the uncertainty in both the original stock and the returns figures, the 2017 estimate has to be treated with low confidence.</p> <p>The Government closed five IDP camps and set up to reintegrate its 3,000 inhabitants in May. It is likely that some of those IDPs might have been displaced by drought, not conflict. It is also unclear if this reintegration counts as a durable solution. In similar government initiatives in early 2017, 69 out of 79 families abandoned the plan due to low quality of offered land (10 families which stayed represent 43 returns). Based on the historically low success rate of the reintegration programme in Mozambique, and without information to prove otherwise, we do not consider the 3,000 people leaving camps as returns because of a low probability of reaching durable solutions.</p>
Myanmar	57,000	635,000	81,000	<p>This figure is based on data compiled by the CCCM Cluster/Myanmar Shelter Cluster, the Border Consortium (TBC), UNOSAT, UNHCR, the Government of Myanmar, the Protection Sector, and the Chin state government. The figure for the southeast is based on decaying data, first published by TBC in 2012 and triangulated in 2014. To update this estimate, IDMC has taken into account UNHCR returns assessments, which provide partial IDP returnee estimates for the southeast. IDMC's research does not fully support removing these caseloads as comprehensive data on return movements, relocations, and local integration in the southeast is lacking.</p> <p>We estimate that more than 81,000 IDPs had reached provisional solutions as of 31 December 2017, of whom less than 49,000 reportedly returned or relocated during the year. There is, however, no system for tracking returning IDPs or their progress toward achieving durable solutions in Myanmar, so these figures are considered to be limited in their accuracy.</p>
Nepal	2	2	50,000	<p>IDMC's estimate include those displaced following inter-communal conflict among flood survivors. Based on documentation from the Nepal Peace Trust Fund in 2012, the 50,000 IDPs reported in GRID 2017 have been 'rehabilitated', and, as a result, IDMC did not include this figure in this year's estimate. However it is still to be determined whether all IDPs have reached a durable solution to their displacement.</p> <p>According to IOM Nepal, 83,000 IDPs are registered in a database by the Government, Relief and Rehabilitation Division at the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction as a result of the 10-year conflict from 1996 to 2006. At the same time, there is also no mechanism for tracking returns in Nepal. In 2012, the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) reported that the remaining 50,000 IDPs were rehabilitated. Based on NPTF documentation, the majority of IDPs were settled and rehabilitated despite insufficient financial support. Some of the limitations cited by the IDPs in relation to the rehabilitation include: (i) inadequate level of financial support, (ii) delay in processing of applications, (iii) existing sense of insecurity in some places of origin. Given these challenges, it is unclear if durable solutions were reached and, as a result, IDMC considers this caseload under provisional solutions.</p>

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Niger	40,000	144,000		IDMC uses figures reported by the Government of Niger, obtained through surveys conducted by local authorities. This data covers the southeastern region of Diffa, which borders the Lake Chad and has been severely affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. IDMC's end-of-year estimate includes some reported 'returnees' due to contextual analysis and evidence indicating that these people remain in a situation of displacement.
Nigeria	279,000	1,707,000	66,000	IDMC's estimate is mainly based on IOM DTM reports, as well as caseloads identified through its Emergency Tracking Tool for which enough evidence exists to classify them as conflict displacement. The geographical coverage is lower this year, due to the absence of data on the Middle Belt States, which causes the 2017 Stock figure to be lower than the previous year. This change is therefore not believed to be due to a decrease in displacement-generating events linked to conflict and insurgency. There are concerns that return figures include individuals or households who only return to their general area of habitual residence rather than their actual homes. As such, our figure only reflects people reported in DTM data as having returned to their habitual place of residence and able to live there.
Pakistan	75,000	249,000		IDMC bases its estimate on reports by UNHCR which tracks people registered as IDPs in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and that are verified as such by Pakistan's National Database and Registration Authority. The estimate also includes data from media reports of border skirmishes with India and Afghanistan this year.
Palestine	700	231,000		IDMC's estimates are based on data collected by OCHA oPt and the Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (BADIL). The numbers of IDPs refer to populations in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. Palestine maintains the oldest caseloads of displacement in IDMC's portfolios.
Papua New Guinea		12,000		IDMC's estimate is based on data released by the IOM DTM office in Papua New Guinea. Given the access constraints and the lack of additional sources to compare figures with, these numbers should be considered as conservative estimates.
Peru		59,000	3,100	The estimate is based on the information received from the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations. The Ministry maintains a database of registered IDPs. The slight decrease in stock reflects people who have return home and are in process of achieving durable solutions, and have been placed in the Provisional Solutions category. The displacement has been caused by conflict between the Government of Peru and non-state armed actors. We received information on returns in Peru in the form of a percentage of the total number of IDPs. No further information regarding the methodology which was used to calculate the percentage was shared, nor any information regarding the conditions in which the returnees live. Because of the uncertainty that these former IDPs have achieved durable solutions, we included these people in the provisional solutions category.

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Philippines	645,000	445,000		IDMC's estimate is based on reports issued by the government's Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Center (DROMIC) and the Global Protection Cluster in the Philippines, which provide not only current and cumulative figures on displacement, but also returns, where available. The majority of those displaced by conflict came from the Mindanao regions. These figures also include displacement caused by criminal violence and extrajudicial killings.
Russia		19,000		This estimate is based on data provided directly by the Government of the Federation of Russia on 2016. Due to the protracted nature of this caseload, humanitarian organizations are not actively tracking internal displacement in the Russian Federation.
Senegal		22,000		IDMC's estimate is based on data obtained in 2015 from OCHA and updated with the latest figures from ICRC on the reconstruction of homes for families returning to their villages. Since 1990, inhabitants of large areas in Casamance, along the border with Guinea-Bissau, have fled their homes as a result of clashes between the Senegalese army and members of the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC).
Somalia	388,000	825,000	93,000	The stock figure was produced through calculations based on IOM DTM assessments. It is a significant underestimate as it covers only half of the country. New displacements were produced based on data from the UNHCR-led Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN). Monitoring displacement in Somalia is particularly challenging because it is a complex crisis where slow-onset disasters and violence overlap making it difficult to disaggregate the different triggers of displacement. Therefore, these estimates reflect IDMC's best effort to capture internal displacement purely triggered by conflict and insecurity. The PRMN reports on people who go back to their place of origin because of 'improved conditions in the place of return', 'forced returns' and 'voluntary returns'. We could not obtain a clear definitions for these categories, nor do we have any further information about the fate of people who try to return. Given the situation in Somalia, we determined that returns are likely to have led to provisional rather than durable solutions since few, if any, of IASC's criteria are likely to have been met.
South Sudan	857,000	1,899,000		This figure corresponds to the end of year figure reported by OCHA, subtracting a caseload of 9,254 South Sudanese displaced in Abyei, which IDMC reports on separately.
Sri Lanka		42,000		IDMC's estimate refers to people who remain in displacement following the conclusion of Sri Lanka's 30-year civil war in 2009. IDMC's figure is based on data provided by the Government of Sri Lanka's Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Hindu Religious Affairs.
Sudan	17,000	2,072,000	3,800	IDMC's displacement estimates for Sudan are based on IDP registration data, covering the 5 states of Darfur and South and West Kordofan, as well as data from the Humanitarian Aid Commission for Blue Nile state, which is not covered by other organisations. The figures are likely to be an underestimate, as not all areas can be accessed for registration of IDPs. New displacement data comes from registered new arrivals in Darfur and South Kordofan, primarily linked with small-scale tribal clashes. A total of about 3,800 people were registered by IOM as having returned to their places of origin in Darfur in 2017 for livelihood reasons, such as to tend to crops or for fishing. These cases do not count as full, durable returns and are therefore placed in the provisional solutions category.

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Syria	2,911,000	6,784,000	747,000	<p>The estimates are based on several sources, including the IDP Task Force, Needs and Population Monitoring (NPM), CCCM Cluster, and OCHA. They capture the number of people displaced across the whole country during 2017. The main limitations include a decrease in coverage in December and the need to rely on estimates for unassessed areas of the country. The majority of the figure corresponds to movements which were triggered by the Deir ez Zor and Raqqqa offensives, as well as ongoing fighting in Idleb, Hama and Aleppo governorates.</p> <p>The basis for our provisional solutions estimate are NPM reports on people returning to different types of shelter. Based on discussions with partners, IDMC decided not to report on any returns and include the vast majority of those returning to their own houses, rented accommodation and abandoned buildings under the provisional solutions category. Returns in Syria are almost inevitably unsustainable due to the ongoing conflict, disruption to services and widespread destruction, meaning that few, if any, of the conditions contained in IASC's framework on durable solutions will have been met.</p>
Thailand		41,000		IDMC's displacement estimate is based on a 2010 Harvard University study that published survey results of a study conducted by Prince Songkhla University on the displacement of Buddhists who fled the ethnic and religious separatist insurgency in the South. At present, this is no systematic mechanism to identify victims and provide basic assistance to displaced individuals and affected communities. Given the data is several years old, IDMC has low confidence in this estimate.
Togo	2,700			IDMC uses figures reported by the Government of Togo, encompassing people who were newly and temporarily displaced by ethnic conflicts in 2 regions, Savanes and Kara. Based on the engagement with the Government of Togo and the latest figures shared, IDMC decided to subtract the remaining and outdated caseload of 1,500 people displaced by political violence that erupted in the country in April 2005.
Turkey		1,113,000		IDMC's estimate includes several caseloads, including a caseload reported by Hacettepe University in 2006, more up-to-date information that covers the end of 2015 to 2016 published by UNOHCHR and on an additional three locations where curfews were put into place. This data is based on reports by the International Crisis Group, a Turkish NGO, and on a damage assessment realized by IDMC.
Uganda	1,300	24,000	30,000	<p>The new displacement estimate is based on media monitoring and corresponds to three instances of intercommunal clashes. The stock figure is a combination of new displacements in 2017 and new displacements in 2016 as IDMC did not receive any proof that these people had returned home or had achieved any other durable solution. The stock figure is significantly lower compared to that of last year's as we removed a protracted caseload of 30,000 people and account for them under the Provisional Solutions category due to the reception of updated information on their situation. IDMC considers 30,000 people in the districts of Agago, Gulu, Kitgum and Lamwo still displaced as of January 2012 by fighting between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan military in the 1990s and 2000s as having reached provisional solutions to their displacement. As contextual information implies that these IDPs are in the process of integrating in their areas of displacement, however, we no longer consider that there is sufficient evidence that they remain displaced.</p>

Country or region	New displacements in 2017 (conflict)	Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2017 (conflict)	Number of IDPs who have achieved provisional solutions	Comments
Ukraine	21,000	800,000		IDMC's estimates of the number of IDPs in Ukraine refer to the displaced people living within government-controlled areas only. It is based on data compiled by OCHA, which in turn analysed figures from several sources including IOM, the IDP database maintained by Ukraine's Ministry of Social Policy, the State Statistics Service and pension fund. For Ukraine's new displacements, we based our estimates on figures of events collected by OCHA and their partners on the field.
Yemen	160,000	2,014,000	956,000	IDMC's estimate of the total number of people displaced in the country is drawn from the latest published report by the Task Force on Population Movement (TFPM). Access to IDPs due to political insecurity and security constraints were only few of the several factors that impacted data collection in Yemen in 2017. These challenges have not diminished in time, therefore the numbers should be considered an underestimate. UNHCR monthly bulletins provided additional data with regards to specific new displacement flows throughout the year. There was some evidence of IDP returns and resettlements, but we were unable to find enough evidence to conclude that they had led to durable solutions. TFPM qualifies its reporting on returns as follows: 'TFPM considers returnees all those previously displaced since March 2015 who have returned to their location of origin, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or another shelter type in their location of origin. The definition of returnees employed by TFPM is used to track only the physical movement of return, and does not imply that returnees have achieved a durable solution, as per the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs (2010)'. As such, we have categorised the 956,000 returnees as having achieved only provisional solutions.

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